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Concepts of personalisation and person-centred care have 
been a long-term focus in health and social care and are 
increasingly embedded in policy. It is a narrative that is 
popular with citizens, practitioners, and leaders as it 
encapsulates an aspiration for responsive care, sensitive to 
our own unique priorities and circumstances. Existing 
research reveals that effective person-centred care involves 
a meshing of principles and practice: ways of both ‘doing’ 
person-centred care and ‘being’ person-centred. If we limit 
ourselves to focus primarily on ways of ‘doing’ person-
centred care, we risk overlooking the role of personhood and 
relationship and undervaluing important, albeit invisible, 
causal mechanisms. The value of people and relationships is 
noted in person-centred research and policy; however, this 
thesis argues that its inclusion is not adequately theoretically 
supported.   
This research employs Critical Realism, Archer's Realist Social 
Theory and Donati's Relational Sociology to reconceptualise 
the role of relationships between carers and care recipients 
in four social interventions; a support service for people with 
mild to moderate mental ill-health, a personal budget 
support service, a community sports intervention for young 
people, and family-based care and support for disabled 
people. It employs mixed methods, in a comparative case 
study methodology to explore whether, how, and under 
what conditions relationships that are established between 
carers and care recipients can foster personal reflexivity and 
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generate relational goods. By operationalising Archer’s and 
Donati’s theory in practice contexts, this research delivers 
new theoretical support for the proposition that care 
relationships can have causal effects, given facilitative 
conditions. This work demonstrates the value of Archer’s 
theories of personhood and reflexivity to empirical research, 
applying these concepts to explore how the biographically 
formed identity and reflexive tendencies of each person are 
implicated in care relationships, and how organisation and 
system factors can be influential.  
The thesis contributes new conceptual tools that can support 
our understanding of the nature and role of care 
relationships and the conditions that support them, namely: 
the Relational/Reflexive Mechanism (RRM) model that 
visually captures how relationships are implicated in personal 
change, and the Orientation to Relational Reflexivity and 
Agency for Change (ORRAC) model, a contribution to Realist 
Sociology that can be used to qualitatively discern and track 
key aspects of a subject’s reflexivity over time. Building on 
the ORRAC model, this work also redescribes the 
requirements set out in Donati’s Relational Sociology for the 
generation of Relational Goods, in respect of care and 
support relationships, further enabling theorisation of 
relational configurations and their influence on the reflexive 
powers of individuals. The application of these research 
findings offers the potential for their practical application in 
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Chapter 1: Overview of thesis  
1.1  Introduction 
This thesis clarifies the role of care relationships in social 
interventions, presenting a challenge to existing practices 
that side-line the causal potential of the care relationship and 
its contribution to personal change. It argues that in practice, 
the care relationship is taken for granted and that attention 
to human aspects of care are displaced by the emphasis on 
the activities of care. Even where the focus is ostensibly on 
‘people’ in popular ideas and strategies of personalisation 
and person-centred care, it is proposed that the essential 
nature of people and the nature of care relationships are 
largely elided. 
1.2 Context for the research 
Relationships are increasingly a subject of discussion about 
physical and mental wellbeing and improving health and care 
services. There is a persistent and underlying interest in 
relational principles in health and social care. This is, 
particularly the case among those who seek radical change in 
health and social care values and infrastructure in the context 
of the challenging austerity conditions of the last decade 
(Cottam, 2018, A.Fox, 2018). As an illustration, a recent 
Academy for Social Justice webinar sharing presentations 
about innovations in relationship-based practice (Wallace 
and Tweedie, 2021) welcomed over 250 (UK) attendees from 
across academic, statutory, and voluntary sectors. The first 
question in response to the presentations was echoed by 
others, essentially how do you get the system to adopt these 
new ways of thinking about care? To underscore the point, 
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publications promoting relational approaches to health and 
care use the words ‘Radical’ and ‘New’ in their titles (Cottam, 
2018, A.Fox, 2018) to emphasise the significant 
transformation required to enable their implementation.  
 
Relationships are known to be integral to wellbeing. In the 
Capabilities Approach, Nussbaum (2011:40-41) identifies as 
‘architectonic’ the capability of ‘affiliation’ – the relationships 
that anchor our humanity and dignity. By architectonic, she 
means that relationships are tied into the realisation of other 
capabilities as they ‘play a structuring role’ in all areas of 
public policy. The transformational power of relationships is 
also viewed as integral to community building approaches 
such as Asset Based Community Development (Block, 2008, 
Russell, 2020), which focuses on the power of association 
that grows through a recognition of the gifts and 
contributions that people make to community life, realised 
through relationships.  
 
More practically, the ‘Five Ways to Wellbeing’, first shared in 
2008 (Foresight Mental Capital and Wellbeing Project, 
2008:81), are routinely promoted in the health and care 
sector. Of the ‘five ways’, two are: 
• ‘Connect: building connections [to] support and enrich you 
every day’ and 
• ‘Give: seeing yourself and your happiness as linked to the 
wider community and create connections with people 
around you’.   
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These are tangible universal principles referring to how we 
live in the world, and they present relationships as central to 
wellbeing. 
 
Despite the perceived value of relationships, however, there 
is limited understanding of the contribution of formal care 
relationships to wellbeing, perhaps because formal care 
relationships are viewed differently from the everyday caring 
relationships (family, friends, workmates, neighbours, faith 
groups, parents at the school gate) that make up our social 
lives. But are they so different? Everyday caring relationships 
are characterised by care, cooperation, love, acceptance, and 
mutuality. A sense of ‘in it together’, whatever that ‘it’ may 
be. So, what is different about formal care relationships? 
Crucially, they are set within the broader context of services 
with resource constraints and within the boundaries of a role; 
a role with norms, rules and processes that influence the 
shape of care. They are also populated by people; individuals 
with their own value-sets and experiences, challenges, and 
aspirations; their own ways and frames of thinking. 
 
This research builds on the premise that care relationships 
are complex because they are constituted of individual 
characteristics and the contextual conditions surrounding 
them. The nature of the people is a focus: their personhood 
and their reflexivity. In doing this, the work can draw 
conclusions about the conditions (cultural, structural, and 
agential) that enable care relationships to offer effective 
support. A highly relevant policy context for care 
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relationships is that of personalisation and person-centred 
care, and the Policy and Practice chapter (chapter 2) draws 
on this literature to consider the challenges and enablers to 
achieving the aspiration of personalised care. 
 
In practice, the application of relationship-oriented 
approaches is most evident at a small scale and seen in the 
innovative example rather than the norm. This research has 
deliberately engaged with organisations that have embraced 
relational ways of working to examine the mechanisms 
underpinning formal care that is intentionally relational and 
the contexts that support or challenge them. Four 
organisations were included in the study to collect sufficient 
comparative data for analysis. The participating 
organisations were as follows: 
• WellCity is a user-led organisation (ULO) that 
supports disabled people to live their best life and fully 
participate in society. Seventy-five per cent of their 
Trustees are disabled people, in line with their ULO 
status. They aim to challenge inequality and change 
attitudes towards disabled people, and they provide 
information, practical support and advice around 
independent living and self-directed support. In 
addition, they have been commissioned to provide a 
one-to-one service to support people with mild-
moderate mental health needs, and Luke and Maxine, 
the practitioner-service user participants who feature 
in this case study, are working together within this part 
of the service. 
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• AllCare is a User-Led Charity. Like WellCity, people 
with direct experience of the services make up most of 
the Board of Trustees, some of whom also draw on 
AllCare’s services. AllCare delivers Direct Payment, 
banking, recruitment, and payroll services to support 
people employing Personal Assistants, and a care and 
respite service. In this case study, the practitioner-
service user participants are Fiona and Fran. Fiona is 
both a practitioner and service user, and Fiona 
supports Fran to manage her Personal Health Budget 
(PHB). 
• GamePlay is a sport for development charity and part 
of a network of organisations that engage young 
people to participate in sports and other cultural 
activities to support them to develop skills and achieve 
positive outcomes. They are community-based and 
building long-term relationships with local young 
people is core to their offer. Zoe and Carly are the 
research participants from GamePlay and have known 
each other for two years. 
• CareConnect is an organisation that coordinates 
support and accommodation for adults with additional 
needs, including people with disabilities, mental ill-
health, and older people. This research involved one 
local scheme that provides the CareConnect model, 
promoting family-based care in ordinary family homes 
and matching care recipients with care providers. A 
national charity, CareConnect Plus, is the UK support 
network for CareConnect schemes, carers, and leaders. 
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Una and Harry are the participants from CareConnect, 
and Harry has been supported in Una’s family home for 
eight years. 
 
1.3 Aims and scope 
This research examines formal care relationships (henceforth 
‘care relationships’) through the lens of realist social theory 
and relational sociology. Familiarisation with these 
theoretical frameworks reveals their potential to engage 
differently with personalisation and person-centred theory 
and practice. They provide the theoretical support required 
to frame an understanding of the nature of people in the 
relationship, within the values and practices of the 
organisation, and the wider system. 
1.3.1 Research questions:  
The following questions informed the research design: 
1. What are the personal and reflexive characteristics of 
the individual participants of a one-to-one relationship in 
these person-centred social interventions? 
2. What is the nature of the relationship between these 
individuals, and does the care relationship contribute 
causally to personal change? If so, how? 
3. Do contextual conditions influence the relationship and 
the individuals within it? If so, how? 
4. Should personalisation theory, policy and practice 




The approach is exploratory and involves a data collection 
method based partially on the empirical work of Archer 
(2003) and an explanatory framework for analysis and 
presentation of the data (ORRAC model1). It engages with the 
nature of the people in the relationship, and views as central 
the interplay between culture (ideas and values), structure 
(practice and process) and agency (people and relationships). 
In doing so, this research also engages with critics of Archer’s 
theory, defending it by illustrating, through empirical 
example, its applicability and utility in responding to these 
questions in social care contexts. 
1.4 Motivation for researching care relationships 
The motivation for this research stems from years of working 
in clinical practice and leadership roles in the UK National 
Health Service. Working in person-centred ways has been an 
enduring interest, fuelled by many experiences, positive and 
negative, challenging and rewarding, of working with people, 
families, practitioners, teams, and fellow leaders both within 
clinical services and on projects aiming to improve person-
centred practice in specific service contexts. A persistent 
challenge is embedding person-centred practice in resistant 
contexts. This resistance is not a rejection of person-centred 
values, which most often resonate with the care people want 
to receive and provide. Person-centred care is frequently 
observable, and there are frameworks that support its 
practice and implementation (McCormack et al., 2015, NHS 
 
1 Orientation to Relational Reflexivity and Agency for Change (ORRAC) model, 
introduced in chapter 4) 
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England, 2019b). However, there remain intangible obstacles 
to its broader realisation. 
Theoretical engagement with critical realism and the 
sociological theories of Margaret Archer (1995, 2000, 2003, 
2007, 2012, 2015) and Pierpaolo Donati (2011, 2015) has 
offered a compelling framework for examining person-
centred practice by considering the nature of people in 
relationships, in context. These theories accentuate the 
relevance of personhood, reflexivity and relationships, and 
their consideration reveals a gap in personalisation theory: a 
lack of theoretical understanding of the nature and 
contribution of care relationships in social interventions. The 
remedy for this oversight is an ontological one: analysis that 
engages with the nature of the people, the nature of the 
relationship and the interplay between the structure, culture 
and agency inherent in the intervention. A remedy supported 
by critical realist social theory. 
Ultimately this research is about ‘being’ person-centred in 
every aspect of ‘doing’ it. It is proposed that until we 
understand the potential of care relationships in 
interventions and the conditions that support their 
realisation and contribution, we will fail to create and sustain 
momentum in person-centred practice. The concept of 
‘being’ as applied to person-centred care is used throughout 
this thesis and needs a brief explanation here. The term 
‘being’ is a useful concept in practice when contrasted with 
the activities and processes (or ‘doing’) of person-centred 
care, highlighting ‘being’ as a distinct consideration of the 
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role of personhood2. This emphasis on ‘being’ may prompt 
practitioners, leaders, and policymakers to further consider, 
if warranted, the causal potential of people and relationships 
as distinct from that of planned activity. Also, and 
fundamentally, this research adheres to a Critical Realist 
philosophical position and draws on Archer’s (2000, 2003, 
2007) work on ‘being’ and becoming3. This position is quite 
different to, for example, a phenomenological understanding 
of ‘being’ that relies on subjective perception (Crotty, 1998), 
which is therefore incompatible with Critical Realism’s 
stratified ontology and concept of a mind-independent 
reality4.  
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis begins with an overview of the policy and practice 
context within which care relationships sit, specifically, 
personalisation policy and person-centred practice. For this 
study, these are considered interchangeable terms and are 
referred to as such, as is the case in practice contexts. One 
might say services are personalised and that they deliver 
person-centred care. 
The ‘Policy and Practice’ chapter (chapter 2) emphasises the 
causal potential of care relationships and elaborates on the 
concepts of personalisation and person-centred care as the 
most relevant policy context within which care relationships 
can be examined. It highlights the tensions between the 
implementation of activities (the ‘doing’) of person-centred 
 
2 Further explained in chapter 2, see 2.4. 
3 Further explained in chapter 3, see 3.14. 
4 Further explained in chapter 3, see 3.2. 
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care and the more subtle but potentially powerful element of 
‘being’ (human, oneself, in relationship). Personhood is 
considered crucial: an active seeking of the nature of a 
person, extending also to the importance of practitioner 
personhood. Contextual factors surrounding care delivery, 
such as management and performance, research, and 
evaluation practices, are also considered. The chapter 
concludes with a challenge to current personalisation policy; 
that it promotes care relationships without adequate 
theoretical support to clarify how and in what circumstances 
care relationships can be effective. 
The ‘Theory’ chapter (Chapter 3) introduces and explains the 
theoretical frameworks used throughout the research. It 
provides an overview of the core concepts of critical realism 
and a rationale for selecting this philosophical position. 
Margaret Archer’s social theory is introduced, with a focus on 
culture, structure and agency, and the role of reflexivity as a 
mechanism in navigating life, including its relevance to 
personhood and personalisation within social interventions. 
Against the backdrop of critiques of Archer’s position on 
habitus and routinised action, her theory of reflexivity is 
explored, specifically the roles of the internal conversation, 
the modes of reflexivity, and relational reflexivity. Archer’s 
work with Donati is also employed, particularly Donati’s set 
of requirements for relationships that generate causal 
effects. 
The methodological strategy and rationale for the study are 
introduced in chapter 4, followed by an account of the 
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selection of case study sites and participants, ethical 
considerations, and data collection methods. Data collection 
involves the adaptation of Archer’s (2003) interviews, 
including the introduction of a paired activity to familiarise 
the participants with the researcher and with concepts that 
may be unfamiliar to them. Applying the theory to the data 
inspired the development of the ORRAC model introduced in 
this chapter. Throughout the case studies, the ORRAC model 
represents the theory, presents the analysis of the people 
and organisations, and is consistent with the objectives of 
social interventions. 
Chapters 5-8 are the ‘Case Study’ chapters. Each of these 
chapters is unique due to the variation in people, 
relationships, organisational models, and interventions 
examined. These chapters intentionally share detailed 
descriptions of the participants, including biographical detail 
and an analysis of their reflexive tendencies, based on 
Archer’s theory. Despite the unique nature of each person’s 
contribution, the theory that underpins the methods and 
analysis enables a consistent approach to each case study. 
This approach facilitated a range of insights, including the 
changing nature of reflexive tendencies during the life 
course, the role of lived experience in care relationships, the 
importance of engaging with personhood, role modelling in 
care relationships, and the viability of Donati’s requirements 




Chapter 9 presents a discussion of the theoretical findings. 
Based on the combined theory and data analysis, part one 
proposes a model that draws together Archer and Donati’s 
theories to illustrate the way that care relationships (but in 
effect any relationship) can, (but certainly do not always), 
support reflexive deliberations that can lead to personal 
change. Part 2 discusses the application of the ORRAC model 
and related findings, exploring how reflexive modes operate 
in care relationships and introducing and elaborating on 
levels of relational reflexivity and their relevance to care 
relationships. The chapter concludes by showing the 
comparative patterns of reflexivity across all four case 
studies and discusses the role of context in care relationships. 
In conclusion, Chapter 10 draws together the key themes of 
the thesis and explains how the findings address a missing 
piece in personalisation policy and practices, albeit hidden in 
plain sight. This chapter then details the theoretical, 
methodological, and practical contributions to knowledge 









Chapter 2: Policy and Practice 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter proposes that the care relationship is taken for 
granted in health and care delivery and highlights the 
undervaluation of its causal role. It will be argued that 
although tacitly acknowledged to be of value, the care 
relationship lacks adequate attention in service design and 
delivery, when compared with its allied practical 
implementation strategies; that the emphasis is on 
the actions of the service rather than the nature of the people 
and relationships through which it is delivered. This research 
takes the critical realist position that there is a mind-
independent reality (section 3.2,); that mechanisms are 
operating unseen in any context, whose activity produces the 
effects that we see and experience. Taking this philosophical 
position necessitates, then, examining the broader 
ideological and structural contexts within which these care 
relationships are operating.  
 
To this end, the chapter then situates the care relationship in 
the policy context of personalisation and person-centred 
care because of the longstanding dominance of this agenda 
on care recipient outcomes and experience in health and care 
contexts. It covers the shifting conceptualisation and 
definitions of personalisation and person-centred care over 
time, leading to different emphases in interpretation and 
practice. A key insight is that there are many practical 
methods that provide structure for the implementation of 
person-centred processes, but it is argued that the emphasis 
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on the practical has diminished attention on ‘being’ person-
centred through relationship, even though this element is 
foundational. This chapter suggests some reasons for this: 
the structural effects of entrenched management styles, with 
an emphasis on systematisation and measurable outputs, the 
different ways that outcomes and value can be 
conceptualised, and the aligned preference for evaluation 
and research methodologies which focus on ‘what works’, 
rather than engaging with equally vital questions of ‘how and 
why it works’. It proposes that the study of relationships is 
not suited to these more popular nomothetic 
epistemologies, and the consequences of this emphasis have 
shaped the care context within which the relationship 
operates in a way that can hinder its expression and effects. 
The chapter then considers the obstacles and enablers of 
change. Firstly, the obstacles created by the ongoing 
reproduction of the structures in the system which constrain 
person-centred practice, and secondly, the introduction of 
new ideas and ideals which have begun to shift the cultural 
landscape and have enabled, at small scale, new structures, 
and ways of working, with a greater emphasis on individual 
and collective values, and a generalised goal of human 
flourishing. 
 
Finally, the chapter concludes that current perspectives and 
research on person-centred care omit the ontological aspects 
of care relationships; the nature of the people involved, the 
nature of the relationship, and the influential structural and 
cultural conditions within which the care relationship 
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operates. Although the personhood of the care recipient and 
the practitioner’s approach are increasingly highlighted as 
essential factors in effective person-centred practice, this 
research identifies the opportunity to apply realist social 
theory to better understand the causal role of care 
relationships in context. 
2.2 Undervaluing the causal role of the relationship 
Relationship is an intangible concept at the interface 
between individuals, yet it is entirely feasible that it has a 
causal role in personal change. It has been particularly 
neglected and taken for granted in recent years, arguably due 
to the quite different priorities of management practices 
focusing on efficiency and an embedded assumption that 
caring relationships are a routine immutable part of 
professional practice. 
 
In Primary Care research, continuity of care has been 
correlated with improved general practice mortality rates 
(Pereira Gray et al., 2018). Researchers highlight the need to 
give greater attention to the interpersonal component of the 
practitioner-patient consultation and other benefits of care 
continuity. This call has been echoed by a recent editorial in 
the British Journal of General Practice (McCartney and 
Finnikin, 2019:4), calling for the ‘preserving of human 
relationships which underpin healthcare’, the use of the term 
‘preserving’ indicating that the relational aspect of care is 
under pressure in their context. This editorial raises 
challenging conditions for care relationships in General 
Practice, conditions that prioritise innovations like big data 
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decision tools to assess GP actions, and side-line other 
factors. The authors highlight the need to ‘foster the 
therapeutic relationship and the thoughtful application of 
evidence’ (McCartney and Finnikin, 2019:5) through shared 
decision-making practice. 
 
The causal role of relationships has been a subject of research 
and practice in other disciplines, most notably counselling 
and psychotherapy, where there is an extensive body of work 
on ‘working alliance’ and ‘therapeutic alliance’, built on the 
work of Carl Rogers in the 1960s (Rogers, 1961, 2004). 
Norcross and Lambert (2018) present the most recent of 
three task forces on evidence-based relationships and 
responsiveness in this field. They explain that in attempting 
to achieve parity of scientific evidence with biomedical 
mental health interventions, psychotherapy research has 
largely ignored the therapeutic relationship. They highlight 
two critical omissions from the resulting practice guidelines: 
the ‘person of the therapist’ and the ‘therapy relationship’. 
The task force led several meta-analyses addressing the links 
between the therapeutic relationship and treatment 
outcome, concluding that ‘the psychotherapy relationship 
makes substantial and consistent contributions to outcome, 
independent of the type of treatment’ (Norcross and 
Lambert, 2018:303). For Norcross and Lambert, the omission 
of the relationship’s causal contribution is replicated in 
clinical treatment guidelines that they say ‘have followed the 
antiquated medical model of identifying only particular 
treatment methods for specific diagnoses’ (Norcross and 
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Lambert 2018:306). As described above, this focus on 
method and process as separate from the relational 
contribution of the intervention presents an equivalent 
challenge for implementing person-centred practice, namely, 
the focus is on the intervention itself rather than the ‘how’ of 
people and relationships. Key to Norcross and Lambert’s 
observations is that the intervention’s relational and 
instrumental aspects are inextricably linked; the ‘what’ and 
the ‘how’ of the intervention, suggesting that both are 
important: ‘The relationship does not exist apart from what 
the therapist does in terms of method, and we cannot 
imagine any treatment methods that would not have some 
relational impact.’ (Norcross and Lambert 2018:304). Their 
findings address the same challenge as raised in this 
research: the care relationship has been an undervalued 
aspect of practice.  
2.3 Personalisation and person-centred care 
The primary vehicle through which the care relationship has 
been championed is the discourse of person-centred care, 
personalisation, and other members of this family of 
concepts; co-production and co-creation (C. Fox et al., 2019). 
In the last 15 years the development of ideas about 
relationships in health and social care has happened in the 
context of these concepts. Current pressures on the health 
and social care system, resulting from a combination of 
austerity-driven financial pressures, an ageing population, 
living longer with complex health and care needs are leading 
to crises in the system, which requires new models of care 
(NHS England, 2014, Ham and Alderwick, 2015).  
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Those involved in innovation in health and social care have 
responsively created models which have been termed 
‘personalised’ or models of ‘personalisation’ (Think Local Act 
Personal, no date). Their focus is operationalising person-
centred practice to place the person at the centre of their 
care in the context of their interests, life, and family while 
ensuring that care planning assists that person in living the 
best life possible. The policy and practice contexts within 
which the current research sits are broad, as relationships 
between practitioners and service users are relevant across 
public service and beyond, as are person-centred concepts. 
Commentators reference Leadbeater’s (2004:34) 
‘Personalisation through participation’ as an important 
moment in policy, introducing a ‘new script’ for those in 
public service, promoting the idea that people on the 
receiving end of care should have ‘a more direct, informed 
and creative say (…) by which the service they use is 
designed, planned, delivered and evaluated’ Leadbeater 
(2004:57). Subsequently, Putting People First (HM 
Government, 2007) committed to addressing the foreseen 
challenges awaiting the health and social care system, by 
setting out objectives to deliver personalised social care as 
part of the solution to these challenges. During the last 
decade, these words and concepts have been a constant 
companion to those working in the health and care system; 
routinely central to UK policy (Health and Social care Act 
2012, NHS Constitution, 2013, Care Act 2014), and in the US, 
patient-centred care is identified as one of six core 
19 
 
dimensions of quality (Institute of Medicine (US) Committee 
on Quality of Health Care in America, 2001). UK leaders and 
innovators in the NHS and Social Care have pushed this 
agenda, as evidenced by the NHS Long Term Plan’s 
personalisation strategy, including initiatives that recognise 
the preventative and health-sustaining power of supporting 
people at a personal level, including through connection with 
their local communities (NHS England, 2019). At scale, 
however, attempts to embed personalised thinking and 
approaches have faltered. NHS and Social Care organisations 
invariably have ‘person-centred’ values and plans, but it is 
striking how difficult it has been to embed ways of working 
which so many seem, ideologically at least, in support of 
(McCormack et al., 2011). Needham’s (2011: 63) account of 
the practitioner perspective provides a cynical analysis; the 
combined popularity and elasticity of personalisation 
concepts can be used to provide ‘political cover for service 
changes’, rather than progressing the broader ideological 
purpose. 
Personalisation, therefore, has not been accepted 
uncritically. There has been concern, for example, that the 
emphasis on self-efficacy and self-determination satisfies the 
neo-liberal agenda of individualisation with underpinning 
ideas of autonomy, agency, choice, and control, while 
overlooking the vulnerability that we are universally 
(although variably) susceptible to. Tronto’s (2015) writing on 
care ethics challenges the impact that a market-driven 
democracy has had on care politics and calls for a step-
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change in the way that democracy is conceived, shifting away 
from an individualistic model towards a concept of ‘citizen’ 
that is inclusive of all the stages and potential vulnerabilities 
of any person. Duffy (2010) reminds us of the value of 
personalisation’s political roots and the progress achieved in 
social justice terms for disabled people, introducing 
processes that enable them to attain more control over their 
support funds and lives. Barnes (2011) balances the value of 
this achievement with a concern that if the focus is solely on 
autonomy and control, then valuable aspects of caring are 
side-lined, meaning that those who are not able to manage 
their care will be disadvantaged. This position is also taken by 
Ferguson (2007) in the field of Social Work, who challenges 
the uncritical acceptance and ensuing implementation of 
personalisation in this field, claiming that in doing so, social 
workers risk disregarding the implications for those in 
situations of poverty and inequality. Houston (2010), in 
response to Ferguson’s critique of personalisation, identifies 
that while there is value in devising and implementing 
mechanisms of choice and control as one aspect of care, that 
concepts of autonomy can be rooted in a concept of ‘homo 
economicus: the view of the actor as rational, individualistic, 
utilitarian, calculative and instrumental’ (Houston, 
2010:842), a position which he argues represents an 
‘impoverished ontology.’ Houston identifies the problem as 
both an ontological and relational one; these issues need 
examination with a closer reference to human nature and 
tendencies and that the resulting understandings should 
prevail when designing and developing interventions. The 
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risk in practice, he concludes, from this view of the actor, is 
that it misrepresents and undermines human identity, which 
is inextricably embedded in social relationships. This research 
recognises as valid all of these perspectives but views 
Houston’s idea of ontology’s centrality as fundamental to the 
others. These debates introduce ideas of person-centred 
care as a dichotomy of ‘being’ person-centred, ontologically 
and relationally, and ‘doing’ person-centred, represented by 
the more empirically available tasks and processes of 
practice.  
 
2.4 Personhood and relationship as foundational 
principles 
Many authors identify the challenge of, and variability in, 
defining person-centred care as a critical challenge in its 
implementation (Collins, 2014, Da Silva, 2014, Ishikawa et 
al.,2013, Needham, 2011, Owens et al., 2017). It is frequently 
described in terms that are not tangible, for example, as a 
‘philosophy’ (Da Silva, 2014), a set of principles (Collins, 
2014), a partnership (National Ageing Research Institute, 
2006, Howarth et al., 2014, McGilton et al., 2012). Waters 
and Buchanan (2017) highlight that this lack of clarity means 
the absence of a common framework of person-centredness, 
even though the concept is used as a quality indicator, 
creating obstacles to both effective implementation and 
measurement.  
 
Harding et al. (2015) set out to review the varying definitions 
of person-centred care by drawing on key contributors’ 
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insights to the research field and highlighting ongoing 
conceptual debates. They reflect that the conceptual 
disparities could impede both innovation in the field and 
improved understanding of causality, progress which, if 
made, could gain more traction with policy makers. In this 
review, Harding et al. (2015) identify three conceptual pillars 
that, although not deemed mutually exclusive, represent 
overarching themes of person-centred care. The first collates 
key practices aligned with person-centred care, such as care 
planning, information provision, self-management support, 
and shared decision-making. The second acknowledges 
personhood, involving an ‘existential and philosophical 
understanding of personhood to better engage with the 
patient’ (Harding et al., 2015:22). The third highlights the role 
of partnership, mutualism, and co-production and 
incorporates the relational aspects of person-centred care. 
The practices of the first pillar are activities of person-
centred care, ways of ‘doing’ in person-centred practice. 
These are designed around person-centred principles and are 
the tools of practical implementation. They are the structures 
and processes led by practitioners, teams, and organisations, 
and the aim is that they are done together with the recipient 
of care. For example, Shared Decision Making is a process 
that necessarily involves both parties. However, although 
these activities cannot happen without both parties’ 
involvement, they can still be applied in the presence or 
absence of a recognition of, and engagement with, 
personhood, Harding et al.’s second pillar. We can create 
models which promote person-centredness that, when 
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implemented, can lack an engagement with personhood. 
Professor Brendan McCormack (QMU), one of the 
contributors to Harding et al.’s (2015:27) study, makes this 
point:  
 
‘Person-centredness is built on a classical philosophical 
framework of personhood – not a care perspective – that lack 
of recognition is the problem – the reason why the policy 
response to person-centred care is so incoherent. It is helpful 
to think about the components of person-centred care (e.g., 
SDM, SMS, health literacy, engagement, etc.), and these are 
vital to operationalising person-centred care, but only if the 
particular philosophy of personhood is enshrined in those 
approaches/models’., (emphasis added). 
 
McCormack asserts then that the ‘philosophy of personhood’ 
is foundational to the effective delivery of the operational 
modes of intervention; it is not simply the ‘what’ of the 
intervention but also the ‘how’ and even the ‘who’; the 
notion of ’being’ person-centred. Dewing (2008:3) defines 
personhood as ‘the attributes possessed by human beings 
that make them a person’. This has been a particular focus in 
Dewing’s and McCormack’s clinical research field of 
gerontological nursing, augmented perhaps by the 
challenges of dementia and ageing; ‘who a person is’ in this 
context may be obscured by significant changes in their 
cognition and communication, alongside changes in their 
social position and visibility. The introduction of the concept 
of ‘selfhood’ and latterly ‘personhood’ in the field of 
dementia is attributed to Kitwood (Dewing, 2008, 
McCormack et al., 2015) and Sabat (Sabat, 1998), but as 
Raineri and Cabiati (2016) suggest, Kitwood’s ideas are also 
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applicable to social care. However, Dewing (2008:6) 
highlights a limitation in Kitwood’s work: a ‘failure to fully 
deal with the person as an embodied being’. The current 
research proposes that Archer’s (2000) conceptualisation of 
the development of personal and social identity and Archer 
and Donati’s (Archer and Donati, 2015) characterisation of 
relational socialisation provides an alternative theoretical 
framework for the practical challenge of grounding person-
centred practice in concepts of personhood. 
 
Those involved in the implementation and measurement of 
practice have struggled with the two distinct but entwined 
aspects of ‘being’ and ‘doing’ in person-centred care, perhaps 
because the concept of ‘personhood’ is both inconsistently 
applied and too intangible to measure. Collins (2014), for 
example, delineates person-centred activities from the 
principles, summarising the core principles as ways of ‘Being 
person-centred’. His use of the word ‘being’ implies the 
importance of personhood. Yet, the principles he offers focus 
on the experiences and outcomes of person-centred care, 
such as ‘affording people dignity, respect and compassion, 
offering coordinated care, offering personalised care, being 
enabling’ (Collins, 2014:5), rather than emphasising a 
philosophy of personhood and ‘enshrining’ this in practice, as 
required by McCormack above. Similarly, Collin’s proposed 
logic models for person-centred process and outcome 
measures, at best, take for granted an orientation towards 
personhood and care relationships, and he does not 




John O’Brien’s (2014) account of the opposing forces of 
‘system rationality’ and ‘lifeworld rationality’ (terms he 
adopts from Habermas) helps to explain this tension 
between ways of ‘doing’ and ways of ‘being’ in implementing 
person-centred care. The ‘lifeworld’ represents personhood 
and authentic relationships, and O’Brien expresses their 
value in creating ‘real change’ (O’Brien, 2015:2). System 
rationality introduces roles, rules, and technical means, such 
as professional objectivity, criteria, and procedure. He 
asserts that these are opposing forces in the same social 
space and that the focus on systematising can overpower the 
very thing which makes ‘being’ person-centred effective. 
Conversely, he says that when planning and practice work 
well, they ‘host’ experiences, suggesting that it is possible to 
create conditions amenable to ‘being’ person-centred: 
‘Gathering to affirm a person in their interdependence 
awakens those engaged to their mutual presence, wonder, 
and plight. This collective awakening demands and guides 
action as people make time to facilitate expressions of higher 
purpose, recognize possibilities and coordinate commitments 
to move toward a better community future.’ (O’Brien, 
2014:1). 
 
In this way, O’Brien establishes the relationship as a pre-
existing condition for ‘guiding the action’ that follows. 
However, O’Brien’s language here is not the language of a 
delivery plan, deliberately so. It captures the experience and 
effects of being in relationship and contributing to a shared 
purpose, driven by collective insight and commitment. The 
dissonance between the objective language typically used in 
planning and evaluation and the subjective perspective of 
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John O’Brien here is, conceptually, at the heart of this 
research. This is not to undermine the crucial part that the 
development of roles, tools, and processes have in delivering 
care, as these are essential structural components that serve 
to scaffold and nurture practice. It is to propose, however, 
that where the relationship is not considered central, person-
centred care cannot be delivered, and measurement tools 
and process are rendered less effective, as summarised here 
by Nunkoosing and Haydon-Laurelut (2015:13):   
 
‘When we observe that practices like person-centred planning 
do not deliver good, desirable and hopeful futures, it is very 
likely that the social capital – the reciprocity, trustworthiness 
and sense of connection between those who receive support 
and those offering it - is missing.’ 
 
A recent thematic analysis of the literature examining the 
concept of ‘being person-centred’ (Waters and Buchanan, 
2017) supports the emphasis that both O’Brien and 
Nunkoosing and Haydon-Laurelut place on personhood and 
relationship. The themes distilled from their analysis were 
‘honouring the person, being in relationship, facilitating 
participation and engagement, social inclusion/citizenship, 
experiencing compassionate love, and being 
strengths/capacity focussed.’ (Waters and Buchanan, 
2017:1033). These themes reflect the values and purpose of 
person-centred approaches, which are relational.  
2.5 Practitioners-as-people  
In identifying the relationship as pivotal to practice, 
understanding the role of both people in the relationship, 
who they are, how they think about the relationship and how 
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the relationship operates as part of the intervention become 
key questions. The practitioner, who is typically faceless and 
replaceable, becomes a person of interest. This idea echoes 
the well-known work of Carl Rogers in the 1960s. He set out 
core conditions for practitioners of ‘person-centred therapy’ 
in the field of counselling and psychotherapy. These are 
‘unconditional positive regard’ without judgement, 
‘congruence’ (genuineness/ no professional façade), and 
‘empathy’ (Rogers, 1961, 2004:50-57). Since then, the 
significance of the influence of the practitioner ‘self’ has been 
thoroughly explored in the counselling and psychotherapy 
literature (e.g., Aponte and Kissil, 2014) and informs a 
therapeutic approach that involves the active recognition by 
practitioners of the relevance of their own ‘self’ and history 
to the therapeutic relationship and process. This approach, 
which in counselling and psychotherapy continues to inform 
learning about therapeutic practice, is arguably no less 
valuable in developing any intervention relationship. In 
intervention relationships outside of the clinical remit of 
psychotherapy, however, practitioners’ self-analysis may 
seem unwarranted. Delivering personalised care is about 
practitioners delivering health or social interventions with 
people where the way they operate within their social 
context is at the fore; how they live the best life possible 
within their current circumstances. However, when 
considering what it is about an intervention that makes a 
difference, the importance of relationship surfaces: the 




In a Realist Evaluation of Social Prescribing, Bertotti et al. 
(2017:241) identified ‘social interaction’ as the central 
mechanism that led to outcomes in social prescribing 
interventions. They found that: ‘In particular, the relationship 
between patient and SPC [Social Prescribing Coordinator] 
deserves further attention’. This finding supports the 
questions of this research: how and why is the relationship 
causally effective; and what is it about the nature of the 
people involved, the nature of the relationship, and the 
conditions that facilitate effective care relationships? The 
authors acknowledge the connection with coaching and 
psychological therapies. However, they warn that this 
connection, in social prescribing, ‘runs alongside a risk of 
‘pathologising’ people’ (Bertotti et al., 2017:239), with the 
potentially associated stigma not found in interventions with 
a social purpose. A detailed exploration of psychological 
approaches to therapy relationships is beyond the remit of 
this research. However, there are theoretical synergies. 
Aponte and Kissil (2014:2) express a position which aligns to 
Archer’s analytical dualism (see 3.5 p60); that they ‘stand by 
thinkers who recognise the infusion in virtually all stages of 
our personal development of the social forces which 
profoundly influence our complex life context’, while at the 
same time proposing that special consideration is given to 
‘the unique struggle for self-definition, self-valuation, and 
self-purposefulness that is at the core of each person’s life 
journey’. In Archer’s terms, this ‘unique struggle’ is the 
reflexive dovetailing of our ‘ultimate concerns’ in context and 
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is expressed within the ‘Internal Conversation’ (Archer, 
2000:221). 
 
Harding et al.’s third pillar also highlights the role played by 
practitioners and the relational aspects of care. It 
summarises research that promotes the combining of 
knowledge, skills, and principles to foster ‘human 
connection, mutual respect, and a deep dialogue to achieve 
person-centred care’ (Harding et al., 2015:30), inclusive of a 
role for the practitioner as a person. Scholl et al. (2014:3), 
whose meta-review set out 15 dimensions on person-
centredness in an integrative model, include ‘essential 
characteristics of the clinician’ as one of their dimensions. 
This inclusion acknowledges that the ‘personhood’ of the 
practitioner is critical; however, their description stops short 
of involving the nature of the practitioner-as-person and 
instead describes common attributes and behaviours such as 
empathy, respect, honesty, self-reflectiveness, and clinical 
competence. McCormack (2004:36) takes a ‘humanistic 
philosophical tradition’ as a starting point. He has since 
sustained a central focus on personhood and relationship, 
promoting frameworks of care and organisational practice 
cultures that create facilitative conditions for person-centred 
practice (McCormack et al., 2015). This paper presents the 
‘Person-Centered Nursing framework’, which describes 
practitioner characteristics as ‘pre-requisites’ of person-
centred nursing practice, including professional capability, 
interpersonal skills, dedication to the job, and self-knowledge 




While accepting the validity of these descriptors and 
frameworks, the current research seeks to explain the nature 
of relationships formed in the context of these pre-requisite 
characteristics and supportive care environments. To do this, 
the practitioner and care recipient will both experience the 
same data collection methods and processes, elaborated in 
chapter 4 (Methodology and methods). This research aims to 
examine the role of the nature of both people and their 
unique relationships in the delivery of person-centred care. 
Can we understand more about the causal implications of 
‘being’ person-centred and ‘being in relationship’, through 
the application of realist social theory? 
 
2.6 Contextual influences: obstacles to prioritising 
personhood in person-centred practice 
The critical realist view proposes that what we see and 
experience in the world is shaped by contextual mechanisms 
that are real and have real effects. Some mechanisms may go 
unseen but nonetheless have real (often termed emergent) 
effects. Put simply, aspects of context are continually 
(potentially) influential. As will be covered in the next 
chapter, ‘Morphogenesis’ as an explanatory approach 
(Archer, 1995) provides a framework for understanding the 
persistence of structures and cultures and how these forces 
influence through the actions of the people in the system. As 
Porpora (2015:118) writes, ‘In the temporal process of acting, 
actors either reproduce or alter both or either the cultural 
and structural circumstances which originally bound them’. 
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This view stresses the role of individual reflexivity, proposing 
that we are influenced by the systems within which we 
practice and may well maintain or reproduce these system 
structures. However, as reflexive mediators, there is also 
potential for effecting change by acting on different ideas 
and in doing so, altering existing structures and cultures. The 
resulting forms and their effects cannot be predicted or 
determined. 
 
Care relationships operate in the context of their incumbent 
structures and cultures, and these mechanisms surround the 
people, the relationship, the leadership, and the team 
involved. It is therefore unsurprising that in recent research 
and policy debates in the field of person-centred practice, 
that supportive team, organisation, and system structural 
and cultural conditions are considered fundamental to 
effective delivery (McCormack et al., 2015, Rock and Cross, 
2020, Phelan et al., 2020). Person-centred care has not, 
however, evolved in unfettered environments and 
contextual factors may explain some of the challenges with 
implementation.  For example, in some contexts, the ideal of 
practice is predicated on ‘a philosophy of personhood’, yet 
existing structures and cultures can work to undermine this 
ideal. The following sections highlight some aspects of the 
broader context that have been problematic for 
implementing person-centred care and that may have shifted 
the balance of emphasis from personhood and relationship 
to person-centred processes and activities. These conditions 
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are current but have also emerged from developments in 
health and care policy and practice over time. 
 
2.7 Calibrating the rational and the relational  
Sayer (2011:61-2) highlights the problem that rationality is 
understood as ‘instrumental rationality’ in a world in which 
we experience the ‘prioritisation of means over ends’. An 
example of this emphasis in public services is the way that 
New Public Management (NPM) principles have influenced 
their design, leadership and delivery (Hood, 1991), applying 
the type of business logic that works for manufacturing and 
production to public services, which differ in aims and 
conditions in many ways (Osbourne, 2018). The introduction 
of NPM, with its principles adopted across OECD countries 
(Hood 1991), meant a focus on professional management 
roles, accountability for results, and achieving more for less. 
These aspirations in the UK led to the adoption of a ‘Taylorist’ 
set of processes for health and care provision (Hood 1991), 
leading to a position where the processes and systems of care 
production became the primary focus. Integral to NPM is its 
instrumental approaches to measurement and decision 
making. While useful for many aspects of governance and 
accountability, an over-reliance on these methods and ways 
of knowing (and a relegation of individual circumstance and 
experience to ‘soft data’) can be a strong driver for decision 
making which helps balance the books in the short term but 
fails to take account of the impacts of decisions on people. 
Sayer (2011), as a remedy, proposes the extension of the 
concept of rationality, to also include ‘practical reason’, 
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based in experience and held within the tacit embodied 
knowledge of people and continuously applied. Sayer posits 
that this oversight may exist because this type of reason is 
difficult to describe, yet says we need to do it justice, and 
value its contribution appropriately. 
Just as O’Brien (2014) describes the opposing forces of 
system rationality and lifeworld rationality, so Unwin (2018) 
characterises this imbalance as a ‘rational lexicon’ which is 
motivated by fairness, safety, and transparency and a 
‘relational lexicon’ which engages with individual identity, 
human connection, and wellbeing. Unwin asserts the need to 
employ both. Her observation is that when the rational 
lexicon alone is employed in designing, evaluating, improving 
public policy, ‘it risks a policy that achieves an objective but 
misses the point - one that does not achieve outcomes and is 
neither trusted nor valued.’ (Unwin, 2018:19). Unwin argues 
that emotions are an integral part of public policy because 
what people care about most (homes, community, safety, 
health and care), shapes public policy. Whilst acknowledging 
the transformative capability of the rational lexicon, she 
describes the effects this dominant approach has on the way 
that public policy treats people, diminishing ‘the capacity to 
respond to individuals, to recognise their differences and to 
engage with the complexity of individuals and their 
communities’ (Unwin, 2018:9). Cultures and structures which 
are system-oriented and employ the rational lexicon 
continue to emanate effects, and for Unwin, can erode the 
potential for engagement with people and kindness in public 
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policy: ‘we need to take much more seriously the way in 
which the human comes into our public policy.’ (Unwin, 
2018:26). By these accounts, the cultural and structural 
context of the current systems can be inhospitable for a 
person-centred practice embedded in a philosophy of 
personhood.  
2.8 Orienting outcomes to the person not the 
system. 
Osbourne et al. (2015), while acknowledging the gains made 
by New Public Management (NPM), like Unwin, reject it as a 
basis for modern public services, building on insights from a 
decade of research and promoting its successor; New Public 
Governance (NPG). Since its inception around 15 years ago, 
the need for this newer framework has been intensified by 
the complex systems within which public service 
organisations are operating. These challenging contexts 
require collaborative working, a focus on service and value 
rather than a ‘product’ mentality, and a move away from 
efficiency-driven improvements, which, in public service, can 
risk undermining the quality that makes provision ultimately 
viable. One of the key learnings in the development of New 
Public Governance of particular interest to this research is 
that NPM models, along with its predecessor public 
administration, characterised service users as passive 
recipients, receivers of service, and care. This 
characterisation obliterates any role for individual 
personhood, relationships and resulting agency. An 
assumption of passivity seems, on the face of it, to be 
reasonable. After all, people are referred to and use services 
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because they have need of something. However, as will be 
considered later in this chapter and beyond, although we can 
make no assumptions about agentic potential, side-lining the 
possibility for agency is counter-productive as in doing so, we 
may overlook a powerful mechanism of change. 
 
A significant shift in thinking with the introduction of NPG has 
been a move from thinking about outcomes as value created 
and provided by the service (service-centric models) to 
considering value created by and with the service user. 
Outcomes and value creation are central to the reason we 
deliver services and understanding the locus of value 
creation is arguably an ideal starting point for service design. 
What difference do we want to make? In NPG’s ‘public 
service logic’ (Osbourne, 2018:228), the creation of value is 
held to occur with the ‘service user as the central locus of 
value co-creation.’ This idea has been expanded on from 
Grönroos’ (2011) work, which critiqued an earlier position on 
value creation for its ambiguity. The original proposition was 
that ‘the customer is always a co-creator of value’ (Vargo and 
Lusch, 2008:8). Grönroos points out that this statement lacks 
specificity; it indicates that both customer and provider are 
involved in the value-creation process, but it does not 
identify how, or the nature of the roles involved. Grönroos’ 
position is that creating value sits with the service user as 
value-in-use, in the context of their broader life experience 
and personhood. ‘Value-in-use means that value for the user 
is created or emerges during usage, which is a process of 
which the customer as user is in charge’ (Grönroos, 
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2011:287). Osbourne (2018:226) says that this concept of co-
creation of value has ‘significant implications for how we 
understand the relationships between PSOs [public service 
organisations] and service users in public services delivery – 
and for what this relationship means for the value that public 
services create in society.’ The context for Osbourne is the 
area of co-production and co-creation of public services, but 
this logic equally applies to and indeed begins with the nature 
of individual care relationships. In this regard, the concept of 
value-in-use is consistent with personalisation and person-
centred principles and resonant with the principle of 
engaging with ‘personhood’, described above. It encourages 
us to view outcomes as emergent of the person: self-
generated and therefore ‘owned’ by them. In the light of this 
perspective, it seems likely that, in some circumstances, at 
least, care relationships could play a contributory role. 
 
2.9 Implications for performance management  
The above position is problematic for current measurement 
and performance management cultures that seek to identify 
and measure pre-determined and uniform outcomes. 
Equally, it rejects an over-reliance on questions of service-
oriented activity and outputs, balancing attention instead on 
the difference achieved by, with, and for the people on the 
receiving end of care. How do we understand and measure 
outcomes which are emergent of individuals in their unique 
contexts? The care relationship is seen in the context of the 
complexity of the social system in which it is provided, and 
outcomes of interventions are viewed as emergent 
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properties of these complex systems (Lowe, 2017a). If 
outcomes are personal, emerging as ‘value in use’ for the 
care recipient and generated by (and with) the person in their 
context, it is impossible to anticipate them or plan and 
measure them in the way we might plan for and measure 
outputs. As Folgheraiter and Raineri (2012:481) say, ‘the 
ultimate purpose of social work is free and unpredictable 
change for the better.’ Lowe (2017a) argues that holding 
people in a complex system accountable for outcomes is 
impossible because the very nature of the outcomes is 
beyond those people’s control. Instead, he argues that 
accountability should focus on the decisions and reasoning 
behind the decisions made, requiring greater insight into 
complexity and detail by those holding organisations or 
practitioners to account. 
Lowe (2017b) further stresses the risks of performance 
management based on NPM logic, including newer forms of 
Outcome-Based performance management, in that it creates 
a ‘game’ where the object is good-looking metrics rather than 
outcomes for service users. He reasserts Campbell’s (1979) 
insight that ‘The more any quantitative social indicator is 
used for social decision-making, the more subject it will be to 
corruption pressures and the more apt it will be to distort and 
corrupt the social processes it is intended to monitor’ (Lowe, 
2017b:327). In these conditions, leader reflexivity will 
balance their own interests (e.g., reputation, keeping the 
contract, and their employees in work) with the demands of 
their role and system expectations. Lowe’s case for a move 
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from counterproductive measurement practices to a 
governance approach that supports learning and flexible 
adaptation to complexity relies on a move from a 
presumption of mistrust to a presumption of trust in the 
relationships between funders and providers.  
These relational conditions entail a reduction in scrutiny, an 
open culture of learning, and a ‘positive error culture’ (Lowe, 
2017b:326), where mistakes are not hidden but shared and 
inform improvement. These changes intend to enable 
practitioners and leaders to focus their reflexive engagement 
on problem-solving concerning client and community 
outcomes rather than how to ‘game’ the metrics. In response 
to the inappropriate application of instrumental responses to 
complex problems, current research and practice in the area 
of Human Learning Systems (Lowe and Plimmer, 2019) 
present emerging models of practice that embrace rather 
than attempt to corral complexity, recognising the relevance 
of working with people where they are at, and focusing on 
the possibility of creating conditions through system-level 
governance and removing system barriers. 
2.10 Policy evaluation and research methodologies 
The rationally motivated, instrumentally driven performance 
management practice that so concerns policy commentators 
(Lowe 2017a, 2017b, Unwin, 2018, Cottam 2018, A.Fox,., 
2018) draws ideological and practical strength from 
dominant research methodologies which, in error (Byrne, 
2009), assume the existence of universal laws in social 
science. Byrne is clear that universal causal laws are an 
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inappropriate quarry in this discipline, suggesting instead 
that seeking generalisable causal explanation through 
researching mechanisms in context provides a more precise 
and therefore applicable understanding of causality. Durose 
et al. (2017:137-8) agree that there is increasing ‘formal 
privileging of positivist empiricism’ in government evaluation 
communities, leading to a ‘corresponding scepticism towards 
qualitative research focusing on (…) how it works’. The 
dominance of these ‘what works’ rather than ‘how it works’ 
methodologies rests in part with the establishment of 
evidence hierarchies.  
The dominance of positivist epistemology has been robustly 
challenged in social science (Pawson and Tilley, 1997, 
Greenhalgh et al., 2018), and policy makers are increasingly 
encouraged to prioritise and consider evidence that deals 
with complexity and contingency (Cartwright and Hardie, 
2012). Byrne (2009:4) also flags the political implications of 
relying on statistical methods using ‘disembodied variables’ 
to model causality, suggesting that this weighs our focus on 
the technical and administrative and limits opportunity for 
the effective workings of local democracy. He stresses that 
there is no preference in case-based research for qualitative 
and against quantitative approaches, advocating for selecting 
an appropriate and defensible methodology. Forms of 
evaluation that increase understanding of mechanisms and 
the implications of contextual factors for their operation are 
increasingly recognised as valuable, emerging from an 
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understanding that dominant methods can be an unreliable 
source of knowledge.   
Relationship centred care (Wyer et al., 2014, Soklaridis et al., 
2016) has not received the same level of attention as person-
centred care in UK health and social care settings but is an 
approach that promotes the personhood of both the 
practitioner and service user, prioritises relational principles 
over professional rule-sets, and is inclusive of other 
relationships which surround the care (Wyer et al., 2014). In 
problematising current approaches to measurement practice 
in relationship-centred care, Wyer et al. suggest the critical 
realism of Bhaskar as offering an appropriate epistemology 
for researching these complex and non-linear phenomena. 
They claim that it is inappropriate to reduce human 
experiences to that of the ‘measurable and observable’ 
(Wyer et al., 2014:886), similarly to Norcross and Lambert’s 
observation above, that there are aspects of relationships 
which are not amenable to traditional approaches to 
generating evidence in health and care contexts. This study 
concurs and works within the paradigm of critical realism to 
address its questions. This is because key elements of care 
and relationships are not empirically available, and 
theoretical work is needed to enable insights into how they 
work. As the authors conclude, analysis which informs policy 
and aims to impact outcomes ‘needs to be fashioned in a way 
that recognises the potentially decisive role of the 




2.11 Inclusion of value-positions in knowledge and 
theory-based evaluation practice 
Expert practitioners and researchers in personalisation and 
the related fields of co-production and co-creation have also 
argued that these types of intervention models are not suited 
to positivist-informed evaluation and service design 
promoted in NPM models and evidence-based policy making 
(EBPM) practice. Durose et al. (2017) conclude that instead, 
theory and knowledge-based routes to evaluation need to be 
deployed to understand and reveal the impact of 
interventions that are responsive and, therefore, nuanced in 
their delivery method. Durose et al.’s inclusion of knowledge-
based evaluation methods is recognition of the value offered 
by the insights of those people who have insider knowledge 
and experience of the service, usually ‘dismissed as 
excessively normative’ (Durose et al., 2017:138), and 
therefore presumed to lack scientific objectivity and 
neutrality. For C.Fox et al. (2019), the need for this position is 
that value co-creation in co-production efforts is necessarily 
premised on a moral dimension. People’s motivations to 
promote and engage in this type of work are born of moral 
concerns about human need and flourishing. To faithfully 
represent impact, evaluation of (and policy making for) co-
production requires a shift from an individualistic notion of 
the good life to one of a ‘socially investive state committed 
to promoting human flourishing’ (C.Fox et al., 2019:37). 
This departure towards ethical naturalism (Lawson, 2017) is 
resisted in general by social scientists. Even realist evaluators 
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who heavily critique positivist epistemology (Pawson and 
Tilley, 1997, Pawson, 2013, 2018) do not permit a role for 
value judgements about how things ought to be, preferring 
to maintain a strict distance between questions of value and 
questions of fact. However, in person-centred practice and 
co-production, the purpose and outcomes of an intervention 
orbit the values and experiences of individuals or groups and 
avoiding engagement with values may circumvent a 
significant contributory factor.  
In contrast, and on the same page as C.Fox et al.,(2019) in this 
matter, critical realism (in almost all ways the philosophical 
root system of Realist Evaluation methodology (Pawson, 
2018)) actively takes account of the importance of what 
matters to people (Sayer, 2011, Porter, 2015,). Porpora 
(2017:49) dissects Sayer’s position on normativity in critical 
social science, agreeing that ‘minimal normative stances’ are 
unavoidable in societal critique and should be made explicit 
rather than ignored or deliberately hidden. 
If it is the case that what matters to people as individuals, 
families, and communities is central to human flourishing, 
then evaluating how that flourishing is achieved and 
iteratively designing effective intervention models, is 
necessarily built on this normative foundation. The goal of 
flourishing is common to the aspirations of the organisations 
involved in the present study and is therefore important to 
include. The nature and meaning of ‘flourishing’ are 
discussed by Porpora (2017:47) as possible to consider in two 
different but aligned ways. For him, and not dissimilarly to 
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Bhaskar (2020), its ultimate meaning can only be fully 
expressed in spiritual terms; a moral pull driven by the 
ultimate purpose of ‘glorifying God’; flourishing not as an 
‘end’ but instead experienced through persistent striving to 
‘serve certain ideals’. Porpora (2017:58) acknowledges, 
however, the resonance of these ideals with non-theistic and 
ethical naturalist understandings of flourishing; a striving for 
‘love and justice and unconditional welcome into 
community’ and accepts that an aim of ‘universal flourishing 
as a more neutral moral goal’, though inadequate for him, is 
an acceptable one for progress, in that it ‘represents the good 
society.’ In considering generalised flourishing as an ‘end’, 
Porpora proposes something interesting and more specific. 
He emphasises the centrality of relationships to flourishing, 
to the extent that, referencing Archer and Donati’s work 
(Archer and Donati, 2015), he suggests, ‘our human vocation 
is to achieve certain relational goods’ (Porpora, 2017: 58, 
footer), depicting mechanisms of interest in this study 
(relational goods), as an outcome. These ideas of 
relationships as central to human flourishing are echoed in 
the writings of those who have implemented and tested 
models of care and support that centralise human 
relationships (A.Fox, 2018, Cottam, 2018, Russell, 2020). 
2.12 The influence of cultural context in the design 
and delivery of social interventions. 
In practice, when considering interventions and outcomes at 
the level of the individual in the context of their community, 
those involved will, regardless of the position adopted by 
evaluators, be informed by judgement and consensus about 
44 
 
the ‘right’ path, a process that incorporates relationships.  
This cultural system (Archer, 1988) is the system of beliefs 
and values that influences yet is influenced by those involved.  
As described in the quote from Porpora (2015) on p31, these 
beliefs and values may be upheld, adjusted, refreshed over 
time through the individual and collective values of the 
people. This characterisation of the cultural system is 
relatively tangible if operating in a voluntary sector 
organisation, one which is self-contained and has grown 
responsively to address a particular set of needs experienced 
by a community. Such voluntary sector interventions fit into 
Lawson’s (2017:242) metaphor of ‘eudaimonic bubbles’: 
‘wider-community-specific-flourishing-facilitating 
contingently protected sub-communities.’ Lawson says that 
the nature of these social forms offers them, to a limited 
extent, protection against the layers of the broader context, 
the causal forces existing within the complexity of the ‘nested 
systems’ in which they operate (Byrne, 2018:93). However, 
they are by no means immune to the wider cultural and 
structural influences in their contexts, and Lawson proposes 
that increased self-awareness of their uniqueness and 
authenticity in the context of the ‘blinkering forces of 
background ideology’ (Lawson, 2017:245) would be 
protective. More practically, that they may benefit from 
‘material support’ to ‘insulate’ them against these ‘wider 
societal mainstream counterforces.’  
This research aligns with the view that the values inherent in 
cultural systems generate mechanisms that can sustain or 
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disrupt practice and that methods of research and evaluation 
need to include in their theory building the conditions that 
these contextual forces create and the impacts they 
generate. Durose et al. (2017:139) say that to date, the 
theorisation of co-production ‘has been of the who / what/ 
when/ how type…and it is less common to find accounts of 
why it is that co-production is expected to produce its 
espoused benefits’. However, they do endorse the work of 
Ostrom (1996:1082), who theorised helpful contextual 
conditions which enable co-production as an effective 
alternative to traditional methods of service development; 
conditions which can ‘explicate a theory of change’ for co-
production (Durose et al. (2017:139) and can ‘generate 
transferable insights.’ This endorsement aligns with the 
critical realist position that theorising facilitative contextual 
conditions is possible and can provide guidance to those 
commissioning and accommodating, or designing and 
delivering, social interventions. 
2.13 Affecting cultural change on a larger scale  
Lawson’s metaphor of eudaimonic bubbles applies to the 
relatively small organisations featured in this research in that 
they have developed in response to ‘conditions where the 
concerns or needs in question are particular[ly] ill-served and 
individuals are suffering much harm’ (Lawson, 2017:242). 
However, there have been efforts on a larger scale to 
radically change the cultural conditions within which services 
operate across the system. 
In the UK, realisation of this type of thinking is evident in 
public sector innovation such as that in Wigan, UK since 2011 
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(Naylor and Wellings, 2019). Responding to austerity-driven 
funding cuts, the Local Authority and partners proposed 
radical change. ‘The Wigan Deal’ promoted a shift away from 
paternalism and expectations for service to a two-way 
relationship where the state and citizens, as part of their 
communities, share in the responsibility for local outcomes. 
The ‘Deal’ included commitments by the council to freeze 
council tax, amongst others, also promoting community 
participation to improve wellbeing. Crucially, they challenged 
entrenched cultures across the system, countering with the 
principles, language, and practice of ‘Asset Based Community 
Development’ (Russell, 2020). The focus is on strengths-
based approaches and co-production to build community 
engagement and a sense of shared accountability for public 
health outcomes in the area. These new cultural principles 
and conversations created the opportunity to critically 
review the current systems and create space for other ideas 
and perspectives. Within this work, they have applied 
relational principles, resonant with those set out by Hilary 
Cottam (2018:online), who insists that solutions to health 
and care challenges come via ‘open conversations….about 
wellness and how to sustain it, about how we are living now 
and how can we create the support and conditions for 
collective flourishing’. The introduction of this radical 
strategy focused on a listening culture, facilitating 
relationships, and local responsiveness, a sharp challenge to 
organisational cultures that maintained control of services 




The relevance of these mutable cultural and structural 
conditions to the current research is the potential for the 
influence of local and system context on the nature of the 
care relationship and its value. In the Wigan example, 
changing cultural conditions have opened up new types of 
conversation that focus on strengths and shared 
responsibility (Naylor and Wellings, 2019). But do these new 
discourses affect the nature of the relationship at the level of 
individual intervention? The Wigan Deal is of interest 
because it attempts whole-system cultural and structural 
change, drawn from a set of principles that offered the 
opportunity to attempt borough-wide reform across all 
public services. The organisations participating in this 
doctoral research place a high value on care relationships yet 
are operating within systems within which they have varying 
influence. In the absence of structures and cultures that 
support the value of relationships, how do existing 
contextual conditions affect how leaders, practitioners, and 
service users engage in care relationships?   
 
2.14 A personalisation strategy with a theoretical gap 
Since this research began, there has been a marked 
commitment to personalisation in the UK with the 
introduction of a new Personalisation strategy embedded in 
the NHS Long Term Plan (2019). The inclusion of this element 
in the NHS plan affirms the view that, in current policy, 
person-centred approaches are considered indispensable to 
quality care and support. The document presents a model for 
personalisation (NHS England, 2019) which has been 
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welcomed by health and social care innovators and 
campaigners, in recognition that it ‘could signal a strategic 
shift in national health policy towards a more integrated view 
of what makes for good health and wellbeing, and ultimately 
good lives’ (Fox, 2019:online). The ‘strategic shift’ described 
here is pre-dated by changes in emphasis of policy language, 
where: 
• thirteen years ago, policy described person-centred care 
in patient experience terms: e.g. ‘a steady state in patient 
reported experience of care’ (Leatherman and 
Sutherland, 2008:2), and  
• nine years ago in the NHS Constitution (Department of 
Health, 2012:online), a focus on ‘tailoring’ of services: 
‘NHS services must reflect, and should be coordinated 
around and tailored to, the needs and preferences of 
patients, their families and their carers’. 
The personalisation strategy in the NHS Long Term Plan (NHS 
Long Term Plan, 2019: online) takes a further step, identifying 
as principally important: ‘Perspective: this is a way of ‘seeing 
people’ and an attitude towards them that is fundamental to 
good personalised care and support planning’. This shift is 
notable because it introduces as ‘fundamental’, ‘ways of 
being’, or to naturally extend this; ‘ways of being in 
relationships’, which must be the case as person-centred 
care is invariably delivered in the context of two (or more) 
people coming together. This is a recognition that both 
parties in that relationship (i.e., practitioner and service user) 
hold significance.  
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This recognition of a fundamental role for ‘perspective’, 
invites us to be inquisitive about the reflexive deliberations 
of practitioners: who they are and how they are thinking 
about the person, their role, the relationship, in the context 
of the service structures and organisation’s ideas and 
priorities.  To this end it is important that ‘perspective’ is top 
of the list of ‘key features’ of the NHS ‘Personalised care and 
support planning’ guidance (NHS England, 2019a: online). 
However, the guidance moves glibly and unjustifiably from 
the importance of the perspective of the practitioner to the 
achievement of a ‘changed relationship’ and ‘different 
conversation’, leading on to describing outcomes of: 
empowerment, feeling valued, central to care planning, 
active in decisions. There is a theoretical gap here. A move 
from acknowledging the influence that the thoughts and 
attitudes of practitioners have on outcomes, to an 
assumption that highlighting this, and providing training will 
lead to ‘different conversations and new relationships’, with 
too little understanding of what this move involves. The 
current research begins from an acceptance that care 
relationships are an integral part of providing care but 
proposes that we know too little about them and that we can 
learn more about their role in supporting people. The tacit 
acknowledgement that relationships are important in care 
masks both how, and the extent to which they are important. 
They are under the radar for prioritisation. However, any 
focus on care relationships must also acknowledge that they 
are one type of the many that people form. This research 
considers care relationships in the context of people’s lives, 
50 
 
acknowledging them as one amongst many other types of 
relationships that exist for people. The focus on care 
relationships does not undermine the role of family or 
community relationships which are viewed as fundamental 
to who we are and become. This research is proposing, 
however, that the mechanisms that exist in personal 
relationships may also have relevance for care relationships.  
This theoretical gap recalls Houston’s (2010) assertion, 
described on page 20, that personalisation is currently 
represented by an ‘impoverished ontology’ and requires an 
ontological approach which attends to human tendencies 
and social relationships. This identification of the need to 
gain a deeper understanding of the ontological in care 
relationships is at the centre of this research. The ‘gap’ in 
policy and practice emanates from the unequal attention 
given to what we are doing in providing care, as opposed to 
how we are being. This inequity, it has been suggested, 
stems, in part, from the ongoing structural and cultural 
effects of dominant instrumental management, performance 
and evaluation practices.  
2.15 Summary 
This overview of current policy and practice has set the scene 
for this research. The characterisation of person-centred care 
as involving entwined aspects of ‘being’ and ‘doing’ led to the 
insight that there is potential to understand more about the 
role of ‘being’ (ourselves and in relationship) in person-
centred practice, through greater engagement with 
ontology; our understandings of the role of personhood, and 
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as an extension of this, relationship.  There is no intention to 
undermine the value of ‘doing’ person centred activities or of 
designing models of practice. Just as Norcross and Lambert 
(2018) conclude, the methods and practices of interventions 
are essential tools. It does, however, attempt to redress the 
balance by foregrounding a role for the inherent nature of 
people, the nature of care relationships, and the way that the 
conditions within which these people and relationships 
operate, contribute to outcomes. Research has already 
concluded that there are characteristics of practitioners and 
organisational and system cultures which are amenable to 
positive experiences of person-centred care, and that the 
care relationship can be a key factor. The contribution 
offered by the current research is the application of a realist 
social theory, to the examination of care relationships to 
better understand how they operate and the conditions that 







Chapter 3: Theory 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 has set the scene for this research by presenting 
an overview of the policy context of personalisation and 
person-centred care, attempts to embed it, and implications 
for practice. Current understandings of person-centred care 
acknowledge the value of the practice, identify methods for 
implementing it, and highlight the central importance of 
engaging with personhood, the value of relationship, the 
characteristics of practitioners and amenable cultural 
contexts. In recent strategy, there has been a greater 
emphasis on the importance of engaging with the 
personhood and ‘perspective’ of the person, but there is an 
assumption that proposing that practitioners do this will 
automatically lead to better care, without the theoretical 
means to explain how these care relationships operate. 
Person-centred care and personalisation promote a focus 
on who people are and become, taking account of their life 
circumstances and what is important to them, essentially 
engaging with their ongoing socialisation process: the idea 
that we continue to become who we are as we navigate our 
unique life course with its equally unique contingencies. 
Social interventions are delivered through care interactions 
or relationships that (intentionally or otherwise) intervene in 
this navigation process. However, as shown in the previous 
chapter, an emphasis on action (‘doing’, implementing, and 
measuring) has, perhaps inadvertently, overshadowed the 
relevance of ‘being’, personhood and therefore socialisation 
within intervention models. Courage needs to be mustered 
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by practitioners here, for, in looking at personalisation 
through the lens of socialisation, our own socialisation is also 
in play. 
This chapter will argue that a critical realist ontology and 
engagement with the extensive social theory of Margaret 
Archer, and the ‘Relational Sociology’ of Pierpaolo Donati, 
offers a deeper understanding of human agency and 
socialisation in care relationships in social interventions. 
Specifically, it will show that a reflexive and relational 
conceptualisation of human agency furthers our 
understanding of the complexity of social care practice, such 
as how practitioner-person relations shape care delivery. The 
starting point is to introduce critical realism, which offers a 
robust philosophical framework within which the ontological 
aspects of care relationships can be explored and theorised.  
3.2 Critical realism 
Critical realism provides the philosophical infrastructure for 
this research and was a position that resonated with the 
author’s experience of care delivery within complex health 
and care systems. The central tenet of critical realism is the 
proposition of a mind-independent reality; that ‘reality exists 
independently of our knowledge of it’ (italics in original) 
(Danermark et al., 2019:21). This distinction between what 
the world is and what we can know of the world is essential 
as it underpins the realist claim about the transitive and 
intransitive nature of reality. Of these two dimensions, the 
‘intransitive’ is the real and relatively unchanging world that 
we attempt to know and the ‘transitive’ is our fallible and 
54 
 
ever-changing knowledge of the world. Critical realism, 
therefore, challenges claims to ‘know’, described by Bhaskar 
(2008:5) as ‘the epistemic fallacy’, rejecting the idea of an 
empirical world, where ‘statements about being can always 
be transposed into statements about our knowledge of 
being’. Acceptance of the intransitive dimension is 
fundamental to critical realism, as it allows for the 
exploration of underpinning structures and their 
effects. Scientific work that relies wholly on what can be seen 
or directly experienced is therefore rejected. Instead, critical 
realism aims to ‘investigate and identify relationships and 
non-relationships, respectively, between what we 
experience, what actually happens, and the underlying 
mechanisms that produce the events in the world’ 
(Danermark, et al., 2019:25).  
3.3 Stratified levels of reality 
Bhaskar (2008) provides structure to help define the 
stratified ontology he proposes; that what we see and 
experience empirically results from the effects of underlying 
mechanisms that operate at levels of reality that are unseen, 
but nonetheless real. He describes three levels of reality: ‘the 
Real, the Actual, and the Empirical’. The Empirical is what we 
can see in the world we experience. The Actual relates to 
events and processes that lead to what we can experience 
but may not be seen. Situated at the level of the Real are 
underlying mechanisms that have emergent properties and 
liabilities, which are unseen. Bhaskar draws parallels 
between the applicability of these in the natural and social 
sciences. In the social world, the Real is what exists, in terms 
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best understood as social structures that pre-exist human 
agents’ activities to maintain or modify them. These 
structures are in constant shift and change, produced and 
reproduced through human activity, and themselves 
possessing emergent properties and liabilities which can 
enable and constrain (or neither) the activities of human 
agents. The result is a physical and social world that is 
ordered but ‘infinitely complex’ (Porter 2015:76). This means 
that we cannot take experiences at face value and draw 
confident conclusions from what is seen, but instead accept 
that there are deep-seated influences, or ‘mechanisms’, 
operating in non-linear ways to form the reality that we 
experience. Seeking explanation through theorising about 
these underlying causal forces enables us to attend to ideas 
about how things are operating and the conditions of their 
operation, rather than just to what we can see, experience 
and therefore ‘know’ in the world. 
3.4 Modes of inference in critical realism 
In critical realism, conceptual abstraction is necessary 
because abstractions afford us the means to consider what 
produces events that we can see and experience. In 
considering the practical use of abstraction in social science, 
Danermark et al. (2019:39) challenge, as misconception, the 
linking of abstraction with ‘vagueness’, and conversely, the 
concrete with ‘tangible’ and ‘real’. As the stratified nature of 
reality cannot be understood through concrete phenomena 
alone, they assert that from a realist perspective, ‘the 
business of science is to establish the connections between 
the empirical, the actual and the real; to observe and identify 
56 
 
the effect of underlying generative mechanisms’ (Danermark 
et al., 2002:43). Abstraction is an essential method to achieve 
this. This advice guides us to engage with reality by 
combining abstract and concrete means, using theoretical 
frameworks within which to situate and examine empirical 
data, and at the same time using that data to dynamically test 
and reconsider the theoretical framework. 
Therefore, the way we interpret information and the modes 
of reasoning we use are critical to developing knowledge. 
Deduction and induction are common types of inference; 
deduction as a tool that provides a logical rule set to test the 
validity of conclusions drawn from the research process, 
induction as a method of inference used to draw generalised 
conclusions based on observed data in research findings. In 
addition, critical realist approaches utilise abduction and 
retroduction as part of their inferential toolkit to develop 
knowledge about the real structures and mechanisms which 
underpin the world that we experience. Abduction is a form 
of inference that involves applying one or more theoretical 
frames (Danermark et al. 2002) through which to examine 
evidence, providing new insights or ways of interpreting 
empirically available data. It involves creativity and 
reasoning, which enables new connections, ideas, or ways of 
re-describing phenomena. ‘Abduction is a move from a 
conception of something to a different, possibly more 
elaborated or deeper conception of it’ (Danermark et al., 
2019:113). Abduction will be used in this study to reframe the 
care relationship by examining the structural relations which 
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constitute it, proposing that examining the nature of the 
people, in relationship, within their structural conditions, 
may shed light on those aspects of people, relationships and 
contexts which are most amenable to effective person-
centred care relationships.  
This work will apply the theoretical frameworks offered by 
the social theory of Margaret Archer (1995, 1998, 2000, 
2003, 2007, 2012), inclusive of analytical dualism, 
Morphogenetic/Morphostatic approach, modes of 
reflexivity, and relational reflexivity. The Relational Sociology 
of Pierpaolo Donati and his work with Archer in this regard 
(Archer and Donati, 2015) provide further theoretical 
support for the analysis of care relationships.   
3.5 Structure, culture, agency, and analytical dualism 
The critical realist position on this central issue in social 
theory, structure, culture, and agency, is pivotal to this 
research because of the emphasis placed on reflexivity, 
which, in Archer’s terms, is the locus of interplay between 
structure, culture and agency with its central and causal role 
between them. Cruickshank (2003) asserts the importance in 
social science of our ontological precepts about structure and 
agency in particular; structure relating to the rules, roles, 
processes that exist and govern everyday life through social 
structures, and agency relating to our human ability to 
interpret the world and act within it. These precepts, he says, 
directly affect research decisions, such as how frameworks 
are created for data collection and analysis, and 
subsequently, how theory is developed from empirical 
58 
 
observations. Danermark et al., (2019) concur that to think 
about social planning and actual practice, it is essential to 
consider these two phenomena that constitute society and 
how we conceptualise the relationship between them to 
create models through which society can be analysed. Carter 
and New (2004) summarise three key ways in which structure 
and agency relations have been interpreted in sociology: 
agential activity determined by social contexts and influence, 
individualistic accounts of the freedom of agents from 
structure, and interpretations that consider the two 
together. Archer (2000) supports consideration of the two 
together, but rejects attempts to conflate the two, which 
prevent their analytical separation and the consideration of 
their interplay. Following Archer, Danermark et al. (2002) 
describe these relations in terms of three types of ‘conflation’ 
respectively; upwards, downwards, and central conflation, 
each of which reduces explanatory power by denying the 
independent emergent properties and powers of structure, 
agency, or both.  
The point of difference between these conflated conceptions 
of structure, culture, and agency, and those proposed by 
Bhaskar’s transformation model of human activity 
(Danermark et al., 2002, Harvey 2009) and subsequently in 
Archer’s Morphogenetic/ Morphostatic approach is that 
people and society are ontologically irreducible to each other 
and that neither one ‘creates’ the other. Instead, as Harvey 
(2009:31) describes, ‘their powers are complementary, so 
much so that they form the necessary preconditions for each 
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other’s existence’. Danermark et al. (2002) describe the 
developed work of Archer, who defends the importance of 
‘analytical dualism’ in making space to consider separately 
the emergent properties and powers of structure and 
culture, the emergent properties and powers of agency, and 
the interplay between them. This ‘interplay’ constitutes the 
focus on the enabling or constraining forces within structures 
and cultures which constitute the conditions in which agents 
operate and the choice-making potential of agents, in the 
context of their personal and social identities and in the light 
of their ‘ultimate concerns and commitments’ (Archer, 
2000:). Archer (1982) explains analytical dualism by 
contrasting two distinct models of structure and agency, 
which deal with them together, rather than conferring 
dominance to either. These are Giddens’ Structuration 
Theory and her own Morphogenetic Theory. Archer 
(1982:456) quotes Giddens (1979) on a point of agreement 
that the ‘escape of human history from human intentions, 
and the return of the consequences of that escape as causal 
influences upon human action, is a chronic feature of social 
life.’ However, they differ in how the relationship between 
structure and agency is conceptualised, and as a result, how 
this informs the way that we study the structure and culture 
within the ever-changing nature of social systems. 
Giddens’ Structuration Theory, as an attempt to integrate 
subjectivist and objectivist sociologies, proposes that 
‘structure as a social object is not external to the subject, it is 
rather inseparable from the agent’s conduct’ (Mouzelis, 
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1995: 118); the interface between them forming a ‘duality’ of 
structure and agency (Mouzelis, 1995, Porpora, 1998). 
Connected in this way, structures are thought to influence 
the behaviours of agents and in turn, agents’ behaviours and 
choices influence the way that structures develop. Archer 
(1982, 2017) describes this as giving structure and agency a 
‘hydraulic’ nature, saying that “Structuration’ itself is ever a 
process and never a product’ (Archer, 1982:457). It denies 
the agent the potential power of ‘theoretical or strategic-
monitoring orientations’ (Mouzelis, 1995:119), which denies 
agents the ability to ‘distance themselves from rules and 
resources in order to analyse or change them’. In contrast, 
Archer’s project is to defend the analytical separation of 
structure and agency to highlight the potential for human 
agents to gain traction within their objective circumstances, 
albeit that their attempts may be thwarted. Archer focuses 
on theorising the process by which this interplay happens, 
how individuals reflexively respond to and operate in their 
contexts and what we can learn about how they do this. In 
rejecting the premises of Structuration Theory, Archer (1982) 
supports the alternative option, the morphogenetic theory 
proposed within general systems theory, notably by Walter 
Buckley in 1968, and has since developed this approach 
through her own social theory. Archer’s Morphogenetic/ 
Morphostatic (M/M) framework (Archer, 1995, Porpora, 
2015) sets out the temporal nature of social change, involving 
a mediating reflexive capacity, and provides a framework for 
analysing empirical data in real-world research. 
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3.6 Habitus, routinised action and reflexivity 
Before moving on to describe Archer’s M/M framework, it is 
worth highlighting that her theory has not been accepted 
uncritically. Archer’s insistence on the analytical separation 
of structure and agency involves a rejection of attempts to 
conflate the two, or to analytically privilege one over the 
other. This is partly because they are distinct entities with 
their own properties (see below) and conflating them 
prevents analysis. Archer’s theory, conversely, intends 
analysis, and is frustrated, therefore by the conflation. 
Archer’s work emphasises agency because her theory of 
reflexivity proposes how agents navigate social conditions 
that are unchosen by them (Archer, 2000). She also, 
however, embeds societal influence in her theory, accepting 
that at times ‘the internal conversations can too readily be 
colonised by the social’ (Archer 2000, quoted in Archer, 2010: 
286).  
3.6.1 Habitus and socialisation 
Archer’s position has been vigorously critiqued by those who 
adhere to Bourdieu’s theory of ‘habitus’, which Archer 
herself rejects (Archer, 2010, Sayer, 2009) on the basis that 
dispositions are held to be passively adopted from society. 
Such critics (Caetano, 2014, Akram and Hogan 2015, Farrugia 
and Woodman, 2015), who accept reflexivity, are concerned 
that Archer overplays its role and in doing so omits to accept 
the role of dispositions derived from ‘the habitus’. Sayer 
(2009:120) defines the habitus as ‘the set of dispositions, 
tastes and orientations that people develop, particularly in 
early life, from living and acting within the particular 
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relationships and environments that exist in their part of the 
social field.’ He summarises that: ‘For me, the habitus is most 
evident when we find ourselves in unfamiliar social 
situations, having to talk with others who have a different 
habitus’ (Sayer, 2009:121); the familiar sense of being a fish 
out of water. 
Akram and Hogan (2015:13) state that: ‘our routinised 
pattern of behaviour, our values and our sense of self are also 
deeply written as it were overtime into how we understand 
ourselves and act’. They go on to say (2015:22) that 
dispositions are ‘pre-conscious, pre-reflexive and non-
cognitive’, but it is unclear from this statement and their 
subsequent examples, how then, dispositions are created in 
a person. Sayer, (2009:120) explains that: ‘these dispositions, 
once activated, produce actions which are generally attuned 
to that context’, but ‘activated’ how? Archer, in contrast, 
provides an account of how we become who we are from 
birth through our embodied, practical and social relations 
with the world and proposes that we develop a sense of self 
and a personal and social identity, embedded in relations 
with our circumstances. This begins with the person. In 
experiencing the external world (through embodied, 
practical and intersubjective means), the person responds, 
learns and evolves. It is unsurprising that in their relations 
with their incumbent structural and cultural emergent 
properties (SEPs and CEPs), that people adopt certain ways 
of thinking and being through these relations, yet in 
encountering novel SEPs and CEPs, that they may, depending 
63 
 
on their personal emergent properties (PEPs) and these 
relations adapt to new circumstances, again, through these 
relations. They may never achieve the congruence of those 
‘fish’ who were spawned in that particular ‘water’ because 
there are a myriad of almost imperceptible embodied, 
practical and social features of social environments that 
make them unique and difficult to infiltrate, albeit that our 
personal emergent properties may also assist in (or 
undermine) attempts to belong in new contexts. 
Caetano (2014:7) also critiques Archer for removing the 
influences of socialisation from her analysis 5 . Caetano 
supports Archer's concept of reflexivity as a conscious 
mechanism but only alongside an acceptance of internalised 
dispositions resulting from social influences and dynamics. 
However, in her chapter 'Socialisation as Relational 
Reflexivity' (Archer and Donati, 2015:124) argues for a 
concept of reflexivity which includes the natural and practical 
orders as ‘bodily encoded and themselves exercising a 
dispositional influence’ (emphasis in original) alongside the 
social order as part of the development of our personal 
identity and as embedded in reflexive responses, underlining 
that although reflexivity has been conceptualised as an 
'internal conversation' in her work, that this is not reduced to 
linguistically mediated responses, but also includes the 
'visceral and the visual'. As an explanatory account, Archer’s 
theory is more persuasive than the idea of dispositions being 
 
5 though she attributes Archer's emphasis in part to the "power dynamics of the sociological 
field" and as a "means of legitimising her approach" (Caetano,2014:11) 
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‘written’ on us, however ‘deeply’. It is a more compelling 
argument that this process of ‘writing’ is a relational one 
between ourselves and our static or changing environments. 
As such, this process is open for further investigation, rather 
than simply assumed.  
3.6.2 Critique regarding the nature of reflexivity 
Archer’s focus on reflexivity as the ‘internal conversation’ 
misleads those who have perhaps engaged only partially with 
her work (e.g. Akram and Hogan, 2015). These authors take 
from Archer’s work the impression that reflexivity is a 
continual and effortful conscious act of ‘reprogramming the 
self’, and that ‘identity and agency’ are a ‘blank canvas’. This 
is a fundamental misinterpretation of Archer’s work (2000) 
Instead, Archer theorises the development of each person’s 
continuous sense of self, shaped through relations with the 
three orders of reality (natural, practical, and social), through 
which a personal and social identity is formed. Her meaning, 
by this author’s interpretation, is that reflexivity is a more 
nuanced mental activity than the one imagined by Akram and 
Hogan, one that is culmination of our myriad of thoughts 
relating to our ‘constellation of concerns’, that form reflexive 
patterns about our concerns in the context of our 
circumstances. These deliberations culminate to shape the 
actions that, in turn, shape our lives. 
As summarised by Sayer (2009:115), the internal 
conversation, described by Archer (2007), has a ‘highly 
abbreviated and personalised form’, a point illustrated also 
by Wiley with his characterisation of the self-talk of a 
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waitress (2015:3). It is also in use not simply for life decisions, 
or moments where our life routines are breached (Akram and 
Hogan, 2015), but is instead a companion, even in daily trivial 
moments, as illustrated the personal examples below: 
FIGURE 1: TRIVIAL BUT TYPICAL INTERNAL DELIBERATIONS 
 
This characterisation shows the internal conversation as a 
much more pervasive guide of everyday action, trivial at 
times but also reflective of the nature of the person, and the 
way their thoughts guide action, rather than a step-by-step 
process of programming our lives. This does not deny 
unconscious action as we may all have found ourselves in a 
certain supermarket aisle, wondering why we are there, or 
for drivers, adopting an automatic pilot on a familiar route 
with no conscious memory of the journey, albeit that these 
occurrences are often when we are thinking about 




3.7 Reflexivity, political philosophy, and 
personalisation 
Arguments for the existence of reflexivity in our socialisation 
beg the question, ‘why is it important?’, particularly in this 
work examining personalisation and person-centred care 
interventions. One response is to refer the reader 
(prematurely) to the case studies (chapters 5-8), that 
illustrate reflexivity in action. In particular, a moment when 
Carly, a seventeen-year-old with a history of family disruption 
and school exclusion expresses her frustration at being 
‘stuck’, as the combination of an underdeveloped reflexive 
capacity and a generous helping of life’s ‘snakes’ rather than 
life’s ‘ladders’ converges in on her in her late teens, limiting 
her options. Social interventions that seek to ameliorate 
reflexive powers, through the relational scaffolding of 
internal reflexive capacity, and by (where possible) 
supporting with contextual ‘snakes’ and ‘ladders’ should 
surely then be promoted, where they can alleviate suffering. 
Another response is to turn to political philosophy. The 
Capabilities Approach (Nussbaum, 2011) is a normative 
theory with the potential to support person-centred 
approaches due to its congruent aspects of reasoning, 
decision making, and agency on the one hand and the 
external constraints on capabilities on the other. 
Furthermore, there is salience between these features and 
with Archer’s explanatory concept of reflexivity. Al-Amoudi 
(2017) makes this connection, but from the other direction, 
highlighting the potential of Archer’s concept of socialisation 
through reflexivity to add social theoretical purchase within 
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political philosophical thought, a move that, as will be 
explained, also has relevance for personalisation. On this 
basis, he proposes that, without undermining either the 
Capabilities Approach or Rawls’ Theory of Justice, it is 
possible to add to them, two sociological considerations, one 
of which is ‘social reflexivity’, as defined by Archer. Al-
Amoudi argues that, despite their value, both these 
normative theories fail to take account of the uneven 
distribution of, and conditions for development of powers of 
reflexivity in their assessment of capability. His critique 
centres on Rawls’ and Nussbaum’s ideas about ‘practical 
reason’ as a capability: that both accept that there are some 
persons who are, for whatever reason, unable to exercise this 
capability, however, that neither theorist considers those 
people who are “less equipped than others with effective 
reflexive powers even though they are not in vital need of 
constant care” (Al-Amoudi 2017:76); a group that he asserts 
are vulnerable to significant inequality as a result. As an 
architectonic capability which “organize[s] and pervades the 
others” (Nussbaum, 2011:39) weaknesses in practical reason, 
seen as impaired capacity for reflexivity may, as Al-Amoudi 
proposes, present inequalities that substantially undermine 
the potential for flourishing. When considering the recipients 
of person-centred social interventions, it is likely that a 
number of them, though by no means all, could be included 
in this group. If functioning ‘social reflexivity’ is key to 
capability, then identifying effective ways to enhance or 
support the capabilities of individuals must include attention 
to their reflexive powers. The current research proceeds on 
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this basis, in agreement with Al-Amoudi that Archer’s theory 
of reflexivity has an integral role when considering conditions 
for the wellbeing of all people in society, and therefore has 
direct relevance to person-centred social interventions. 
3.8 Morphogenetic/Morphostatic (M/M) Approach 
As described in chapter 2, research evidence in 
personalisation and person-centred care identifies the 
importance of contextual conditions for the effective 
implementation of person-centred practice and the 
realisation of its intended effects. That chapter provided an 
overview of some of the entrenched conditions that have 
created obstacles to implementation and, equally, conditions 
held to enable person-centred practice. This section 
introduces Archer’s M/M Approach, which is utilised in the 
case study design in this research, to take account of the 
structural and cultural conditions within which the care 
relationships operate; asking how do these conditions 
influence the people and relationships, and equally, how do 
the people in relationship influence the nature of the 
structures and culture? So, how can Archer’s theory help with 
these questions? 
Archer’s formulation of structure, culture and agency, their 
independence and interplay underpin her social theory and 
the development and application of the M/M Approach 
(Archer 1995, Porpora, 2015). This provides an analytical 
framework for temporally separating what is happening to 
adequately analyse social change and its influencing factors; 
‘it accords full significance to the timescale through which 
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structure and agency themselves emerge, intertwine and 
redefine one another’ (Archer, 1995:76). The M/M Approach 
entails temporally distinct but overlapping phases. The 
propositions on which Archer rests this temporal separation 
of structure and agency are twofold.  
Firstly that ‘structure necessarily pre-dates the action(s) 
which transform it’ and secondly ‘that structural elaboration 
necessarily post-dates those actions’, as depicted in Figure 2. 
FIGURE 2: THE MORPHOGENETIC SEQUENCE (ARCHER 1995:76) 
 
3.9 Emergence and causal powers 
Understanding and applying the morphogenetic sequence 
relies on a prior acceptance of the realist explanation of 
emergence and its inherent causal powers. This is the idea 
that structures (and cultures, agents) as entities have their 
own unique ‘powers and liabilities’ (Sayer, 1992:104) or, as 
Danermark et al. (2019:46) remind us, can also be 
‘weaknesses’ or ‘vulnerabilities’. Emergence is a fundamental 
concept in critical realism and refers to the causal properties 
or powers of entities, where entities are to be understood as 
‘objects or things’ (Elder-Vass, 2005:317). Structures within 
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the context can be empirically tangible entities with a 
relatively stable existence, such as a role, a team, a strategy, 
a contract. These entities are made up of component parts, 
and it is the ‘composition’ of these parts that make up the 
whole and generate its unique emergent properties (Elder-
Vass, 2005:325). These properties are causal and constitute 
mechanisms, essentially ‘ways-of-acting’ (Sayer, 1992:105), 
which cause effects, exist in potential and are realised as 
causal. (see also 3.9, p71). Archer (2000) gives the example 
of a vacant senior post in an organisation. Despite the 
vacancy, the existence and meanings of that post for the 
people around it have emergent properties. The post is one 
element of the pre-existing environmental influences (which 
create constraints or enablement for agents operating 
between T2 and T3 of the sequence). These emergent 
properties are elsewhere described by Archer (2000:307) as 
‘structural emergent properties’ or SEPs, and ‘cultural 
emergent properties’ (CEPs). Although these properties exist 
temporally prior to the human action, Archer is clear that 
they ‘only emerge through the activities of people (PEPs) 
[Personal Emergent Properties], and they are only causally 
efficacious through the activities of people’. The point is that 
SEPs and CEPs form the context that agents are reflexively 
evaluating and responding to. 
Although the M/M model depicted above represents 
structural morphogenesis, Archer uses an equivalent for 
cultural morphogenesis (Cultural system at T1, Socio-cultural 
interaction at T2-3, and cultural elaboration at T4). In using 
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the term culture, Archer does not intend the conventional 
meaning of community identity. For Archer, ‘culture as a 
whole is taken to refer to all intelligibilia; that is any item 
which has the dispositional character to be understood by 
someone’ (Archer, 1988, quoted in Lipscomb, 2014:25). 
Knowledge, ideas and propositions in the cultural system are 
therefore ontologically distinct from and pre-exist the people 
who engage with these ideas at the socio-cultural level, 
where they are upheld, adjusted or replaced to form T4; 
cultural elaboration. 
The cultural system includes the ‘stories we tell’ and their 
influence. These stories are palpable in practice, and the 
analytical separation of the cultural system (T1) from the 
socio-cultural level (T2-T3) in the morphogenetic sequence 
enables us to establish the prevailing ‘stories’ or frames of 
thinking that influence (and are subsequently modified/ 
sustained by) people acting at the socio-cultural level. As 
described by Nunkoosing and Laurelut, 2015:26): ‘Stories are 
powerful because they shape our meanings and experiences; 
they contribute, by means of language, to cultures.’ The 
authors consider how slightly differing accounts of the same 
situation for an individual can create different meanings for 
the person and their empowerment. In Archer’s terms, these 
accounts have emergent effects as part of the cultural system 
(Archer 1995, 1998). 
In organisations that have their established values base as 
core, built around a person-centred philosophy and mode of 
delivery (see Think Local Act Personal, no date), a ‘cultural 
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system’ has been designed and can operate at a distance 
from (although not immune from) the wider structural and 
cultural influences inherent in the statutory health and care 
systems. These small-scale organisations are entities that 
align with Lawson’s (2017:239) metaphor of ‘eudaimonic 
bubbles’, described in chapter 2, and their priorities result in 
structures that are designed in line with the principles that 
drive them. The ensuing socio-cultural interaction (T2-3) is 
imbued with, but not determined by, the values inherent in 
the cultural system and socio-cultural interaction will either 
reproduce these values, adjust them, or transform them. 
Lawson’s metaphor reflects that these ‘bubbles’ are 
somewhat distanced (because of their uniqueness) from 
broader system influences and pressure, but this does not 
entail protection from those cultural and structural forces 
that continue to exist and interact with them. 
The analytical separation of culture and agency offered by 
the morphogenetic sequence enables us to see the stories we 
tell (as constituents of the cultural system) as distinct from 
the people who tell and hear, absorb, and evaluate them, 
enabling the opportunity to examine their influence. In 
Archer’s view, each agent has their own response to such 
cultural forces. Each individual has a unique personal 
identity, and although artefacts from the cultural system at 
T1 exist and can be influential, there can be no assumptions 
that such ‘constraints and enablements have a standardised 
impact on agents who are similarly placed’ (Archer, 
2017a:146). As continuously reflexive human agents, with 
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identities and priorities developed over time through our 
ongoing interface with the social world, our response is 
‘evaluative’ of the situation regarding ourselves and what is 
important to us. This research seeks to understand the 
nature of the cultural system within which the intervention 
operates, including the ideas and stories to which people 
uniquely respond, seeking evidence of any aspects enabling 
or constraining the care relationship, its purpose and its 
effects. 
Therefore, the morphogenetic approach provides a 
framework that enables us to separate out the pre-existing 
cultural and structural conditions, the agential activity and 
the resulting stasis or change. So, structural conditioning, the 
existence of SEPs at T1, in turn, influences but does not 
determine social interaction between T2 and T3, which then 
creates change (or reproduction) at the stage of ‘structural 
elaboration’ (T4). T4 becomes the new T1 as the process of 
reproduction or elaboration of structures continues. Some 
researchers have claimed that the morphogenetic approach 
is more applicable to the understanding of whole systems 
rather than directly applicable to empirical research (Dalkin 
et al., 2015) however, as explained by Lipscomb (2014:21), 
for Archer, ‘if micro-macro or agency-structure links are 
relational, then actual group or unit size becomes 
immaterial’. As Lipscomb (2014) has shown in his worked 
example, the analytical framework provided by Archer’s 
morphogenetic approach can be applied to the explanation 
of happenings in a Hospice of modest size. It could equally be 
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applied to an investigation of the role of reflexivity and 
relationships in a number of social interventions. 
3.10 Mechanisms  
To better understand the causal properties of structures, 
cultures and their potential effects, an introduction to the 
critical realist conception of mechanisms is needed. To 
distinguish conceptions of mechanisms between paradigms, 
Porpora (2015) emphasises the distinction between the 
premise of the covering law model which links causality to 
law-like ‘if-then’ generalisations, and the critical realist 
approach to causality, in which view mechanisms can exist 
regardless of the number of times they operate. Critical 
realists are not seeking law-like rules (as is the case in 
positivism), but instead are interested in causal properties, 
‘causal properties which can be countered’. By this, Porpora 
means that any causal force needs a particular set of 
conditions to be realised as an outcome and gives the 
example of gravity which can certainly be counteracted: 
‘There are no events gravity necessarily produces’ (emphasis 
added, Porpora 2015:50). This does not question the law of 
gravity and its effects. It simply says that even gravity relies 
on a set of conditions, which can be counteracted. This 
emphasises the principle established above, that 
mechanisms and their realisation are always contingent on 
contextual factors.  
3.11 Mechanisms in context 
Porpora (2015:46) describes causal mechanisms, the 
emergent powers of structure, culture, agents in critical 
realism as ‘what makes things work’ and that this is typically 
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‘some kind of causal structure’. He argues for the importance 
of comprehensively describing the phenomenon to be 
examined, to be in a position to articulate mechanisms. 
Acknowledgement of the existence of active or latent 
mechanisms in open systems means rejecting the reduction 
of causality to simple linear processes:  
‘for example, individuals are themselves complex 
systems but live within households which exist in 
spatial areas, are surrounded by institutional forms and 
are affected by markets…and so on.….all systems at all 
levels are intersected with other systems and causal 
powers flow in all possible directions.’ (Byrne 2018:93). 
Porpora (2015) reminds us that structures do not require a 
physical presence and can be abstract forms, for instance, 
relations. It is important to distinguish here between 
‘relationship’ and ‘social relations’. The relationship is, in 
practical terms, the relationship between people; in this 
research, the relationship between the practitioner and care 
recipient. Social relations are between any emergent entities, 
which can be person and person, but also person and team, 
organisation and contract, policy and commissioners, 
signifying that the relation between them is constituted of 
the emergent properties of each and how these interact. In 
this study, an example could be the relations that subsist 
between the Local Authority or Clinical Commissioning Group 
and the provider organisation. Arising from the history, 
ethos, tendencies, relationships, processes and rules, any 
commissioning/provider activity will be influenced by the 
76 
 
causal forces generated by the nature of these relations, 
creating conditions that influence, but do not determine the 
subsequent action of agents and effects that follow.  
Westhorp (2018:56) also emphasises the idea of emergent 
properties and liabilities of structures. Similarly to De Souza 
(2013), she highlights the ‘internal structures and processes 
of the relevant aspects of context’. The use of the word 
‘relevant’ is essential here.  It speaks to Pawson’s (2018:212) 
challenge that context is ‘absobloodylutely anything’ and the 
need to identify aspects of context influencing a particular 
mechanism, described by Pawson (2018:212) as ‘those 
contexts of which a strong case can be made for their 
relevance’. The researcher’s role then is to discern the 
mechanisms and their relevant contexts, and vice versa.  
As described above, mechanisms can also be emergent of the 
values and social norms of the cultural system (Archer 1988, 
Porpora, 2015), and these mechanisms and their influence 
should be included in causal analysis. As Westhorp (2018:55) 
summarises, ‘these norms and values have their effect by 
operating as social forces which cause, or contribute to, 
outcomes – that is by operating as a mechanism’. As 
highlighted in the policy and practice chapter (see 2.11), the 
integral role of values and ideals in the provision of care is 
deemed important in this study, as they are embedded as 
mechanisms in the cultural context, emergent of, and 
reproduced by the people involved. A value-neutral approach 
would be misleading as these VCSE sector services have 
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emerged from and continue to regenerate these values as a 
basis for operating. 
De Souza (2013) sets out a helpful framework to illustrate 
different contextual mechanisms (Structural, Cultural, 
Agential). This has helped clarify how to conceptualise 
contextual mechanisms in this research into social 
interventions, and Figure 4 shows its application to a real 
reported social care experience, featured in a blog post by 
Aisling Duffy (2018) (Figure 3), as part of the Social Care 
Future blog series: 









FIGURE 4: STRUCTURAL, CULTURAL, AND AGENTIAL MECHANISMS 




3.12 Reflexivity as a mechanism 
Mechanisms emergent of structure and culture are 
important in this study in that they constitute the influential 
contexts within which care relationships are delivered. 
However, the primary focus of this research is the idea that 
human rationality or agential reasoning is a generative 
mechanism, establishing reasoning as causal. Porpora 
(2015:50) asserts that this simply means that ‘it is people’s 
wants and beliefs that cause their actions – although to be 
sure, not in law-like ways’.  
Archer’s social theory (Archer 2000, 2003, 2007), upon which 
this research primarily draws, provides a thorough 
theoretical account of the way that human rationality 
develops and operates in context. Archer argues that 
reflexivity is a causal power of people or personal emergent 
property (PEP). When confronted with our circumstances 
and with reference to our concerns, we deliberate and decide 
upon courses of action, thereby ‘activating the structural and 
cultural powers’ (Archer 2007:16). Archer proposes that 
reflexivity also incorporates relational reflexivity, which 
extends our reflexive deliberations ‘by means of internal and 
external conversation’ to include others and collaborate with 
them either around decisions or practical projects (Archer 
and Donati, 2015:211-12). This research is also examining if 
(and if so how) reflexivity incorporates a relational 
mechanism as part of the reflexive process and will draw on 
the developed theory of Pierpaolo Donati (2011) and Archer 
and Donati (2015) to support this examination.  
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3.13 Utility of describing these ‘invisible’ mechanisms 
The realist principle that mechanisms operate at a different 
level of reality than the outcomes they generate means that 
all mechanisms are somewhat invisible. Some mechanisms 
are more empirically available than others, but empirical 
availability does not signify increased causal influence. 
Pawson (2013:122) describes invisible mechanisms as ‘the 
tacit powers of interventions’, highlighting that these 
‘powers’ are foundational yet overlooked and undervalued in 
evaluation research. Of the different types of ‘tacit powers’, 
Pawson includes reference to those that are relational in 
nature and affirms the position of Bellavite et al. (2006) that: 
‘Issues such as interpersonal, physical, non-verbal rapport 
and empathy (in whatever treatment) could be studied as 
change mechanisms in their own right.’ (Pawson, 2013:158). 
Implicit within Pawson’s description of the role of these 
hidden mechanisms in behaviour change is the variation in 
individuals and their reflexivity as addressed by Archer’s 
social theory. 
Westhorp (2018) says that exploration of layered 
mechanisms is important in policy and programme research 
because it seeks a level of understanding beyond a 
description that a context influences a mechanism - to how 
and why this occurs. This is a core premise in the current 
research, as we know that the personhood of the people 
(practitioner and service user) and the cultural and structural 
contexts of the intervention are important to person-centred 
interventions, but we do not have the means to understand 
how and why. Westhorp proposes that in understanding the 
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how and why, the knowledge produced can support the 
adaptation of a programme to different contexts. As she says: 
‘the theory about ‘how’ context affects programme 
mechanisms is as important as the theory for ‘how’ 
programme mechanisms generate programme outcomes.’ 
(Westhorp, 2018:56). Practitioners may be further 
encouraged by these developments to consider the 
mechanisms that are beyond those intended or experienced 
directly by programme originators and participants, to 
include ‘invisible mechanisms’ operating within the action 
context of the programme which ‘shape, enable and disable 
mechanisms inherent to the programme’ (Westhorp, 
2018:57).  
Westhorp’s explanation is consistent with the description of 
‘vertical’ mechanisms as described by Collier (1994:48), 
marking a difference between horizontal explanation: ‘the 
explanation of events by mechanisms and antecedent 
causes’ and vertical explanation as to the ‘explanation of one 
mechanism by a more basic one’, reflecting the layers of 
stratified reality. The inclusion of both underlines the need to 
explore mechanisms and their contextual factors, which may 
not initially seem relevant to, or within the scope of the 
programme, with an awareness that seeking the causes of 
causes can lead to greater explanatory insight. This research 
considers the nature of individual reflexivity and care 
relationships as potential invisible mechanisms and, as such, 




Westhorp (2018) distinguishes between the pragmatic and 
philosophical viewpoints on the value of exploring in depth 
the mechanisms that exist within contexts. The pragmatic 
perspective is one of utilisation. She quotes Mark et al. 
(2000), who say that ‘increasingly molecular analyses may 
not enhance utility’ (Westhorp, 2018:53). This challenge is an 
important one, as pragmatically, attempts to examine 
reflexivity and the role of relationship may not offer 
explanatory value. However, in examining personalisation 
and person-centred practices, this research argues that the 
move is warranted. Personalisation, viewed ontologically, 
has the objective of responding to and supporting the nature 
of an individual in the process of their lifelong socialisation. 
In viewing personalisation in this way and developing and 
testing a theoretical framework consistent with 
personalisation practice, the findings of this research may 
provide theoretical insights for those conducting research 
into interventions that are person-centred in nature. 
 
3.14 Archer’s ‘reflexivity’ and personalisation 
The morphogenetic approach liberates agency through the 
inclusion of reflexivity; the internal deliberations of the 
individual agent; deliberations centred on their sense of self, 
their practices and their interests, in the context of (but not 
determined by) their social environment (Archer, 2000, 
2003). Carter and New (2004) acknowledge the contribution 
of Archer's M/M approach for analysis, as a heuristic that 
establishes the temporal nature of structure pre-existing the 
activity of agents, who in turn, re-establish or make changes 
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to the existing structures. This approach means accepting 
that although structures influence agents, they do not 
determine action and the distinction allows for the 
expression of individual agency (Archer, 2000:255). 
The potential for agency is important even if the person's 
current context is disabling to their ability to act.  
Person-centred care and personalisation assume this 
possibility for agency, supported in particular by those who 
emphasise the centrality of 'personhood' in practice (Dewing, 
2008, McCormack, 2004). From a practitioner perspective, 
acknowledging the possibility for agency is an emancipatory 
move, not just for the care recipient but also for themselves. 
They may be constrained by multiple aspects of their context 
but have the potential to deliberate on these aspects and 
choose the way they act. In care provision, acknowledging 
personhood can guard against assumptions about what 
people need and how they will respond or how they should. 
Practitioners remain analytical, reflective, seek to 
understand, and make careful judgements about the level of 
support needed, in turn, seeking feedback about their 
judgements and assumptions about care.  
3.15 Characterisation of the agent’s personhood 
Archer’s detailed examination of the human agent (Archer, 
2000) goes further than those definitions of personhood 
utilised in the person-centred care literature to justify their 
approaches (Dewing, 2008, McCormack, 2004, Sabat, 1998). 
It may, therefore, offer additional support to the project of 
those who seek to emphasise the role of personhood in care 
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practices. Understanding Archer’s conception of the human 
agent introduces the important role that she assigns to 
agency in social life. In Being Human (2000), Archer 
underpins her theory with a ‘model of man’ and human 
agency. She describes a model where each of us has a 
personal identity and each a social identity. Our social 
identity is not of our choosing but is rooted in our natal 
circumstances. However, the choices we make influence and 
shape its progression throughout life. Our personal identity 
is comprised of our relations with three orders of reality: the 
natural, practical, and social orders. Our relations with each 
of these; our embodied experiences and learning in the 
natural order, our engagement with material culture 
(objects/tools/methods/practices) in the practical order and 
our relationship with cultural propositions in the social order 
intertwine and are constitutive of who we are and continue 
to become. Our priority concerns are established through an 
ongoing dialogical relationship between our concerns and 
our second order emotions (see Archer 2000: 230-1).  
An advantage of Archer’s theory, revisited in the case studies, 
is that she emphasises that our concerns are not limited to 
our ‘discursive’ and social relations with our world 
(subject/subject relations), but are also sourced from our 
embodied (object/object relations) and practical experiences 
(subject/object relations). This enables the inclusion, rather 
than the exclusion of people, for example, with Learning 
Disabilities who present with significant differences in their 
cognitive, linguistic and/or social development, and who 
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have their own profile of concerns developed through their 
unique relations with these three orders of reality. Archer’s 
detailed theoretical argument can be explored in her work 
(Archer 2000). However, the relevance for this study is that 
our reflexive deliberations are not only dealing with the day 
to day’ cat food and phone calls’ (p65) type of deliberation 
(although these are included). They are also engaged with the 
depth of a lifetime of entwined, embodied, practical and 
social experiences and learning, each of us within our own 
unique and always-changing circumstances. This cumulative 
learning constitutes the knowledge source of the internal 
relations of the internal conversation (see 3.16), which is also 
subject to different ‘modes’ of reflexivity (see 3.17).  
Reflexivity is the process by which we adjudicate between 
these concerns through our internal conversation. Archer 
(Archer and Donati, 2015:135) refers to their ‘dovetailing’, 
explaining that having several priorities does not lead to their 
realisation, and through the reflexive process, we have to 
‘design a life in which they can become integrated’, although 
always with variable success.  Our personal identity forms in 
pursuit of those concerns to which we most faithfully 
commit, in Archer’s terms, our ‘ultimate concerns’ and 
‘commitments’ (Archer and Donati, 2015:88). Archer (2017a) 
describes the challenge that this presents each of us, as we 
continually and simultaneously spin the plates of the natural, 
practical and social orders, as there is potential for conflict of 
priority between them. For example: ‘evasion in response to 
the prompting of physical fear can threaten social self-worth 
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by producing cowardly acts; cessation of an activity in 
response to boredom can threaten physical wellbeing’ 
(Archer, 2017:142).  
Fran, who will be introduced in case study 2, described the 
need to adjudicate two concerns. The first was a concern in 
the natural order: being positioned well by her visiting carers 
for a comfortable sleep (an exacting process). The second 
was a concern of the social order: avoiding frustrating her 
carers with too many instructions so that she could be 
confident they would attend to her future requests. Fran 
described compromising her physical comfort at times to 
safeguard her influence on her carers, longer-term.  
Fran’s reflexive deliberations took account of her concerns in 
the context of her circumstances, which had been severely 
compromised 20 years earlier in an accident that had 
resulted in paraplegia. In this situation, Fran’s concerns did 
not ‘dovetail’, and she felt compelled to prioritise her social 
and practical concerns over those in the natural order.   
Those who aim to work in person-centred ways seek out 
what is important to and for the person, aiming to 
understand their concerns. Archer’s detailed examination of 
the ‘orders’ of concerns may help to broaden ideas about the 
nature of people’s concerns and how they might be 
discovered. The NHS personalisation strategy urges us to do 
this; to consider ‘perspective’; the importance of ‘seeing 
people’ (see 2.14, p49). Archer’s theory offers a deeper 
conception of personhood, highlighting the importance of 
embodied and practical concerns, where the previous focus 
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may be primarily on the ‘social’ in person-centred care. This 
is emphasised by Lee (2019:56), who says: ‘person-centred 
care is human-human relation-centric and is often reliant on 
the cognitively fit to make care decisions for the cognitively 
impaired’. Lee introduces, as a partial remedy in a care home 
context, the idea of ‘material citizenship’ in the context of 
social citizenship; that our engagement with everyday 
functional objects is, in part, constitutive of a person, taking 
account of the importance of the natural and practical 
orders, in concert with the social. She says (2019:57) ‘what 
has been overlooked is the relation between the human and 
material worlds’. Although Lee does not explore this 
connection, Archer’s analysis would seem to provide strong 
theoretical support for ‘material citizenship’, but more 
importantly, draws practitioner and practice focus 
towards all three orders of human concerns. In turn, this has 
implications for people with dementia, as in Lee’s study, and 
those with any type of disability involving the cognitive, 
linguistic or social.   
3.16 Agency, reflexivity and the Internal 
Conversation  
Hitlin and Elder (2007) describe the ‘slippery’ and ‘abstract’ 
nature of agency in empirical research, as it primarily resides 
in theoretical debate. Following the work of Mead, they take 
the view that ‘individual’s actions are oriented toward 
meeting the conditions of social life’ (Hitlin and Elder, 
2007:175); that actions are intentional and oriented within, 
and in response to, social circumstances. From their 
perspective as social psychologists, they take the step, 
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similarly to Archer, that incorporating an understanding of 
the ‘self’ enables a deeper understanding of agency. This 
means that discussions of agency can tie in more closely with 
empirical research practice. They also critique the practice of 
sociology in general for overlooking the importance of 
exploring the workings of agency, accusing sociologists of 
side-lining the ‘actions of actors’ as ‘epiphenomenal’, and 
using the term ‘agency’ to express ‘some vague sense of 
human freedom (…) within a broader model’ (Hitlin and 
Elder, 2007:170-1). However, in contrast to Archer, 
they fully adopt Mead’s work, drawing the concept of agency 
together with the theory and writings about the ‘self’. They, 
referencing Flaherty and Fine (2002) in this regard, 
emphasise the importance of temporality in Mead’s work - 
that our identity is continually formed over time in response 
to our social context.  
Archer (Archer and Donati, 2015) recognises the contribution 
made by Mead’s linking of socialisation and reflexivity, 
viewing the ‘inner conversation’, as a breakthrough in its 
potential to explain the connection between the individual 
and society and the way that the ‘social order enter[s] into 
the constitution of the human being’ (Archer and Donati, 
2015: 123). In particular, Archer commends the way that 
Mead maintains the position that socialisation involves the 
reflexive reasoning of subjects.  
However, in a more detailed discussion of Mead’s position 
(Archer 2003), Archer articulates problems with his 
conception of the process of reflexivity, identifying that C.S. 
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Peirce, before Mead, presented a more convincing case for 
an internal conversation which recognised a ‘balancing act 
between our external lives in society and our internal life of 
the mind’ (Archer, 2003:78). Mead, in contrast, takes a more 
socialised position; his idea of the ‘inner conversation’ is 
more akin to an individual’s conversation with society rather 
than an individual’s conversation within him or 
herself. Archer rejects this position on the basis that in doing 
this, Mead omitted the three personal emergent properties 
which for Archer are key; ‘the interiority, subjectivity, and 
causal efficacy of the life of the mind’ (Archer, 2003:93), 
consistent with the principle of analytical dualism, creating 
space for the temporal analysis of agency in context.  
For Mead, the ‘I’ is ‘the active portion of the self-concept that 
carries on a dialogue with the reflective “Me”’ (Hitlin and 
Elder, 2007:178). Hitlin and Elder (2007:178) say that ‘the 
very existence of “I” allows for agency when compared to an 
over-socialised view of social action’. However, for Archer, 
this is inadequate. She proposes that Mead’s ‘inner 
conversation’ is over-socialised in that the “Me” represents 
the ‘generalised other’ and therefore is not a conversation 
with oneself at all, but with society; a position endorsed by 
Wiley (2016) in his account of the contribution of the 
pragmatists’ to concepts of inner speech. Peirce, in contrast, 
proposed a stratified model of the internal conversation, 
which he described as a dialogue ‘between different phases 
of the ego’, interested in self-transformation (Archer, 
2003:89-90). In contrast to Mead’s ‘me’, Peirce’s ‘me’ – is the 
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‘critical self’, which is ‘one’s conscience and the seat of the 
deepest underlying dispositions that one has developed 
biographically’. Peirce’s theory also includes engagement 
between the ‘I’ and the ‘You’; deliberations which prepare 
the ground for future manifestations of the ‘I’: what Peirce 
called ‘the power of preparatory meditation’ (Archer, 
2003:76). Archer, whilst acknowledging Mead’s work in 
establishing the role of the ‘inner conversation’, thus 
expresses a strong preference for the theorising of Peirce and 
develops his work in her own theory of the internal relations 
involved in the internal conversation.  
3.17 Internal conversation: ‘who is speaking to 
whom?’ 
Archer identifies the internal conversation as central to the 
reflexive process, characterising it as the way we ‘have a 
conversation with ourselves, silently in our own heads’ 
(Archer 2003:161); an ordinary process of inner speech 
involving such mental activity as ‘mulling things over, 
prioritising, rehearsing, clarifying, deciding’, among others. In 
Archer’s research, her respondents readily agreed that this 
was something they did and reported to consider it a 
universal phenomenon (Archer, 2003). Archer’s model of the 
internal conversation sets out: “who is speaking to whom?” 
(Archer, 2003:105), and following the work of Peirce, she 
elaborates on the internal relations which constitute the 
internal conversation. She proposes that: 
• the ‘I’, the ‘only speaker in the internal conversation’ 
(Archer and Donati,2015:103), confers with 
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• the me-relation reaching back into the past for what I 
know (objectively) of myself,  
• the you-relation which considers the future I can 
conceive of for myself and  
• we-relation; our engagement with the reflexivity of 
significant others (see also Carrigan, 2014:252).  
Archer is clear that the I – me – you- we relations are simply 
‘analytical devices…because I can only talk to myself and the 
internal conversation is not between three reified people 
inside me’ (Archer, 2003:75), so that ‘this is an ontological 
claim not an epistemological claim’ (Archer and Donati, 
2015:100), but maintains that they are each analytically 
important as they represent different functions within the 
internal conversation, capturing ‘the past-alive-in-the-
present and the future-which-is-being-made.’ (Archer 
2003:112). Wiley (2016:157) similarly states the advantage 
that Mead and Peirce’s thinking offers to conceptualising 
how humans engage with temporality: ‘We are three-legged 
stools, standing simultaneously in the past, present and 
future’. 
The example above in Figure 1 (Trivial but typical internal 
conversations) recounts an internal conversation about 
answering the phone to my brother. Reviewed as conversed 
between the internal relations, it can be represented like 
this: 




These surfaced aspects of my momentary internal debate 
represent the more numerous ‘concerns-in-context’ that 
helicoptered in my mind during the four rings before I 
answered.  This complexity is acknowledged, but it is 
maintained that it is possible to model the internal 
conversation in this way, enabling insight into surfaced 
reflexive thought and action. This illustrates how people 
uniquely respond to circumstances and as a result (in small 
ways like this, and in more impactful ways), shape their lives. 
This conceptualisation of the internal relations allows for self-
reflection and offers emancipatory, transformative power to 
agents. Their reflexivity via the internal conversation 
underpins the continuous development of their personal 
identity in the light of core concerns, circumstances, 
relationships, and the development of projects. Writing 
about action in the context of the structural constraints 
surrounding person-centred practice, John O’Brien (2013:5) 
observes that: ‘the wonder is that even in a world dominated 
by system rationality people can choose to resist its limits and 
transcend those limits by supporting one another to act 
outside its boundaries in a shared search for the good life.’ 
Such resistance and transcendence are made possible 
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through reflexive deliberation. Archer is clear that the 
realisation of intentions, for any individual, may not be in 
reach due to contextual constraints but insists on the 
capacity for reflexivity as a ‘personal emergent property’ 
which has the potential to counteract those of structures and 
cultures.  
In contrast, Hitlin and Elder (2007), describing their different 
‘ideal types’ of agency and embedding the concept of 
temporality into agency and the development of identity, use 
a Meadian interpretation of reflexivity and agency, summed 
up with a sense of passivity:  
‘what we term life course agency leads then, over time, to the 
accumulation of identities that are claimed at the level of 
agentic actions. Over time these actions get folded into our 
sense of self and become guiding forces for identity 
agency.’ Hitlin and Elder (2007:184). 
 
The difference between these two positions may seem 
subtle; however, they have implications for research 
practice. Taking Archer’s view opens the opportunity to 
explore the reflexive processes which underpin action, rather 
than viewing identity as a passive accumulation of 
experience. 
3.18 Modes of reflexivity 
Internal relations represent the discussion between 
temporally informed parts of our ‘sense of self’ (the ‘past-
alive-in-the-present’ and the ‘future-that-is-being-made’). 
Archer’s modes of reflexivity are derived from her empirical 
research (Archer, 2003) in which she sought to explore 
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whether there was variation in people’s internal 
conversations and hence different patterns of reflexive 
deliberation. As reflexivity is the personal power of people to 
deliberate about concerns in the context of their 
circumstances and choose to act (or not) to effect change on 
their structural and cultural conditions, what would 
differences in the nature of reflexivity mean for the way they 
navigated life, and therefore how society is formed? This 
initial research (Archer, 2003) identified patterns or ‘modes’ 
of reflexivity, and subsequent research (Archer 2007, 2012) 
built on these initial propositions. Archer’s findings 
culminated in the presentation of four reflexive ‘modes’. To 
illustrate these, she shared ideal types (Archer, 2003) of 
individuals where the patterns of reflexive tendencies were 
strong. Archer is clear that these modes of reflexivity are not 
set and that we can move between expressing each of them, 
even in a single day (Archer, 2017b) and throughout our life 
span. They are considered in this research as a heuristic 
device that presents characteristics of the reflexive 
mechanism, which spurs people’s thought and subsequent 
action in a particular direction. Thinking about the modes as 
tendencies allows necessary flexibility, as one tendency may 
typically dominate, yet circumstance or influence may ‘light 
up’ another.  
These modes of reflexivity are useful in considering the 
reflexive characteristics of the participants. The question 
being, are modes of reflexivity distinguishable in participants 
and if so, do they play a part in the nature of the care 
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relationships being studied? Their development is connected 
to both the individual’s relationship to their natal context and 
their primary concerns (Scambler, 2018).   
The nature of our reflexivity, Archer proposes, emanates 
from a continual process of personal morphogenesis shaped 
by our natal context and ongoing life experiences. Archer 
proposes that variation in contextual continuity in childhood 
and adolescence is an indicator of dominant reflexive mode 
(Archer, 2003, 2007). Contextual continuity, characterised by 
stability and family relationships, which consistently 
generate relational goods throughout development, leads 
to Communicative reflexivity, a tendency to maintain and 
reproduce the contextual conditions of home and 
background (morphostasis). The intimate nature of this 
family and local context leads to reflexive deliberations that 
typically involve other close-knit group members, and 
decisions are therefore made consensually, checked with, 
and confirmed by others in the group.   
Contextual discontinuity or incongruity leads to a ‘reduction 
in family and natal bonds’ (Archer and Donati, 2015:116) and 
the development of an identity, a sense of self that is 
distanced relationally from the original family context. The 
pattern of reflexivity in these people is orientated towards 
change; morphogenesis, as they function in a context where 
the established ways of operating are less familiar and need 
to be dealt with actively and independently. Those who 
distance themselves from their background due to disruption 
resulting from separation, difficulty, or a personal need/ 
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opportunity for freedom (experiencing ‘relational evils’), 
pursue a path of self-reliance with a tendency towards 
Autonomous reflexivity. Those who distance themselves 
because they discover that their purpose or ultimate 
concerns are incongruent with that of their family (despite 
relational goods) tend towards Meta-reflexivity. 
The modes are summarised as follows: 
Communicative reflexivity is seen in ‘those whose internal 
conversations require completion and confirmation by 
others before resulting in courses of action’ (Scambler, 2013, 
2018:99). Archer (2003, 2007) presents this group as typically 
having strong bonds family and local bonds, a reflexive 
tendency characterised by ‘contextual continuity’ during 
development years, with likely stability in both the 
geographical location and relationships. This reflexive 
tendency maintains this continuity. 
Autonomous reflexive tendencies are evident in ‘those who 
sustain self-contained internal conversations, leading directly 
to action’. (Scambler, 2013, 2018:99). They act strategically 
to progress towards focused goals. Archer (2003, 2007) 
presents this group as having experienced ‘contextual 
discontinuity’ from their natal context through freedom, 
opportunity, or a level of disruption or family breakdown.  
Those tending towards meta-reflexivity are critically 
reflexive about their own internal conversations and also 
critical of effective action in society (Scambler, 2013, 
2018:99). Archer (2003, 2007) also presents this group as 
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having experienced contextual incongruity leading them to 
critically evaluate their natal background and choose a 
different way of life consistent with newly attained contexts, 
values and relationships. 
The fractured reflexives internal conversation ‘cannot lead to 
purposeful courses of action but only intensify personal 
distress and disorientation’ (Archer and Donati, 2015:143). 
The identification of modes of reflexivity using these 
definitions risks compartmentalising people and a 
temptation to use the modes instrumentally. However, this 
would be a misuse of the theory as modalities are context-
sensitive, and although people may present with habitual 
patterns, grouping people into ‘types’ would be clumsy and 
premature. Circumstances are critical to reflexive 
responses.   
Extending the example of the phone call above (Trivial but 
typical internal conversations p65), in different 
circumstances, I may have thought and acted somewhat 
differently: 




This example demonstrates that reflexive modes are not 
categories of people but a personal tendency that is subject 
to a momentary blend of concerns and circumstances. Having 
said this, if we aggregate up, as individuals, we show patterns 
of tendencies that may orient us to a dominant mode, which 
may remain stable or may change in the light of new 
circumstances. This is what Archer (2003) identifies firstly in 
‘Structure, Agency and the Internal Conversation’, and 
develops in her subsequent two books (Archer, 2007, 2012). 
The application of these modes to the current research is part 
of the analysis of each participant, both practitioners and 
people receiving care, to examine whether their reflexive 
tendencies are evident within their life circumstances. This 
then enables consideration of the relevance of reflexive 
modes to the care relationship and helps us understand how 
participants engage in the care relationship and what their 
unique reflexive patterns mean for the care relationship. 
3.19 Relational reflexivity and the ‘We-relation’  
As already set out above, Archer’s account of a person’s 
ontology helps consider who they are and become through 
their reflexive engagement with the natural, practical, and 
social orders in their unchosen, yet influential, social 
circumstances. She articulates a person’s reflexive 
commitment to their priority concerns from an array of 
potential interests, attempting to dovetail their chosen 
affairs in the (always fallible) pursuit of a good life. If this 
sounds idealistic, it is worth emphasising that fallibility is 
perennial, and this pursuit will, for most of us, entail the 
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unexpected events that present a further opportunity for 
reflexive activity. This pursuit is also not an individualistic 
one; it involves relational reflexivity as integral to the process 
of ‘shaping a life’.  
Archer characterises reflexivity as inherently relational, 
engaging, to a greater or lesser extent, with others within the 
bounds of our reflexive projects. For Archer (Archer and 
Donati, 2015:137), the result of reflexivity is life as a ‘personal 
property’, as she explains, ‘only one person can have the 
internal, subjective sense of what gives unity to his or her 
own life. Archer argues, however, that how this happens also 
incorporates relationships into reflexivity. Our relationships 
are intertwined with our concerns and the way that we 
adjudicate between them. Relationships ‘accompany and 
surround’ what is important to us. Within this 
representation, we are also ‘Relational Subjects’ (Archer and 
Donati, 2015:50), intentionally orientating our actions 
towards shared purpose with others. 
Archer and Donati (2015) share their concept of the ‘We-
relation’ to replace other conceptions of plural subjects. They 
argue against ideas of ‘we-thinking’, proposed by other social 
theorists to explain collective thought. Other propositions of 
‘we’ in social theory described by Archer and Donati 
(2015:37-49) include ‘we-thinking’ as shared intentions 
(Bratman), a conscious joint intention (Searle), we-mode: 
becoming ‘as one with a group and adopting the norms of the 
group’ (Tuomela), or the adherence to the binding or unifying 
commitments of a group (Gilbert).  
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These positions are rejected because they lack temporality. 
They are represented in the present without reference to the 
individuals themselves, how they come together, or why. 
This lack of attention to individual biography, reflexivity or 
common purpose overlooks the richness that these aspects 
bring to relationships between people. Archer and Donati 
(2015:50), in their alternative proposition of we-ness, 
emphasise the potential for emergence in social relations and 
present a ‘Relational Subject’ who thinks for him/herself and 
has his/her own internal ideas and beliefs, yet will ‘orient his 
or her actions to…emergent goods’ through shared purpose. 
Archer’s model of ‘internal relations’ (introduced above) 
includes this ‘we-relation’. 
In our internal conversation, the ‘I’ confers with the objective 
‘me’, the future ‘you’ and the relational ‘we’ in deliberation 
about long- and short-term actions. Thus, for Archer and 
Donati, socialisation is an ongoing active, reflexive and 
relational process. This theory forms the foundation of the 
empirical research undertaken.  
3.20 Relational subjects and relational goods 
The focus for this research on the care relationship rests, 
therefore, on the importance of the nature of the people in 
the relationship, how they reflexively make their way 
through life, and how the relationship draws on these 
foundations. The further challenge is to conceptualise the 
nature and role of the relationship itself. Pierpaolo Donati 
(2011), in his relational sociology, assists with this. Consistent 
(and as a co-author) with Archer (Archer and Donati, 2015), 
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he theorises the relationship as an objective entity with 
emergent properties. It consists between people and is not 
reducible to either (or any) one of them. In this view, the 
relationship is not a peripheral and subjectively understood 
concept but an objective entity, both sustained by and 
generating ‘energy and resources’ (Archer and Donati, 
2015:205).  
Donati characterises the energy and resources generated as 
‘relational goods’ (and their counterpart ‘relational evils’). 
These are valuable societal goods that are not material, 
functional or ideas-based goods but goods that are emergent 
of social relations. Donati (Archer and Donati, 2015:205) 
describes a relational good as ‘an intangible good in which 
energy and resources can be invested and from which energy 
and resources can be drawn’. An example could be a 
relationship between long-term colleagues, who, through 
challenging times, have drawn on their relationship for 
strength, a sense of ‘in it together’. This theory of the 
‘energising and resourcing’ nature of relational goods 
indicates potential causal properties and effects, providing a 
relational infrastructure: platforms or footholds within the 
‘we-relation’ for moving on or maintaining or nurturing 
elements of life that are important to us. Archer (Archer and 
Donati, 2015) theorises that throughout life, the different 
we-relations we forge are influential in developing our 
personal and social identity. She proposes that, through the 
ongoing process of relational reflexivity, new affiliations can 
‘prove to be the doorway to a different ‘Me” (Archer and 
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Donati, 2015:107). The current research examines the 
existence and role of relational goods, empirically testing the 
theory that relational goods may provide energy and 
resources within a relational infrastructure, to support 
agency and fuel potential agential activity, asking: Is there 
evidence that this process operates in the way that the theory 
presents? 
Archer’s and Donati’s theories indicate that, in social 
interventions such as those examined in this research, the 
we-relation may be a fundamental mechanism for personal 
change; its conditions of possibility consisting within people 
and circumstances. However, it is important not to overstate 
the influence of a single ‘we-relation’ within a social 
intervention as it is operating as only one relationship within 
(in all likelihood) multiple others. The hypothesis being 
considered here is that care relationships in social 
interventions can contribute causally to personal change; if a 
‘we-relation’ is formed, relational goods are generated, and 
the resulting ‘energy and resources’ trigger action towards 
this shared purpose. It is feasible that in building a 
relationship that supports someone, the relational synergy 
created between people can become a platform for change 
that has effects for the relationship and individual action. In 
the last chapter, the concept of outcomes as ‘value-in use’ 
(Grönroos, 2011) was introduced, identifying, at the level of 
service delivery, the centrality of the person receiving a 
service in value-creation. Relational reflexivity and the we-
relation, as theorised by Archer and Donati, may help to 
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model how this value creation process could happen for 
individuals within this relationship as they reflexively 
navigate life.   
The possibility for the coming together of Relational Subjects 
to generate Relational Goods depends on conditions set out 
by Donati, based on his empirical work. Donati (Archer and 
Donati, 2015:211-12) gives an account of the requirements 
for the generation of Relational Goods involving Relational 
Subjects, which will be expanded upon later in analysis and 
discussion of the observed and described relationships in this 
current research. In short, however, he establishes that the 
generation of a relational good requires: 
• a ‘personal and social identity’ of participants 
because the relational good is tied into the nature and 
concerns of the people involved,  
• relationships which are ‘characterised by caring’, an 
absence of instrumental motivation between parties,  
• a ‘reciprocity that exists between them, that the 
goods are such that people both generate and share 
them together, and  
• The generation of goods requires ‘elaboration over 
time’ and therefore are not the product of a 
momentary interaction between relative strangers. 
In addition, Donati (Archer and Donati, 2015) draws on 
Archer’s reflexive modes and indicates that relational goods 
are more likely to be emergent from a communicative or 
meta-reflexive mode of reflexivity due to the incompatibility 
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with purely ‘autonomous’ motivations or ‘blocked or 
fractured’ reflexivity.6 These conditions presented by Donati 
immediately raise two questions. First: to what extent care 
relationships can meet these criteria? Second: how can an 
exploration of care relationships extend our understanding of 
relationships which do/do not generate relational goods? 
3.21 Conclusion 
A challenge to personalisation theory and practice is that 
some of its philosophical roots remain in individualism and 
that with this comes ‘responsibilisation’ (Ferguson, 2012:59); 
the idea that facilitating personal agency and self-reliance 
will in turn decrease reliance on public services. Although this 
approach to personalisation is superficially a win-win for 
person and state, it fails to engage with a more 
comprehensive understanding of personhood-in-context, 
and crucially the part that relationships play in socialisation, 
and potentially in care. This highlights the gap in person-
centred theory and therefore practice. New guidance (NHS 
England 2019a, 2019b) has emphasised ‘personhood’ and the 
‘perspective’ ‘ways of seeing people’ and ‘new relationships’, 
however, it is argued that there is inadequate theoretical 
underpinning to support this position, meaning that these 
aspects risk being side-lined in practice. The solution offered 
by this research, in applying Archer’s social theory, does not 
dispense with features of individualism, as autonomy and 
self-determination are observable human tendencies. 
 
6 Remembering that modes are characterised as preferences and that although 




Instead, it sets this tendency within a broader context of 
human reflexive responses, rooted in early and ongoing 
socialisation (inclusive of relationships) and responsive to 
current circumstances. In doing so, Archer accounts for active 
agency in human life, whilst acknowledging the conditions 
which may generate passivity. To this, Archer and Donati 
(2015:15), add that ‘social relations are partly constitutive of 
personhood’ (emphasis in original) and that in their make-up, 
the human person should instead be viewed as a ‘subject-in-
relation’, rather than one of independent socialisation. In 
short, our social relations (to a greater or lesser extent) are 
embedded in who we are and become. Accepting these 
propositions, the question for this research, is: do, and if so 
how do, care relationships enter this socialisation process? If 
this happens, what are the conditions which enable and 
disable this process?  
The beginning of this chapter set the research in the 
paradigm of critical realism and provided an overview of the 
conceptual framework within which this research has been 
constructed. It argues that critical realism enables new 
understanding of the care relationship in care contexts with 
its facility to examine the contextual mechanisms, not only 
within structures and cultures, but also within agents and 
social relations. The chapter then introduced Archer’s 
developed theory on human agency and reflexivity in the 
light of its relevance to the concept of personhood in 
personalisation and person-centred care, including, then, the 
conceptually resonant work of Donati and the combined 
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potential of their ideas for exploring care relationships in 





Chapter 4: Methodology and Methods 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a description of and rationale for the 
research design and methods selected for this study, 
exploring the nature and effects of, and conditions of 
possibility for the relationship in social interventions. Chapter 
three set out the paradigm within which this study is being 
undertaken. Critical realism provides the philosophical 
position from which to explore the questions posed in this 
study. Realist social theory and Archer’s theory about 
reflexivity (Archer 1995, 2000, 2003, 2007, 2012) and 
Relational Sociology (Donati, 2011, Archer and Donati, 2015) 
provide a theoretical framework consistent with critical 
realism within which to develop the methodological 
approach. The empirical work of others who have tested 
aspects of this theory in practice was also engaged with to 
explore the role of reflexivity in personal change (Carrigan, 
2014, Lipscomb 2014, Hung and Appleton, 2016). 
4.2 The case for case study methodology 
The case study continues to be at risk of being undermined 
as a methodology, due to the frequently challenged, but 
pervasive hegemony of ‘general theoretical (context-
independent) knowledge over the value of concrete, 
practical (context-dependent) knowledge’ (Flyvbjerg, 
2001:73). This is one of a series of arguments presented by 
Flyvbjerg that promotes case study methodology as a robust 
methodological choice in social science. Similarly to 
Flyvbjerg, proponents of case study research (George and 
Bennet, 2005) promote its broad relevance to scientific 
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discoveries, highlighting that progression, particularly in the 
applied sciences such as biology, medicine, and social 
science, is reliant on the close process of theorising and 
building understanding of how and why something operates 
in the way it does. The context-dependence of the case study 
is its foundation, and for critical realist studies seeking to 
uncover causal mechanisms and sequences of these 
operating in context, using abduction, this methodological 
choice is particularly appropriate (Ackroyd and Karlson, 
2014). 
In dealing with further misunderstandings of the case study, 
Flyvbjerg (2001) challenges the idea, held by those who 
follow the natural science ideal in the social sciences, that it 
is not possible to generalise from a single case; an idea which 
renders the case study impotent in growing an understanding 
of social life. Flyvbjerg cites examples from the natural 
sciences where single experiments, cases, and experience 
have been pivotal to furthering scientific understanding. He 
highlights that a strategic choice of case study is central to its 
generalisability in any form of science, concurring with others 
(Yin, 2014, Patton, 2002).  
Flyvbjerg concludes that generalisation is only one of many 
forms of creating and accumulating knowledge. He highlights 
the value of the ‘collective process of knowledge 
accumulation in a given field or in society.’ (Flyvbjerg, 
2001;76). More specifically, Sayer (1992:249), while 
acknowledging the risk of ‘over-extension’ of findings from 
case studies, says that it would be absurd to diminish the 
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value of studies of individuals on this basis. His position 
supports the premise of the present study that: 
 ‘although at the level of concrete events the results 
may be unique, insofar as intensive methods identify 
structures into which individuals are locked and their 
mechanisms, the abstract knowledge of these may be 
more generally applicable, although it will take further 
research to establish just how general they are.’ (Sayer, 
1992:249, emphasis added).  
This approach seems particularly relevant to the process of 
testing and building on theory that has not been subject to 
thorough empirical testing, as is the case in the current study. 
A criticism of case studies is that they can be vulnerable to 
bias, a risk that the research will be conducted in such a way 
that confirms rather than interrogates the theories of the 
research team. Flyvbjerg challenges this view as one that 
reflects a lack of knowledge about what is involved in case 
study research, citing the experience of seasoned case study 
researchers who report that case studies rarely reveal that 
which they anticipated. Patton (2002) reflects that the focus 
for purposefully sampled qualitative research is identifying 
information-rich cases, as close-up examination and 
explanation is their purpose. That, in fact, what would be a 
weakness in experimental designs using statistical sampling 
approaches is a strength of qualitative case study 
approaches. Awareness of the risk of bias is protective in 
designing research. Flyvbjerg identifies a risk of research bias 
in any design, following a natural human tendency to focus 
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on and be energised by the positive rather than the negative 
in progressing understanding. One of the proposed strengths 
of randomisation is eliminating bias through the ability to 
step back and run the numbers. However, in the initial 
selection of variables and categories, both ‘arbitrary 
subjectivism’ (Flyvbjerg 2001:83) and pragmatism will be 
present in design decisions. These design decisions may 
affect results, but the researcher may be less aware of the 
effects, being less familiar with participants and their 
contexts than they would be if undertaking a case study. 
Although not intending to undermine the contribution made 
by randomised samples and formal generalisation, Flyvbjerg 
offers a balancing view by highlighting the limitations of 
believing that formal generalisation is the ‘only legitimate 
method of scientific inquiry’ (Flyvbjerg, 2001:76). From a 
realist perspective, Sayer (1992:249) points out that it is 
problematic in any research if we are not clear what we deem 
our findings to be representative of, for ‘as descriptions of a 
particular open system, they are unlikely to represent other 
systems.’ Therefore, the question is not whether the case 
study is a robust methodology; as a methodology, it is 
adequately supported in the methodological literature. It is 
instead, is the case study design the best fit for the questions 
posed by the research? It is the design and selection process 




4.3 Case study and realist approaches 
Case study research is a methodology with the potential to 
answer ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions in real-world contexts. Yin 
(2014) acknowledges case study research as consistent with 
a realist perspective, confirmed by other authors (Ragin, 
1992, Byrne, 2009, Carter and Sealey, 2009). Ackroyd and 
Karlson(2014) set out the case study as an appropriate choice 
in critical realist research. The current study design will be a 
realist comparative case study, described by Ackroyd and 
Karlsson (2014:31) as an effective approach to draw out and 
‘compare similarities and differences in processes and 
outcomes, generative mechanisms and conclusions about 
causes and outcomes’. In taking a realist approach, the case 
study design does not intend that the cases selected will all 
be similar apart from one specific variable of interest as 
would be the case in an experimental design. Instead, the 
research examines cases to identify mechanisms likely to be 
working in different ways in different contexts but discernible 
across cases. In the current research, the mechanisms of 
interest are thought to involve the internal processes of 
individual reflexive deliberations, linked to their unique 
concerns and the influence of relational factors. The way that 
these mechanisms interact with contextual influences will 
also be examined. 
4.4 Theoretical framework for case study data 
collection and analysis 
Academic advice tends towards the increased likelihood of 
doing good research if the implicit philosophical assumptions 
are accounted for within the research methodology 
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(Greener, 2011). For example, mixed methods can be used 
effectively, but they cannot sustain the mixing of theoretical 
perspectives, either ontological or epistemological. 
Philosophers and theorists from realist and other theory-
driven traditions warn of confusion of ‘truth claims’ where 
objectivist and constructionist-based methods are employed 
in tandem (Crotty, 1998). Carter and Sealey (2009:70) also 
emphasise the importance of ontological considerations in 
making decisions about methodology in social science. In 
particular, they highlight the rigour that realism’s explicit 
social ontology brings to the process of casing. Accepting a 
stratified nature of reality involves accepting that ‘social 
reality is not exhausted by either actor’s or researcher’s 
accounts of what they do’. In other words, for realists, what 
is seen and spoken of in the empirical domain is only one of 
three domains of social reality. Carter and Sealey (2009:76) 
explain that the implications of this for case study research 
and the process of specifying a case are that case 
identification can only be provisional, a working hypothesis 
at the outset of the research. Rather than identifying 
‘categories’ for cases, the process involves ‘engagement with 
theories about which kinds of things in the social world share 
properties in common’. Ragin (1992) suggests that this 
exercise involves a research strategy of ‘casing’ rather than 
relying on clearly pre-defined boundaries of a case. He 
reflects on the contrast between research that takes a 
conventional approach and the more theoretical approach of 
casing that involves establishing the case by moving between 
the theoretical and the empirical, to establish, sometimes 
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towards the end of the research process, the nature of the 
case. 
In this research, examining the nature and influence of the 
practitioner-service user relationship in the context of social 
interventions, the process of casing has involved both 
empirical insights from a personal background in clinical 
service delivery and theoretical frameworks consistent with 
critical realism. In particular, Archer’s social theory (Archer 
1995, 2000, 2003, 2007, 2012) and the relational sociology of 
Donati (Donati, 2011, Archer and Donati, 2015) are applied. 
This framework is consistent with the critical realist 
conception of a stratified social ontology, the relative 
independence of, yet reflexively mediated relationship 
between structure and agency, and the temporal nature of 
these relations. The use of this framework provides an 
opportunity to pull apart and analyse aspects of the case 
which may be influential but may not be immediately (and 
empirically) perceivable in the absence of a theoretical 
framework through which to examine them.  
The proposed ‘case’ centres on the relationship between 
practitioner and service user, applying Archer’s 
Morphogenetic/Morphostatic (M/M) framework detailed in 
chapter three, to explore the nature of this relation (T2-T3), 
the nature of its effects (T4) and the factors which shape it 
(T1). Figure 7 depicts the departure point for casing based on 
theoretical work at the point in the study when the case 
study was defined, with a brief explanation below. The 
theoretical framework underpinning the research has since 
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developed, based on further study, and is presented below 
(Figure 8). 
FIGURE 7: THE BOUNDARIES OF THE CASE 
(Adapted from Archer’s Morphogenetic Approach, 1995:157) 
 
 
4.5 Summary of the theoretical model for casing 
In terms of the morphogenetic sequence, there are pre-
existing structural, cultural, and agential, factors that create 
the ‘conditions’ within which the care relationship sits (De 
Souza, 2013). These are explained in chapter three (see 3.10 
p75-76) as pre-existing contextual mechanisms. These are 
represented at T1 (structural and cultural conditioning) and 
will be examined to understand the emergent properties of 
these conditions that shape the nature and development of 
the relationship, inclusive of organisational leadership, 
structure, and wider system influences. In addition, at T1, the 
pre-existing nature (including biography and reflexive 
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tendencies) of the individual agents will be examined, with 
the assumption that prior to the relationship, there are 
established characteristics (ways of being and thinking) 
which will themselves contribute to the way that the 
relationship operates. The relationship itself is represented 
between T2 and T3, the social interaction phase of the 
morphogenetic sequence. This is where reflexive 
deliberations and activity of agents (individually and 
collectively) are represented but are not considered in 
isolation from T1.7 The reflexive (individual and relational) 
deliberations at this stage of the morphogenetic sequence 
are key; deliberations are influenced but not determined by 
the nature of the enabling or constraining conditions 
emanating from T1. This is where agency is given its space, 
always acknowledging that the pre-existing conditions are 
ever-present and influential. At T4, the nature of change or 
stasis resulting from the agential activity is represented, with 
contextual conditions reproduced or elaborated by the 
activity at T2-T3. 
The theoretical framework informs the selection of cases 
within the specific area of person-centred social 
interventions. The cases can each stand as a single case 
study. However, comparison across case studies will also be 
undertaken to explore regularities between cases, learning 
about how reflexivity operates and whether the influence of 
 
7 It is important to note the temporal overlap between phases depicted in Figure 7, 
this overlap allowing for the interplay between structure and agency between T1 




structures and cultures is detectable in individual and 
relational reflexive deliberations. Any generalisation 
proposed will be theoretical, in the sense that this research 
examines a specific phenomenon of which greater 
understanding is sought (Greener, 2011). 
4.6 Research questions 
The questions that have underpinned this research from the 
beginning inquire about the role and effects of the 
relationship in person-centred social interventions. As 
outlined in chapter two, there has been increasing interest in 
person-centred working and approaches to the 
personalisation of services in health and social care contexts, 
and although the role of the relationship has been tacitly 
accepted as necessary, its causal role, and how this may be 
realised, has not been closely examined. Archer’s (2000) 
social theory involving the human agent, theory, and 
empirical evidence about the role that reflexivity plays in the 
way we navigate the world provides a framework through 
which to explore these questions:  
RQ1. What are the personal and reflexive 
characteristics of the individual participants of a one-
to-one relationship in these person-centred social 
interventions? 
RQ2. What is the nature of the relationship between 
these individuals, and does the care relationship 
contribute causally to personal change? If so, how? 
RQ3. Do contextual conditions influence the 
relationship and the individuals within it? If so, how? 
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RQ4. Should personalisation theory, policy, and 
practice attend more closely to the care relationship’s 
role and contextual conditions? 
The initial theoretical framework introduced for casing 
(Figure 7, above), was developed based on a subsequent, 
more thorough understanding of Archer’s theory (Figure 8, 
below) and is tailored to the research questions above. It 
represents two people (represented by green and blue 
respectively), an analytical model of their internal relations (I 
– me – you – we), proposed by Archer (Archer and Donati, 
2015:102) as a way of acknowledging a continuous sense of 
self, which at any temporal moment can project back into the 
past, into the future, and can attend to the social relations 
which are constitutive of it. There is a notional connection 
between the people in the relationship through the ‘we-
relation’, represented by the dotted line. This is notional in 
the sense that it is not the case that all relationships will 
operate at any moment as ‘we-relations’, and in the case of 









FIGURE 8:THEORISED ROLE OF THE 'WE' RELATION IN PERSONAL 
CHANGE 
 
There are three main aspects of this theoretical model under 
investigation through this empirical research. The first is each 
person’s reflexive tendencies to gain insight into the nature 
of the individuals involved in the relationship (RQ1). This 
involves biographical detail about the individual, their 
primary concerns and projects, and the nature of their 
reflexivity as defined by Archer’s reflexive modes. The second 
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focuses on the relationship between the participants and 
how it operates (RQ2). This represents the ‘we-relation’ as 
part of each person’s internal relations and applies Archer 
and Donati’s work on relational subjects and relational goods 
(Archer and Donati, 2015). The dotted line indicates that the 
relationship may or may not be this type of relationship; that 
is, a relationship that forms a ‘we-ness’ between participants 
with causal effects. The third pans out to account for the 
context for the care relationship, the structural and cultural 
conditions at T1 that pre-exist it, and which influence 
it through the agents involved (RQ3). Research question 4 is 
considered in the concluding chapters. 
The methods in this study were designed to capture and 
analyse data that would be informative across the research 
questions. They aim to gain insight into individual reflexive 
activity and mode, including observation of and insight into 
the relationships included in this reflexive process and the 
nature of the organisations and interventions which provide 
contextual influence.   
4.7 Methods  
The theoretical framework described above supported the 
process of casing (Ragin, 1992) and provided direction about 
the type of data that assisted exploration of the aspects of 
the care relationship posed in the research questions. This 
research utilises a multiple case study design, as described by 
Yin (2014) on the basis that except for situations that require 
a single case, such as extreme or revelatory case studies, they 
hold greater analytic potential than single-case designs, and 
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the evidence they produce is more compelling. In addition, 
the multiple case study design enables the logic of 
replication, in this case, theoretical replication, a set of cases 
that anticipate contrasting results for predictable reasons. 
Each case included in the design consisted of a 'whole' study, 
analysed and reported individually, and synthesised in the 
discussion chapter. Regarding the number of cases, Yin 
(2014) counsels that this is a discretionary decision, based on 
several factors including the research aims and the nature of 
the study. He does counsel, that the more 'subtle' the theory, 
the more replications may be needed. Research capacity is 
also a consideration, however. Hence this decision requires a 
balance between the research capacity and ensuring that 
there is sufficient data to enable theory testing. In 
consideration of both of these, a decision was made to 
include a total of four cases.  
4.7.1 Sampling 
The term ‘sampling’ with its origins quantitative research and 
statistical sampling is identified as a less appropriate 
descriptor for the process undertaken in qualitative research 
(Maxwell 2012, Emmel 2013). It is a term originating in 
research that relies on independent variables to represent 
people or groups for comparison and generalisation of 
results to a broader population with the purpose of 
prediction. Maxwell gives two reasons for the limited use of 
statistical sampling and generalisation in qualitative 
research: 
• it is impractical where sample sizes are small, and 
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• the point of qualitative research is to ‘understand the 
processes, meanings, and local contextual influences’ 
(Maxwell,2012:94) for individuals in particular 
settings.  
Emmel (2013:51) agrees, stating that ’a reliance on variables 
constrains the possibilities for theoretical and analytic 
advances in the research.’   
 In qualitative research, sampling advice tends towards 
selecting study sites and participants to ensure that the 
people and places will ‘best exhibit the characteristics or 
phenomena of interest’ (Maxwell 2012:94). It is a way to 
ensure the data collected is relevant to the objectives and 
research questions. Maxwell adds to this the term 
‘theoretical sampling’, using the conceptual framework 
already developed from a current understanding of subject 
matter and considering the relevance of the cases to this 
framework. 
Purposive sampling involves ‘selecting information-rich cases 
strategically and purposefully; the specific type and the 
number of cases selected depend on study purpose and 
resources’ (Patton, 2002:243). A subcategory of purposive 
sampling is theory-based sampling, defined by Patton as 
‘finding manifestations of a theoretical construct of interest 
so as to elaborate and examine the construct and its 
variations’ (Patton, 2002:243). Due to the current research’s 
theory-driven nature, the sampling strategy used is 
purposive and theory-based. The sampling strategy at the 
design stage is a ‘best fit’ based on theoretical understanding 
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prior to data collection, recognising that as the research 
progresses, further sampling decisions may be needed as 
new understanding is revealed through empirical testing of 
the theory: ‘key to theoretical or purposive sampling is 
recognising that a phenomenon will be revised throughout 
the research.’ (Emmel, 2013:47). Emmel (2013:46) asserts 
that ultimately, a claim for research validity ‘requires the 
researcher to retrace and reconstruct the route through 
which claims are made’, and sampling choices are a key 
aspect. 
Maxwell adds that there is a place for convenience sampling, 
which, although often criticised as non-rigorous (Patton, 
2002), can have advantages in terms of relationships with the 
research sites or participants, facilitating the implementation 
of research plans. Maxwell does note that it is dangerous to 
make convenience sampling the only reason for site 
selection; convenience is often a practical consideration. In 
this research, convenience sampling is used; however, this 
was after establishing the primary sampling strategy. It was 
recognised that the nature of the cases sought meant that 
the contexts for the case studies were numerous so that 
convenience could be used as a secondary strategy. 
4.7.2 Selection of research sites  
The nature of the research questions and theoretical model 
for casing provided a significant field of possible research 
sites and participants. The research required organisations 
operating within the voluntary or care sector providing one-
to-one social interventions. They also needed to characterise 
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their work as person/client-centred or personalised. The 
criteria required that the intervention exceeded a minimum 
of four sessions so that at least a fledgling relationship could 
be formed, although the actual case studies all involved care 
relationships much more established than this. Site 
identification was in all cases initially supported by personal 
contacts, both supervisory and supportive fellow 
researchers. These research sites have been briefly 
summarised in the thesis introduction and will be introduced 
fully in each case study chapter. 
4.7.3 Selection of cases within research sites 
Except for the inclusion and exclusion criteria detailed in the 
ethics section (p122), the guidelines to the research sites 
were to identify one typical service user/practitioner pair 
who had been engaged together in a person-centred social 
intervention for a minimum of four sessions. It was made 
clear to each site that as the research was interested in the 
relationship and the people in the relationship, the 
practitioner and service user would be treated equally, using 
the same research methods. The nature of individual need 
and type of intervention, although interesting context, is not 
a principal focus of this research, and so these were not 
specified in the criteria. The design of the theoretical 
framework applies to any care relationship.   
The sites were provided information about the research 
process so that the time commitment and structure of the 
research was clear at the outset. The service leads selected a 
willing practitioner, discussed potential service-user 
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participants and asked them if they would be interested in 
participating. There is a risk in this process that the cases 
selected would not be representative but would be selected 
based on the organisation's specific interest or bias. To 
ascertain their reasons for selection, a question about this 
was included in the service lead and practitioner interviews.  
However, as discussed in the sampling section, this research 
seeks to test the application of a theoretical model and 
elucidate ways to explain how the care relationship operates, 
the role of reflexivity in this, and the influence of contextual 
factors on individuals and the relationship. Therefore, the 
motivations of those people identifying participants are not 
a central concern. The sites may well have made their choice 
based on an excellent example of the care and support they 
provide, but as this research is not primarily interested in 
assessing the standard of care, but more so how reflexive and 
relational mechanisms operate in these contexts, this factor 
is not a concern.  
4.7.4 Ethics and research integrity 
The research followed Manchester Metropolitan University's 
ethics procedures, using the EthOS system. This included 
gaining informed consent from each participant interviewed, 
ensuring that they had read and were clear about what was 
involved in the study. The nature of the interviews was 
somewhat unusual in that the questions explored the 
internal conversations of individuals, and it was unclear at 
the outset whether this may draw out detail that participants 
may subsequently feel uncomfortable having shared. The 
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participant information sheet (Appendix 2) therefore 
emphasised the importance of only sharing what felt 
comfortable to share, and this was reiterated verbally before 
the interview. Participants were made aware of the 
university procedures relating to data protection and that 
they could withdraw from the study. 
Due to the nature of the research, there were specific 
exclusion criteria for service user participants. The study 
excluded participants who lacked capacity as defined by the 
Mental Capacity Act (2005), and participation would have 
been stopped if there were any concerns from the 
organisation or participants in this regard.  
Participants with a level of language and communication or 
cognitive difficulty that would hinder a meaningful 
discussion, and therefore limit access to the range of insight 
needed were also excluded. This research aimed to gain 
insight into individuals' personal and social identity and 
reflexive deliberations, so adequate verbal expressive ability 
was required. One participant of the eight has a Learning 
Disability and Autism, which affects his language and 
communication, however, it was judged at the outset that his 
communication skills were adequate to be able to contribute 
meaningfully to the study, and he was included. For the same 
reason, carers were not included as they cannot represent 
the personal and social identity of the person they are caring 
for or provide insight into their reflexive deliberations. Those 
who do not speak English were also excluded. For both 
practical interviewing and analysis purposes, the challenge 
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presented by working through an interpreter would 
potentially limit analysis. I have worked with interpreters in 
the past and have experienced the challenges that this 
presents. In a structured interview, this would present less of 
a challenge. However, the semi-structured nature of the 
interviews required flexibility, and the added layer of 
interpretation is likely to have obstructed meaning. 
4.7.5 Interviews in research 
Brinkmann (2018) suggests that the interview, as a way that 
researchers and journalists most frequently gain information, 
has been normalised as a process; it has become a cultural 
norm to take the role of interviewer and interviewee, noting 
that Kipling considered it an imposition. These roles, reminds 
Brinkmann, always have an asymmetrical power relation, 
however carefully the interview is set up, due to the one-way 
dialogue led by the interviewer and sometimes containing 
what may seem a hidden agenda, where the interviewee may 
not understand the exact nature of the information which is 
sought. This was a risk in the current research and required 
forethought.  
The introduction of the ‘internal conversation’ concept 
before the one-to-one interviews was aimed at ‘sharing what 
this is about’, in a way that could be reflected upon during 
the interviews.  There is no reason to have a hidden agenda. 
However, there are several elements to the research that, 
although necessary to keep in mind to ensure data collection 
was faithful to the research questions, it was unnecessary to 
share with participants, particularly the detail of the 
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theoretical constructs upon which the research questions 
rest. Archer’s (2003) reflection on her role in these types of 
interviews says that she is not playing the role of 
‘interviewer-as-cipher’ (Archer, 2003:162), and her 
characterisation is one of ‘collaborative conversation’. A pilot 
process (described in 4.8.4) assisted in designing a method 
that enabled an appropriate and effective introduction of the 
concepts. 
4.7.6 Critical realist interviews 
Differing ontological and epistemological assumptions 
influence contrasting approaches to interviewing: from the 
positivist preference for a structured and tightly controlled 
interview to the constructivists perspective that close 
descriptions of phenomena, through interviewing give us a 
first-order understanding of the world through concrete 
description (Brinkmann, 2018), to ethnographic approaches 
which seek both knowledge and meaning through interviews 
within the context of other ethnographically sourced data 
(Smith and Elger,2009), and the realist perspective that 
interviewing is a tool that supports the development of 
theory, with others, about the underlying mechanisms (in 
context) which influence the world which we experience 
(Manzano, 2016). 
The research methods are underpinned by the critical realist 
view of a stratified reality, and this has implications for the 
planning and execution of data collection. The theoretical 
framework has been used to cast the case studies and plan 
data collection to examine the emergent and causal 
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properties of structure, culture, people, and relationships 
and how these may intersect with each other through 
individuals’ reflexive deliberation. Smith and Elger 
(2014:122) highlight this approach as a particular strength of 
interviewing in critical realist investigations that interviews 
are ‘necessary for accessing human thought, meaning and 
experience’, while recognising that ‘they are not by 
themselves an adequate basis for analysing the multiplicity 
of causal factors at play in social relations.’ They reflect on 
Archer’s (2003) assertion that gaining from participants 
insights into their thoughts and deliberations helps us 
understand the causal role that our thoughts play in shaping 
our own lives, within the enablers and constraints of our 
context, and in shaping society. In the current study, in 
addition to gaining insight into thoughts and actions, these 
interviews also seek to draw out influential relations 
between structural and cultural forces in context and the 
people and relationships involved in the interventions. Smith 
and Elger (2014:130) emphasise that the role of the critical 
realist interviewer is an ‘active, investigative and analytically 
informed’ one, where interviewing is most fruitful when it is 
undertaken and analysed in the context of a broader research 
design that incorporates triangulation of data with other 
methods.  
4.8 Data collection 
Multiple data collection methods were used to gain empirical 
insights into the theoretical propositions. These were: 
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• A paired activity which served the multiple purposes 
of an introductory activity, familiarisation with the 
language and concepts in the study using a fictional 
example, an opportunity to establish the equal nature 
of the participants in the study (in what was 
otherwise a relationship with delineated roles), 
observation of the relationship between them, and 
insight into how they applied reflexive decision 
making to a fictional situation.  
• Observation of an activity or communication which 
was typical for them. 
• Individual semi-structured interviews, based on 
Archer’s (2003) methodology, to learn about aspects 
of their biography and reflexive nature by discussing 
their internal conversation and what is most 
important to them. 
• Individual semi-structured interviews for each 
participant about their experience of care 
relationships, including the care relationship being 
investigated in this study. 
• Individual interviews with a service lead about the 
role of care relationships, and to gain insight into 
service commissioning, planning, and delivery. 
• Document review of organisational documents 
shared by the organisational leads, or publicly 




This study was not a longitudinal one, so the timescales for 
data collection were flexible and convenient for research 
participants. The periods within which the full data set was 
collected varied between two and six weeks. The regularity 
of contact within the timeframe enabled a sense of 
continuity and momentum for participants. The data 
collected will be reflected in the case study chapter and 
referenced throughout the analysis and discussion. 
4.8.1 Introductory meeting 
The first contact was an introductory meeting with the 
organisational lead and, where possible, the participating 
practitioners to explain more about the research and 
requirements. This meeting was beneficial for initial 
relationship building and engagement. Following this first set 
of meetings, a further Research Introduction Sheet was 
created (Appendix 1), as the length of the Participant 
Information Sheet (Appendix 2), although required, 
generated feedback from one site that they would value a 
more user-friendly version to help practitioners introduce 
the research to service user participants. Each organisation 
was asked to provide written service information detailing 
the nature of the organisation and their service provision, 
which supplemented the information gained from the service 
lead interview. 
The data collection process was partially based on Archer’s 
(2003) empirical work, which explored the reflexive 
deliberations of participants while gaining an understanding 
of their personal and social history relevant to their key 
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concerns, life experiences, and decisions. This methodology 
has since been used by researchers (Hung and Appleton, 
2017) who found it an effective way of gaining insight into 
the reflexive process. For this research, Archer’s 
methodology needed adapting due to differences in the case 
study design. Archer’s (2003) study participants were 
purposively selected, either personal acquaintances or 
through university or local contacts, and hers was an 
exploratory study of individual reflexivity and not in the 
context of a care relationship. Given the range of the 
participants, further thought was needed about how to 
broach concepts that participants may not be familiar with 
discussing, like the ‘internal conversation’ or how people 
‘think things over’. The present study’s focus on the nature 
and role of care relationships meant that adjustments were 
needed to both the method and the introduction to the 
research.   
4.8.2 Research design: session 1 
The first formal contact with the practitioner and service user 
pair was together. This intentionally established their equal 
participation and provided the opportunity to clarify that the 
research would focus first on each of them individually and 
then on their relationship. This step proved to be necessary, 
as even though the equal nature of the research was detailed 
in the participant information, in one session, the 
practitioner had assumed the primary focus would be on the 
service user. It is more typical for research to focus on service 
users than practitioners, and an equal focus on both parties 
is a unique feature of this research. Participant information 
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was sent ahead, and consent forms were completed at the 
beginning of the first session, with an opportunity to ask 
questions.  
The design of the first session had several purposes. The first 
was familiarisation with the researcher. In most cases, no 
contact had been made with either participant, as the first 
contact was organised via the service lead. Personal 
experience as a practitioner visiting people’s homes for the 
first time as an unfamiliar person guided the design. It was 
essential to the research that participants were comfortable 
and relaxed. Meeting them both together for the first time 
had the advantage of mutual support, and the reiteration 
that research was interested in both people individually 
emphasised the sense of equality and, therefore, to a degree, 
camaraderie. It also enabled informal conversation which 
variably touched on the locality, family, how long they had 
known each other, and any curiosity they had about the 
researcher, both personal and study related.  
4.8.3 Ketso tool 
The first design challenge was introducing the study concepts 
to people with different backgrounds and experiences and 
roles in the care relationship, ensuring that the concept was 
familiar enough and that they felt confident enough to share 
their own experiences and insights. With a background in 
delivering therapy interventions, including paired and group 
activities, the idea of using a creative activity was compelling, 
and the Ketso tool (Ketso, no date) introduced during a 
postgraduate workshop, seemed ideal.   
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The Ketso tool is a participatory research tool originally 
designed for large groups, but it can be equally effective for 
individuals or small groups (mini Ketso). This tool is a simple 
felt board with felt branches and Velcro ‘leaves’ on which 
participants can write or draw ideas. Kara (2015) suggests 
that where interviews address sensitive or uncomfortable 
subjects, visual methods can be facilitative.  
Even though the subject matter of internal conversations is 
not necessarily sensitive or uncomfortable, it was anticipated 
that this idea would be novel to participants. Using a visual 
and tactile method would provide space and time for thinking 
and discussion, relax participants, and increase the quality of 
contributions.  
Using it with the pair of participants emphasised the equality 
of the task; each had a pen and ‘leaves’ to write on, and all 
ideas could be discussed and included. The Ketso activity also 
enabled observation of the relationship between the two 
participants, their respective roles, and how they undertook 













FIGURE 9: IMAGE OF KETSO ACTIVITY 
 
 
4.8.4 Pilot study 
The original focus for the Ketso activity was planned to be the 
internal conversations of the individuals themselves. This 
was tested at the pilot phase with a volunteer practitioner 
from one of the participating organisations. Although the 
pilot did not involve a practitioner/service user pair for 
practical reasons, it did enable the testing out of different 
methods to assess their efficacy. The pilot showed that using 
the Ketso tool delivered the anticipated benefits; it was 
tactile and enjoyable to work with. However, in discussing 
the individual’s internal conversation, the activity drew the 
participant’s focus to writing on leaves and detracted from 
detailed explanation. Also, it became clear that some of the 
content of the internal conversation was of a confidential 
nature, and in a paired activity, disclosures may be limited.  
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The pilot also prompted the realisation that adapting the 
interview method in this way would draw too far from 
Archer’s original method, which needed to remain intact 
within the context of this research. Therefore, it was decided 
to reserve Archer’s interview structure for the second session 
(individual interviews) and retain the first session for 
introductions and familiarisation of concepts. 
4.8.5 Familiarisation with concepts 
The introduction to the research and the concept of the 
internal conversation and how we use it involved a story 
presented to participants about a fictional character, Jack. 
The Ketso tool was used to develop a discussion between the 
practitioner-service user pair about how ‘Jack’ might think 
things over (Appendix 3)8. The researcher read the story and 
the participants also had a copy to refer to during the 
exercise. This activity enabled the participants to become 
familiar with the language and ideas within the study 
without yet touching on personal experiences. In her inquiry 
about the ‘internal conversation’, Archer used prompts for 
the different ways we might use it; the mental activities of: 
‘planning, deciding, re-living, imagining, budgeting, 
imaginary conversations, rehearsing, mulling over, clarifying’ 
(Archer, 2003:161), each of which were discussed in terms of 
how Jack might think things over. In addition, the pair 
discussed what might be most important to Jack and how the 
perspectives of others in his life may influence him. 
 
8 In the Appendices, there are two versions of the Jack story. They both have the same 
structure, but the second version was devised to be more relevant and accessible to the 17-
year-old participant in case study 3. This adapted version was only used in that case study. 
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This introduction to concepts central to the research was 
intended to familiarise the participants with talking about 
how people, including themselves, think things over. It was 
emphasised that there were no right or wrong answers. The 
intention was that in subsequent interviews, they might feel 
more confident and relaxed to talk about their own 
experience of their internal conversation. This prediction was 
realised in that the researcher was able to refer back to Jack’s 
situation during the interviews to ‘tune’ participants into the 
concepts being discussed, particularly in session 3. There may 
be an objection that in taking this step, data collected about 
the participants’ thoughts or experiences may be influenced 
by their discussion of Jack’s. However, the ‘Jack’ exercise is 
no different from the everyday conversations we may have 
about a neighbour or a character in a film. Jack’s context and 
decision bore no similarities to those of the participants, and 
there was no indication in their interviews that they were in 
any way basing their personal experiences or thoughts on the 
discussions they had previously had about Jack. This activity 
was judged successful in its research purposes as an ‘ice 
breaker’, an opportunity to observe the care relationship and 
familiarise diverse participants with internal conversations 
and other concepts being used in the study. 
4.8.6 Internal Conversation Indicator (ICONI) 
As introduced in the theory chapter, Archer’s (2003, 2007) 
work on reflexivity has generated a typology reflecting 
commonalities in reflexive behaviours between people.  
These reflexive modes (see 3.17), are a heuristic device, 
utilised in the current research to explore the reflexive nature 
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of the study participants. Archer’s reflexive ideal types 
(communicative, autonomous, meta, and fractured 
reflexivity) offer insights into how people think and behave in 
relationships; the way they engage with the reflexivity of 
others. Archer (2008) is clear that qualitative work gaining 
insight into the personal biography of individuals is the most 
effective method of identifying their reflexive tendencies, 
however, she has also developed an ‘Internal Conversation 
Indicator’ (ICONI) (Appendix 4), a short, 13 item Likert scale 
questionnaire that assigns respondents to a dominant ‘mode’ 
of reflexivity.  
This tool was utilised in this research at the end of session 
one, due to a curiosity about whether the patterns of 
reflexive preference indicated in the results would fit with 
qualitatively derived conclusions about each individuals’ 
reflexive type. However, after its use the decision was made 
to set aside the results as some items were insufficiently 
relevant to some participants (for example, there is an 
assumption that respondents had experienced being in work) 
and the language used in some items rendered it inaccessible 
(certain abstract concepts needed explaining) to certain 
participants, invalidating the results. The ICONI tool has not 
been published for use and is only accessible via Archer’s 
research report (Archer 2008). Meriton (2016) has critiqued 
the tool based on an investigation of its statistical validity 
identifying that further development work is needed before 
it can be confidently applied. The ICONI was therefore not 
relied upon for identifying reflexive modes, and analysis 
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relied instead upon the qualitative data. The second part of 
the ICONI questionnaire asks participants to share the things 
that matter most to them: a list of three. This aspect of the 
questionnaire was utilised as it provided a starting point for 
the second part of the session three interviews, which 
explored these priorities in more detail. 
4.8.7 Research session 2 
The second session enabled observation of a typical session 
between the practitioner and service user, or one that is as 
typical as possible with an observer present. There was the 
option for the pair to do this on the same day as the first 
contact or select a different day or session. The purpose was 
to gain an insight into the relationship and how it operates in 
an everyday context. Observations noted the context for the 
meeting, roles in the interaction, and the verbal and 
nonverbal interactions of participants, including topics 
covered and the purpose of the communication.  
Additionally, any data on how organisational structures 
(roles/rules) and cultures (ideas/ purpose) may influence the 
relationship. This session was not audio-recorded, as this 
might be overly intrusive, and instead written notes were 
taken.  
4.8.8 Research session 3 
This session was an individual interview, following the format 
used by Archer (2003) and subsequently by Hung and 
Appleton (2016), to build a picture of each individual’s 
reflexivity; the way that they think about their concerns and 
life projects, how these deliberations have contributed to 
shaping their lives, and how each deliberates about their 
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future (Appendix 5). This interview started with asking 
participants whether they recognised the experience of 
having an internal conversation and, if so, to describe this in 
their terms, and then they were asked to provide examples 
of the different ‘mental activities’ of internal dialogue (see 
p133). The introduction of these concepts through a fictional 
example had value.  It enabled referring to the Jack story as 
contextual support: ‘just as we talked about in the Jack 
exercise, I will ask you about how you think things over’, and 
the terms for the mental activities were familiar. The second 
part of the interview, also following Archer (2003), asked the 
participants to talk about the things that mattered most to 
them, with prompts that intended them to elaborate on 
whether these concerns had always been priorities, whether 
these were competing (or dovetailed) concerns, whether and 
how they thought these through, what in life may have 
helped or hindered the realisation of these concerns, and 
whether they could talk about their plans in relation to these 
concerns. Although the interview structure was the same for 
all eight interviews, there was significant variation in the 
interview length and the amount that the participants shared 
about these topics, with interviews ranging from between 31 
and 76 minutes. The longer interviews, those breaching the 
planned 60-minute period, could have been longer, if not 
intentionally curtailed. The shorter interviews were more 
challenging, requiring more involvement from the researcher 
to encourage elaboration, with variable success. On 
reflection, the introduction of a Ketso timeline of life stages 
for each participant to complete may have provided helpful 
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structure for the interviewees, providing visual support and 
prompts which would tune them into reflecting on a greater 
range of life experiences. 
4.8.9 Research session 4 
The fourth session was a semi-structured individual interview 
with each participant, focusing on the social intervention and 
the relationships established (Appendix 6). This interview 
gained insight into the participants’ experiences of care 
relationships. The first part of this interview focused on care 
and support relationships in general, requesting examples 
beyond the current care relationship. Examples were sought 
of both positive and negative relationships, and participants 
were asked to elaborate on the nature of the people, 
relationship, and context. The second section focused on the 
relationship with their fellow participant in the study, asking 
them to describe the person, who they are, how they think 
about them, and then also to describe the relationship, how 
it had developed, what, if anything was different for them 
because of the relationship, and what enables or constrains 
the effects of care relationships. The final section informed 
research question three, designed to find out about 
participants' awareness of the organisation, the processes 
and principles important in its service delivery, and their 
views on how these supported care relationships or 
otherwise. 
4.8.10 Research session 5 
This session was a semi-structured interview with a service 
lead in the organisation, close to the operational 
management of individual care, but who also had insight into 
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the wider organisational and system within which the care 
relationship operates. In all cases, the person whom I had 
met to introduce the research at the outset, had also opted 
to participate in the interview, and therefore had been well 
oriented to the research, through that first contact and the 
subsequent participant information. The interview was a 
semi-structured discussion, based on questions, used as a 
guide only, (Appendix 7) which interrogated their views on: 
• the role and effects of care relationships,  
• how care relationships are supported or otherwise by 
organisational and system contexts,  
• the characteristics of the people they employ and 
manage, and  
• the nature of the care relationship in their service 
compared with other models of relationship, for 
example friendship or clinical service relationships.   
Alongside the secondary data provided by service leads 
about the organisation, this interview was designed to gain 
insight into the conditions within which these care 
relationships existed. It is important to acknowledge that 
each of the organisations involved in this study professed to 
value and promote the care relationships they offered.   
4.8.11 Limitations  
There were limitations to this data collection process. Data 
from an interview of up to 75 minutes, with participants 
presenting with varying degrees of openness or 
defensiveness (Hollway and Jefferson, 2000), could only 
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provide a sketch of the person. Despite this, the nature of 
Archer’s interview format, interrogating what is important to 
people, how they think about what is important, and the 
involvement of relationship in this process enabled more 
direct access to relevant data than, for example, an interview 
producing a more generalised personal narrative.   
When reflecting on the application of this method, two 
changes may have helped generate a more comprehensive 
response from some participants. Firstly, emphasising to 
them that who they are as individuals is central to the 
research. This was described in the participant information 
and was reiterated face to face. However, because the 
emphasis of the research title was on the relationship, there 
was a sense that the exploration of who they were as 
individuals was still somewhat unexpected and may have 
resulted in a more limited response from some participants. 
Secondly, the introduction of the additional step of a life 
timeline activity (Lord, 2016) in session one, using the Ketso 
tool for continuity, would be useful, partly to provide greater 
insight into their whole life context and partly to prompt 
them to use examples from across their life course. Some 
participants did this naturally, but with those who were less 
forthcoming, it would have been a helpful visual prompt and 
may have helped to generate more examples. 
4.9 Data analysis 
Smith and Elger (2014) discuss the need to develop theory 
through analysis during data collection to maintain a close 
connection between the empirical data and the developing 
143 
 
theory. The early engagement with the theory in this 
research enabled analysis throughout data collection and 
transcription, enabling continuity of theory application into 
the data analysis phase. As described in the theory chapter, 
this research uses abductive inference to consider care 
relationships in a new framework of understanding, testing 
the idea of re-describing (Danermark et al., 2002:94) the care 
relationship as a reflexive and relational process that is 
sensitive to and conditioned by contextual forces. The 
intention is to better understand personalised care 
relationships through this theoretical framework and learn 
what care relationships can tell us about the theoretical 
framework. As Danermark et al. (2002:95) describe: ‘In 
research practice guided by abduction, the interplay 
(dialectic) between theoretical re-descriptions of cases and 
case study based theory development is absolutely central’. 
The process of abduction makes use of Archer’s social theory 
and Donati’s relational sociology. The data analysis design 
was informed by the research questions and structured using 
the theoretical framework (Figure 8: 4.6).  
Maxwell (2012) distinguishes between analysis that uses 
categorisation and analysis that uses contiguity. Insights 
gained from these approaches are different. Categorisation 
pulls apart the data and enables the detection of emerging 
themes. This is the most common form of data analysis in 
qualitative research. Contiguity examines the data in context 
rather than divorced from its context and provides a more 
temporal understanding of the data. Maxwell (2012:119) 
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suggests that rather than considering contiguity and 
categorisation as separate methods, researchers should 
instead make ‘moves’ between them in response to research 
questions, integrating the methods, ‘at each point in the 
analysis, one can take either a categorising step, looking for 
similarities and differences, or a connecting step, looking for 
(contiguity based) connections between things’. These 
different ways of gaining meaning from data were both used 
in this research. The theoretical framework identifies 
categories or concepts for analysis, for example, people’s 
concerns, circumstances and reflexive modes, and aspects of 
structure or culture across cases that support the generation 
of relational goods. Narrative and sequential data involving 
participants’ experiences and biographies were also 
examined to explore their reflexive development over time.  
Frosh (2007) challenges an over-reliance on narrative 
understanding in qualitative research. He posits that 
narrative accounts, if seen as a ‘whole’, restrict 
understanding by relying too much on integrating the data 
into a coherent story and limiting analytic possibility. This 
research avoids this problem using a theoretical framework 
that enables a deconstruction of the structural, cultural and 
agential elements of narrative data to examine the 
relationships between them. In this research, then, applying 
a theoretically driven analytical approach to narrative data 
has helped highlight the aspects of the person of interest to 
the research and helps to discern, albeit partially, the 
person’s ontological makeup through the lens of the theory.   
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4.9.1 Familiarisation with the data 
Hollway and Jefferson’s guidance on analysis encourages 
approaching the data holistically, not fragmenting the data 
for themes, but applying the ‘Gestalt’ principle, which is ‘the 
internal capacity for holding…data together in mind’ (Hollway 
and Jefferson 2000:69). They describe this as an effect 
achieved by immersion in the data, resulting in the 
researcher having a sense of being ‘inhabited’ by the 
interviewee. In this research, the process of the transcription, 
completed by the researcher alone, enabled lengthy 
immersion in the data in a way that created this recognisable 
effect. However, it is acknowledged that there is a need to be 
mindful of one’s own subjectivity and reflexivity in drawing 
conclusions about those of others (Hollway and Jefferson, 
2000:65). Sayer (2011:13) distinguishes between a ‘spectator 
view’ of people in their contexts, and the alternative of 
viewing people as ‘participants and agents’ in their lives, to 
discern what matters to them. Archer’s theoretical 
constructs support this focus, and although researchers are 
always to some extent spectators, her theory and research 
methods engage with how people are ‘participants and 
agents’, and why this is important. At this ‘immersion’ stage 
of analysis (Ritchie and Spencer, 2002), the memo function of 
NVIVO 12 was used to note thoughts and questions linked to 
the theoretical framework. As a result of thorough 
engagement with the theory before starting the data 
collection, interaction with the data continually presented 




4.9.2 Applying the theoretical concepts 
With the theoretical framework established, the next step 
was to apply the concepts to the data to identify whether the 
concepts described by Archer were compatible. In order to 
bring the theory and data together, the core theoretical 
concepts, such as ‘concerns’, ‘circumstances’ ‘dovetailing’, 
‘projects’, ‘reflexive modes’, ‘internal relations of the internal 
conversation’ and also the ICONI scores, were included in an 
Excel spreadsheet with representative headings (Appendix 
8). The spreadsheet was then populated with data, for 
example, in a participant’s account of a situation: the 
circumstances, the identified concerns, how the internal 
relations were represented in their account, and evidence of 
reflexive tendencies. This was an experimental process and 
one of familiarisation with and confidence in applying the 
theory to the data, and vice versa. Through this process, it 
became clear that Archer’s theoretical concepts could be 
used to examine and build an albeit partial picture of each 
individual, which provided insight into who they are, what 
matters to them, the way they think about life, including the 
role of relationships. It also enabled the recording of 
evidence for and analysis of their reflexive preferences 
according to Archer’s modes (Archer, 2003). Identifying 
reflexive tendencies is important to this research because it 
is of interest whether reflexive type has a bearing on the 
nature of the relationship (research question 2).   
4.9.3 Summarising concerns in context 
This immersive process generated a tangible sense of what 
mattered to each person in the context of their 
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circumstances, combined with insights drawn from their 
biographical data; enabling a sketch of their personal identity 
and ‘sense of self’, which, as Archer proposes, is the ‘source’ 
of personal emergent properties (Archer, 2000:255). These 
insights were summarised, alongside the sources of key 
contextual mechanisms, the structural and cultural emergent 
properties, in the participant’s immediate contexts 
(Appendix 9). These summaries used the template inspired 
by de Souza (2013), as described in the theory chapter and 
represent the relational nature of existence and record the 
types of contextual mechanisms evident in each person’s 
account. The summary of personal emergent properties was 
supportive when considering the reflexive tendencies, and 
relational reflexivity using the ORRAC model. These analytical 
tools supported familiarisation with the concept-data 
relationship, and when engaging with the data to understand 
the nature of reflexivity, this categorisation approach was 
invaluable. The next stage was to discern each participant's 
reflexive tendencies, drawing on Archer’s empirical data and 
findings as guidance. This involved a holistic approach 
(Hollway and Jefferson, 2000) that enabled a more temporal 
understanding of the data for each person (Maxwell, 2012).  
4.9.4 The ORRAC Model  
The familiarisation and summarising processes resulted in 
descriptions, without a method of presenting the data in a 
way that adequately demonstrated the connection between 
Archer’s theory of reflexivity and personalisation. It was 
possible, like Archer (2003, 2007, 2012), to summarise and 
evidence the reflexive tendencies of the individuals, but this 
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study needed to go a step further, so that the analysis of 
individual reflexivity could be extended to understand its 
relevance to care relationships. This gap in the analysis 
inspired the development of the ORRAC (Orientation to 
Relational Reflexivity and Agency for Change) model, a 
product of this research devised at the point where 
theoretical constructs met data analysis, in part because of 
the lack of guidance for analysis in Archer’s exploratory 
methodology. During data collection and analysis, the 
process of moving between theory and data highlighted the 
need for a way of both representing and comparing aspects 
of the reflexive tendencies of the study participants, relevant 
to person centred social interventions. It was anticipated that 
building a picture, albeit partial, of the reflexive nature of 
each participant would enable examination of the relative 
social relations between practitioner and service user, with 
the regards to two key dimensions of reflexive tendencies, in 
the context of the intervention. The next two sections set out 
the rationale for each continuum of the model (Figure 10) 
which is presented on p 152. 
4.9.4.1 Orientation to Relational Reflexivity 
Archer’s research established that those with 
Communicative and Meta-reflexive tendencies had greater 
experience of shared relational goods than the other modes 
(Archer and Donati, 2015). Early consideration of the data, 
and particularly the biographical data, revealed discernible 
shifts in reflexive tendencies of participants over time in 
response to life experiences and context, and suggested that 
149 
 
orientation to relational reflexivity increased in work 
environments where a relational approach was promoted, 
and where the leaders showed meta-reflexive tendencies. 
This insight inspired the idea that orientation to relational 
reflexivity could be represented on a continuum, 
representing the extent to which relational reflexivity 
features in a person’s reflexive deliberations: an openness or 
orientation towards relational reflexivity. According to 
Archer’s research findings, this orientation to relational 
reflexivity, for those who chose to remain within their natal 
context, would be inward looking; limited to family, friends 
and established local networks (Communicative reflexivity, 
see 3.17,). For those who had become distanced from their 
natal context, the orientation to relational reflexivity 
remains, but its scope is unconstrained and is open to 
elaboration. This perhaps accounts for the extent to which 
those with meta-reflexive tendencies are pre-occupied with 
matters of social justice (Archer, 2003:258), showing a 
tendency to relate to the concerns of those beyond their own 
personal context and experience. It is not that they certainly 
generate relational goods with those for whom they are 
concerned, it is that they are oriented to do so because of 
their increased openness to relational reflexivity. 
The vertical axis of the ORRAC model (Figure 10, below) then, 
is a continuum of low to high orientation towards relational 
reflexivity. The bottom of quadrant 3 represents a highly 
individualistic mechanism which forges a process of 
socialisation which is self-oriented, as any relational 
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reflexivity is limited in scope to include those with whom 
autonomous goals can be pursued. The top of quadrant 2 
represents a highly collective mechanism, towards relational 
reflexivity which is open to influence through a concern for 
the experiences and insights of others. 
4.9.4.2 Agency for Change 
The second dimension of the ORRAC model, drawn from 
Archer’s reflexive modes is the extent to which people enact 
agency towards change. The social interventions that are 
being studied aim to support people to move forwards, to 
make changes in their lives, through building and 
strengthening relationships and through taking steps to act; 
to try new things, to do something different. Within these 
interventions, both agency and relationship play key roles. 
The horizontal axis of the ORRAC model shown in Figure 10 
represents a continuum of low to high application of agency 
for change. This axis is not about capacity for agency or 
competence, but instead the extent to which agency is 
applied towards change (or moving forwards). Context will 
shape these levels of application of agency; it is 
acknowledged that there will be both internal and external 
contextual conditions that will have shaped and will continue 
to shape the expression of agency. 
Those with Communicative tendencies enact agency but it is 
to maintain or reproduce their current circumstances, rather 
than the pursuit of change, and those who are experiencing 
fractured reflexivity lack the capacity for agential action; 
recall that their internal conversations whilst operating in this 
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mode lead to ‘distress and disorientation’ (Archer and 
Donati, 2015:143) rather than action. However, those who 
tend towards Autonomous and Meta-reflexivity and who 
have distanced themselves from their natal context have, in 
doing this, already expressed a tendency towards agency for 
change. Their capacity for the mental activities required to 
confront novel situations has been tested and exercised, 
albeit that they are fallible and may have struggled along the 
way. 
To be clear, the quadrants of the ORRAC model are not 
presented here as analytically equivalent to Archer’s modes 
of reflexivity. Instead they represent elements of Archer’s 
(2003) reflexive modes within two axes that are key to 
reflexive deliberation and vary between people. The ORRAC 
model presents these aspects of reflexivity seen as relevant 
to care relationships and social interventions: agency and 
relational reflexivity. This model has been developed using 
existing theory, supported by consideration of empirical data 
from this study. Figure 10, below, therefore shows features 
of Archer’s reflexive modes that are relevant to the axes of 
relational reflexivity and agency for change. These quadrants 
are representative of discernible patterns within people’s 
reflexive behaviour: patterns that are integral to shaping 
their ongoing socialisation. They are not categories of people, 
or personality types, they represent different tendencies of 
the reflexive mechanism and can therefore help to explain 
patterns of choices, attitudes, behaviours, actions or 
inaction. The dominance of each mechanism at any one time 
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or in any one role can be detected. The pattern of emphasis 
between mechanisms can be very stable, or can change over 
time, or can vary between situations. In the case studies, data 
gathered from the participants is examined and presented 
using this framework. In examining the patterns of reflexivity, 
the interplay between structure, culture and agency in the 
social interventions can be more closely understood.  
FIGURE 10: THE ORRAC MODEL 
 
4.9.5 Care relationships and Donati’s criteria 
The analysis of the study relationships built on the analysis of 
the participants' reflexive tendencies, their orientation to 
relational reflexivity, and how this knowledge revealed 
insights into the care relationship. With new knowledge of 
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their comparative reflexive tendencies, the social relations 
between the participants were of particular interest.   
The analytical approach was to apply the part of the 
theoretical framework, which represents the relationship 
between the parties (R->RG, p112), and is based on Pierpaolo 
Donati’s (Archer and Donati, 2015) requirements for 
relational subjects that generate relational goods. The 
theoretical model in Figure 8, p116 shows these ‘goods’ 
bending back through the ‘we-relation’ to ‘provide energy 
and resources’ to each person. It is hypothesised that these 
relational goods have the potential to create effects within 
the individual, for example, may change the nature/content 
of the objective ‘me’ (e.g. I feel confident) or the future ‘you’ 
(eg I could do ’x’), or ‘we’ (I don’t have to do this 
alone). Before assessing the evidence for or against relational 
goods working in this way, Donati’s requirements were 
applied to the case study relationships to consider whether 
they met the requirements, and also considered the meaning 
of the requirements themselves in the context of care 
relationships. Donati’s requirements for relational goods are 
presented in Figure 11 below. Each of the relationships in the 
study were quite different and operated within different 
contexts, so it was anticipated that this exercise would be 
fruitful in both understanding whether the relationships met 
the requirements, the influence of context on whether these 
requirements could be met, and the validity of the 
requirements for care relationships as opposed to naturally 
occurring social relationships. As the data collected reflected 
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other care relationships in the participants' lives, these were 
also included in the analysis, as they provided useful insights. 
 
FIGURE 11: REQUIREMENTS FOR RELATIONAL GOODS (RG) 
 
4.9.6 Data relating to contextual conditions 
In terms of the Morphogenetic/Morphostatic framework, 
the emergent properties of structural and cultural conditions 
exert their influence through people. In addition to knowing 
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about these contextual conditions, it was important to 
examine their effects, and how these may influence care 
relationships, through the service lead and practitioner, and 
through the service user as these conditions may affect their 
perception about the service, and in this way influence the 
way that they approach or engage with the relationship.  
Analysis of data included a review of service information, the 
service lead interview (session 5), practitioner interview 
(session 3), and service user interview (session 3) to identify 
structural and cultural factors and how these were 
understood and experienced in practical terms by those 
involved. For example, there was tension for Fiona (AllCare 
practitioner) in the rules for spending Personal Budget funds, 
where limitations for spending were based on rules set by 
finance officers and senior managers in the Local Authority 
who lacked understanding of personalisation and the reality 
experienced by the service users. This situation required her 
to preserve her relationships with service users by clarifying 
that although her role was to advocate for them, she was not 
the decision-maker; these cultural and structural emergent 
properties were beyond her influence. There were, however, 
conflicting interests because a Local Authority contract 
funded Fiona’s support, and she, therefore, was also 
expected to ‘manage expectations’. It is Fiona’s reflexivity 





This chapter has set out the rationale for using case studies 
in critical realist research and has described the practical 
steps in the design and execution of this research. The next 
four chapters will present the case studies in turn, presenting 
an analysis of the reflexivity of the participants, the role of 
the care relationships, the structural and cultural contexts for 




Chapter 5: Case Study 1, WellCity 
5.1 Introduction to the case studies 
The four case studies provide detailed accounts of the nature 
of the practitioner, the service user and the organisational 
context (from the perspective of each organisational lead). 
They illustrate the use and reveal the utility of Archer and 
Donati’s theories in examining care relationships at this 
granular level. The primary focus is on individual reflexivity 
because examining individuals’ reflexivity in context will 
reveal important insight into their relational reflexivity. The 
ORRAC model, introduced in the Methodology and Methods 
chapter, is a vital tool in representing the reflexive nature of 
each participant. 
The discussion chapter following the case studies will draw 
on the data already presented, articulate the research 
findings, and incorporate further examples from the data to 
support the conclusions drawn about care relationships in 
social interventions. 
The format of each case study examines one contribution at 
a time: practitioner, service user, organisational lead. The 
research questions and data collection methods have led to 
thorough and personal accounts. This is reflected in the case 
study text using detailed description and embedding the 
participant voice to represent their meanings faithfully. This 
approach was undoubtedly influenced by Archer’s (2003, 
2007, 2012) empirical work, and it is hoped, helps to reflect 
the ‘first-person character of internal conversations’ (Sayer, 
2009:116). The order of introduction of each protagonist 
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varies in each case study, aligning with the critical realist 
principle that people, structures and cultures are equally and 
incorrigibly emergent, and so a predictable sequence of 
importance is unwarranted. 
5.2 WellCity 
WellCity is a user-led organisation (ULO) that supports 
disabled people to take control over their lives, fully 
participate in society, challenge inequality and contribute to 
a change in attitudes towards disabled people. The 
organisation provides support by providing information, 
practical support and advice around independent living and 
self-directed support. Their ULO status requires that 75% of 
volunteer trustees are disabled people.  
As an extension of a county-wide initiative to encourage local 
community groups to be inclusive and welcoming to all 
members of the community, including those with a disability 
and those with mental health needs, they have been 
commissioned by the local council to include a one-to-one 
service, to support people with mild-moderate mental health 
needs. The latter service is the focus of the research with this 
organisation. 
The case study is structured to first introduce the service 
user, Luke, providing an analysis of his reflexive 
development, the role of reflexivity in shaping his life, and his 
experiences in shaping his reflexivity. Next, the organisation, 
WellCity, will be presented through the descriptions of senior 
manager, Lorraine. Lorraine provides insight into the internal 
culture and processes of WellCity and the external context 
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within which the organisation operates. Lastly, Maxine is 
introduced. Analysis of Maxine’s case builds an 
understanding of her reflexive development and tendencies.  
It also considers the implications of WellCity’s context and 
leadership for her reflexivity and her support role with Luke.  
5.3 Introducing Luke 
Luke is in his early 60s. He grew up in London, attended 
private school as a day pupil and studied Law at 
University. He subsequently began a career in recruitment 
which, longer-term, led to working for himself in both 
Recruitment Services and Management Consulting.  
Luke has struggled with alcoholism for most of his adult life 
and had his first “detox treatment..mental treatment” at the 
age of 28-29, and at the age of 32 achieved sobriety that 
lasted for almost 17 years. A few months before the research 
interviews, Luke had been referred to WellCity by a care 
coordinator at his GP practice following a period of personal 
crisis. He had separated from his wife, sold the family home, 
and his alcoholism had exacerbated, resulting in hospital 
admission. The physical and mental impact of this relapse 
was significant, resulting in difficulty walking and poor 
mental health. When Maxine (WellCity practitioner) had first 
met him a few months earlier, Luke lived in a rented flat 
directly opposite the large property, which he had, until 
recently, owned and shared with his family. At that point, 
Luke was required to move out by his landlord, and with 
support from the care coordinator at the GP practice, he 
secured social housing in a large town in the same county, 
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which was some distance from his home town and new to 
him. Maxine’s role was to support Luke to establish himself 
after his relocation.  
Luke acknowledges that due to being on his own so much, he 
tends to speak a lot and quickly because he enjoys being with 
people whom he can talk to: “I live a very solitary lonely 
existence at the moment … I used to be ...very convivial with 
people - and I think that’s why I tend to gush too much … it’s 
the pent up thing of being on my own all the time”.  
Unlike any other participant, Luke’s interviews were less like 
a semi-structured conversation and more akin to a stream of 
consciousness: “..and there’s a point to what I am coming to 
– I know I go off the point – sorry..”.  In this way Luke, rapidly 
switching between topics but almost always returning to his 
point, was generous in sharing a great deal of detail about his 
life, struggles, interests and insights during the data 
collection sessions. 
Luke’s account showed that his sudden change in 
circumstances had presented an overwhelming challenge to 
the way he lived and his self-concept. He had been severely 
physically and mentally unwell, had lost everything 
(materially and socially), and was beginning at the time of our 
interview to regain equilibrium. “I know that my wellbeing at 
the moment - not off the scale…. but... I’m sort of breathing a 
sigh of relief - saying crikey - maybe it is possible to start 
again”.  At the point of the interview, Luke had recently 
moved into social housing in an unfamiliar town. He talked 
about accepting ‘rock bottom’ and said, “whilst I consider my 
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life to have been a considerable failure... I am grateful to be 
alive and to have a chance for a fresh start”. Internally, his 
capacity for agency was low, being largely reliant on support 
to begin building a new life, get out and about, set up utility 
bills, consider employment and engage with other agencies 
for help with health and wellbeing. Represented below on 
the ORRAC model (Figure 12), his orientation towards agency 
for change fell at the low end at the point of data collection, 
albeit that there were some signs of his regaining expression 
of active agency.   
Luke’s circumstances meant that his social connections were 
almost completely diminished at the time of his breakdown. 
His second marriage had ended two years previously: “her 
leaving me to sell the house and me rattling around on my 
own...having clients who are very demanding...I was suddenly 
then in a real pickle – family was all gone – work was all over 
– and my health had been affected – having ignited the 
poison of drinking again”. He and his adult children were also 
estranged, and he was no longer working. He was out of 
contact with his network from Alcoholics Anonymous, 
although he had just begun to attend a group in his new 
town. His brother was the only consistent family contact and 
source of support. An agreement with his brother evidences 
Luke’s lack of decision-making capacity: “we agreed I would 
use his brain - so whether it was send a letter - have a row 
with universal credit…whatever the hell the decision was, we 
agreed that I would rely on his decision-making….it was 
complete acceptance of - I’ve by and large done it my way and 
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its ended in tears”. Apart from long-distance support from his 
brother and care relationships with service providers, Luke’s 
social support network was minimal. Represented on the 
ORRAC model, Luke’s opportunity and capacity for relational 
reflexivity was low. Low capacity for both agency and 
relational reflexivity places Luke in quadrant 4, aligned with 
Archer’s mode of Fractured reflexivity, defined by Archer 
(2007:96) as those ‘whose internal conversation serves only 
to intensify their personal distress and social disorientation 
without enabling them to determine upon a purposeful 
course of action’ and ‘subject to the pushes and pulls of social 
hydraulics’. Luke’s own description of his internal 
conversation mirrors this definition: “...what led to this crisis 
and what made it so profound was that my discussion with 
myself was quite constant and...negative - it was very much 
fuelling stuff I can’t change - stuff from the past and I could 
do nothing about it - and it was very lonely”.   




5.3.1 Reflexivity at different life stages  
This finding for Luke represents his ‘current’ (at that time) 
reflexive capacity; however, it is incomplete in that it 
represents just one temporal slice of his life. Archer 
(2007:96) asserts that anyone can be susceptible to a 
dominant mode of fractured reflexivity: ‘the continuous 
exercise of our reflexive powers, which is what makes us 
active agents...is always a fragile property, ever liable to 
suspension’.  Luke’s interviews revealed that he has shifted 
between fractured and more active periods of reflexivity 
throughout his adult life, rather than it being a single 
outcome of his recent crisis.  
For Luke, alcoholism has been a pivotal risk factor in his 
unstable reflexive capacity. This is illustrated by an example 
which describes the onset of an earlier crisis period:   “when 
I was 17-years-sober in 2007 a number of events 
happened...and I didn’t have the mental strength to deal with 
them…discovered that my first wife who I had met at 
university had died young …..got very upset about that - and 
then....other events that went wrong…..and I was in [town] 
high street one day…I picked up some vodka….” 
Luke is self-critical throughout his interviews. His comment 
above about being “a considerable failure..” could be 
interpreted as candid self-awareness; however, the 
importance of temporality in reflexivity comes to the fore 
here. Luke reflects on the entirety of his past through the lens 
of his current dominant reflexive mode.  In this fractured 
mode, the internal relations, particularly the ‘me-relation’ of 
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his current internal conversation, is characterised by 
negativity. An illustration of this is Luke’s reflection on his 
recruitment and management consulting career spanning 40 
years. His account at interview primarily emphasises how he 
was at fault:  “I think on the rare occasions in my life where I 
have worked hard - I’ve had phenomenal - all good...results - 
but mostly I haven’t - I’ve been more of a chancer or I’ve been 
lazy…generally I have made intuitive decisions made on gut 
feel and emotion - which happen to, in my case looking back, 
have been bad decisions”. Similarly, Luke compares himself 
unfavourably with others whom he holds in high esteem; his 
brother’s very stable and prosperous career trajectory, and 
also that of a previous client: “Tom was a client for ten years 
– a very disciplined man in a way that I was undisciplined”.  
5.3.2 Active and autonomous 
Figure 12 represents Luke in Q4 of the ORRAC model, his 
social immobility consistent with Archer’s description of 
Fractured reflexivity. However, this has not always been the 
case for Luke, and his account provides evidence of well-
developed and active reflexive capacity. His description of 
leaving home to go to university as a young man and his 
moves through first jobs illustrates this active agency, which 
was motivated by what he wanted to do, and, he says, by 
‘money and status’:  
“I decided what I wanted to do, and I was gonna do it, and I 
wasn’t much influenced by anyone else..” 
“They paid a basic of twelve and a half to thirteen grand, 
[1979] - threw a company car in...so that was very attractive 
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- and I was very much in a hurry to achieve whatever I wanted 
to achieve.”  
The focus on personal progression and a lesser focus on 
relationships suggest that in this early part of his life, Luke’s 
reflexivity was operating in Quadrant 3, aligned with the 
autonomous reflexive mechanism, seeking to move on and 
up in the world and valuing material symbols of success. The 
value he places in independence is evident in the way he 
described his later consultancy role: “I like the idea that my 
consultancy job was always playing second fiddle to the client 
like a lawyer who works for the client - but might run his own 
practice - but I liked the idea that I was self-employed and 
that I was in control..”. His emphasis on independence shows 
that the autonomous mechanism was in play, engendering 
agency for moving forward, but what led to the dominance of 
this autonomous mode in this early part of his life? 
5.3.3 Development of Autonomous traits 
The information Luke shared about his family background fits 
the pattern set out by Archer (2007) as typical of autonomous 
reflexive development, involving early exposure to situations 
that necessitate or nurture self-reliance. These conditions 
directly contrast with those which nurture communicative 
reflexivity, where ‘similarity and familiarity’ (Archer 2007: 
275-6) anchor social placement. Luke was clear that his 
parents did not get on: “I could hear them when they rowed - 
and they stayed married ’til the day he died - we knew she 
was tricky and he was unusually easy-going - and they came 
from…a generation where you stayed together..”. Luke went 
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to university some distance from home and began to build 
his career and life as distinct from theirs. Archer (2007:196) 
remarks that ‘one of the most overt consequences [of 
autonomous reflexivity] is their marked tendency to leave 
home and…never return to their natal context except as 
visitors’. 
5.3.4 Vulnerability to fractured reflexivity  
Although the data reveal that Luke has autonomous 
tendencies in his initial trajectory, there are elements of his 
account that set him apart from Archer’s ideal type of 
autonomous reflexivity and are implicated in his fractured 
tendency.   Firstly, he was not equal to self-sufficiency which 
drives the autonomous mechanism: “I was never very self-
sufficient on my own - which is what is very interesting about 
this [his current situation] which is that I need to be self-
sufficient on my own”. This need for relational stability is 
evident in his comment above that he liked to ‘play second 
fiddle’ professionally and act in a support capacity whilst also 
having the freedom offered by working for himself. Seeking 
relational stability also appears as a feature of Luke’s 
personal life, particularly at times of personal crisis. Luke met 
his second wife in his late twenties during his first detox 
treatment for alcoholism. She was his new secretary and had 
come to take dictation from him at the clinic where he was 
being treated. “I ended up marrying her..I thought she was a 
nice person...had a strong work ethic...would be a good 
mum…I knew I had blown that first marriage - someone I had 
adored…so I thought it’s time for my head to rule my heart … 
and so we got married”.   
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Luke’s account of this relationship and family life showed that 
it served as an effective stabilising factor, a period which 
coincided with his 17 years of sobriety: “we started from 
scratch in 1990 - and rented a place for ten years and then 
bought quite a large house which I then sold last year - um - 
but there were flashes of business success..”. Luke and his 
wife had two children who were finishing their GCSEs when 
times again became challenging for Luke. Ultimately his 
marriage ended, his work opportunities dwindled, relational 
supports disappeared, and he had limited social support to 
rely on.  
Also out of step with a secure expression of autonomous 
reflexivity is Luke’s account of a lack of planning and strategy 
in his decision-making. With hindsight, he reflects: “ I think in 
terms of planning, where I have planned things - at least I’ve 
had a ‘what if’ scenario to fall back on of if it goes wrong - so 
I’ve had the positives and negatives - but generally I have 
made intuitive decisions made on gut feel and emotion – 
which happen in my case to be bad decisions”.  At times these 
examples of a shift from autonomous to fractured tendency 
coincide with relapses in alcoholism, here linked to financial 
decisions and management:  “….choosing to educate them 
[his children] privately which I could ill-afford - so putting 
myself under pressure…re-thatching the house couldn’t 
afford the thirty grand for that …I’ve got twenty grand so I 
thought I would find the extra ten…and I didn’t plan where 
the ten was coming from - just somehow I’d get it….” 
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So far in this analysis, the data have shown that Luke initially 
operated in an autonomous modality but that at times he lost 
the capacity for active reflexivity, leading to ‘fractured’ 
periods with loss of both relational connection and agency. 
Luke appeared to regain a functional expression of reflexivity 
in a supportive family relationship structure, but to what 
extent did relationships factor in who he was and how he 
operated in his working life?  
5.3.5 Relational reflexivity at work 
Luke volunteered some written testimonials about his work 
life from his (“now defunct”) company website, which, 
although not requested for the research, provided valuable 
insight into how he was viewed in his working life.   
“…there were...close relationships with clients - as per those 
testimonials...reveal…now those testimonials are quite 
interesting as they are genuinely how other people see me - 
and although they have been chosen to be flattering to go on 
the website - they are people who knew me quite well.” 
The testimonials were from CEOs and Directors of companies 
he had worked with as recently as two years prior to the 
interview. The testimonials present Luke as someone highly 
skilled relationally. He is described as having a ‘strong moral 
compass’ and an ability to ‘decipher cultures’, using these 
skills to place people appropriately, build teams, and provide 
corporate level coaching and support organisations with 
acquisitions. As Luke says, these testimonials were “chosen 
to be flattering”, but it is of interest that their content is 
markedly relational in nature. His skill set, according to these, 
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was in effectively understanding what mattered to people 
and using this knowledge to support businesses by managing 
and supporting relationships. 
The relational reflexivity employed by Luke in his work 
context, however, retained an autonomous purpose. The 
nature of his work was relational. As he puts it, applying “soft 
skills” or, as a client described, “handling complex souls”. 
Luke’s ability to apply relational reflexivity in this way 
promoted corporate harmony to meet clients’ human 
resource requirements and ensure the development, smooth 
running, and sale of their businesses. There is no evidence 
that Luke’s relational reflexivity extends beyond the 
boundaries of this instrumental purpose to, for example, 
broader ideas of social justice. It is of interest, though, that 
relational reflexivity is not absent in those who tend toward 
autonomous reflexivity; but instead, the interests and 
circumstances of others are not as readily prioritised within 
their social concerns. For Luke, it appears that managing 
relationships (beyond immediate family) is a primarily 
practical rather than a social concern and a practice for which 
he has been highly praised. 
5.3.6 Agency and relational reflexivity in Luke’s new life 
Although Luke’s circumstances have wholly transformed, his 
approach to relationship management in his new context is 
markedly similar. He uses his social capital and 
communication skills to navigate new challenges: “for all of 
my short-comings and there are many – if you can’t 
communicate over the phone or you are not articulate....you 
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haven’t got a chance in hell”.  He is frustrated by system 
barriers and the anonymity cast over him by the system, and 
it therefore makes a significant difference to him if 
practitioners demonstrably prioritise him as a person over 
and above system rules. As the following examples show, this 
contributes to securing his trust and approbation.    
Luke applied his social skills to build a relationship with a GP 
receptionist to access hospital results which, for bureaucratic 
reasons, were not available to him: “I worked extremely hard 
to build up relationships…to get the right care .. the right 
Doctor, the results of the scan.” “the receptionist at 
the...surgery shouldn’t have rung me but she did...she 
thought it was unfair the way that patients are treated – so 
she went outside the circle…”. Similarly to his approach to 
work, Luke describes relationships as a practice with a 
purpose. He tapped into a concern that was common to them 
both; that the system was in some ways unfair. The 
receptionist ‘went outside the circle’, responding to Luke’s 
dilemma and circumventing structural barriers on his behalf. 
This relationship is not a long-term care relationship but may 
have begun to generate relational goods for both Luke and 
the receptionist. For both parties, the satisfaction of an issue 
resolved, the rules slightly bent, a level of trust between 
them for future interactions, and a sense of self-efficacy. In a 
similar vein, Luke celebrated the decision of a support 
practitioner who ‘broke the rules’ by meeting him in a 
restaurant where he was having lunch instead of in their 
booked room at the library: “she said well I’ll probably lose 
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my job but never mind – I’m going to break the rules…we had 
a laugh about that – and she said I won’t squeal on myself if 
you don’t…”.   
Conversely, Luke’s relationship with Jessica, his Universal 
Credit advisor, is likely to generate relational evils rather than 
relational goods. Jessica is relatively new in the role, and Luke 
struggles to tolerate what he sees as incompetent. His 
impatience spills over into personal criticism, mocking her 
weight: “she likes her cakes” and expressing his 
frustration: “Jessica will stand behind a computer and the 
Universal Credit system…her lack of knowledge…is 
staggering”. Jessica’s experience of Luke can only be 
imagined. Luke’s orientation to relational reflexivity is 
conditional upon whether he likes a person or not, and 
competence is a key test. Maxine [WellCity practitioner] also 
observes that Luke has “got quite a firm idea around how 
people should be” and “I suppose class is quite important to 
Luke”.  Luke himself indicates that expressing empathy in 
such cases is not easy, yet also indicates that he is trying to 
change this: “I had to work very hard to empathise with the 
people...at the Job Centre and Universal Credit...but I just 
thought – well it’s not her fault – it’s the fault of the people 
who employed her…the lack of training – she had a long 
period of being out of work before she got this job..”  
5.3.7 Summary of Luke’s reflexive shifts 
The ORRAC model below summarises the temporal shifts in 
Luke’s reflexivity, revealed through his account of his life. It 
shows that Luke started out post-university with 
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autonomous traits (T1) and that in his late twenties, there 
was a fractured period (T2). Stability was achieved through 
his second marriage, family and consistent sobriety (T3), 
which led to Luke developing his business, and here we see 
him utilising relational reflexive mechanisms, albeit towards 
an autonomous purpose. His recent crisis takes him back to 
quadrant 4 (T4). Luke’s support relationship with Maxine and 
others is scaffolding his capacity for reflexivity (T5), engaging 
again in relational reflexivity with autonomous purpose.  
FIGURE 13: LUKE'S REFLEXIVE SHIFTS ON THE ORRAC MODEL 
 
5.3.8 Adjudicating between concerns 
According to Archer, the internal adjudication between 
competing interests is the core business of reflexivity.  Luke 
raised a conflict between his ambition (practical order) and 
his relationship with his brother (social order). He recounts a 
potential conflict between the viewpoint of his brother, a 
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solid support to him, and his own. In these following two 
excerpts, Luke shows that it is important to him to use his 
skills (practical order) and regain a sense of self-worth and 
status (social order). 
“I’ve only been here 2 months - the next part of the jigsaw is 
working - any paid employment - but very quickly I’ll want 
that paid employment to be slightly more challenging and 
interesting - better - because it’s in my nature to and I will 
fight that to try and prove to myself and other people that I’ve 
changed..”   
Whilst Luke’s reflexivity was incapacitated, he had agreed 
that he would “use my brother’s brain” for any type of 
decision making, and his relationship with his brother was 
generating relational goods. However, Luke anticipates the 
risk of relational evils in his drive to pursue his own concerns: 
” the battle then comes between … people pleasing - a job in 
a shop or helping out here (library) - at one end - right the way 
through to finding a consultancy - or counselling type job that 
I could enjoy - for a moderate amount of money…..so this idea 
of other people’s judgement is difficult - - so from my 
brother’s point of view which I am influenced by - well 
certainly he’s helped me quite a lot - it’s - you know - any job 
- but he is very black and white about it - and I’m probably 
very grey about it..”  
On the second section of the ICONI, Luke’s first listed concern 
was “Relationships – brother/son/daughter”, and the ‘battle’ 
that he refers to involves the adjudication between this 
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crucial social concern, and his ambition to regain other social 
and practical footholds of his personal identity. Archer 
(2007:224) points out that accommodating interpersonal 
relationships is essential for those who tend towards 
autonomous reflexivity whilst ensuring that they ‘do not 
usurp the subject’s internal satisfaction deriving from work’. 
Now that his capacity for independent reflexivity is returning, 
Luke’s autonomous leanings seek to satisfy these concerns, 
despite his challenging and unfamiliar circumstances.  
This example illustrates that shifting reflexive tendencies 
require accommodation in our relationships. In other words, 
relationships need to be responsive to the reflexive modality 
of the person being supported. While he was reflexively 
incapacitated, Luke’s relationship with his brother was one of 
reliance; however, in his recovery, his autonomous 
tendencies re-emerge.  How Luke and his brother will 
navigate this territory will depend on the extent to which 
each of them a) value their shared relational goods, and b) 
can both exercise relational reflexivity to facilitate ongoing 
shared understanding. 
This account of Luke has used Archer’s work to explore the 
changing nature of his reflexivity through aspects of his 
biography. This research is ultimately interested in care 
relationships. However, it maintains that the nature of each 
person in the relationship and their reflexive tendencies have 
implications for the nature and effects of the relationship 
itself, an assertion which warrants this detailed analysis.   
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In addition, the context for the relationship is considered a 
key influence. The theoretical model within which this 
research sits sets out to investigate the potential for 
structural and cultural influences. These are theorised to 
influence the nature of the relationship through the people 
involved. Before introducing Maxine and then the 
relationship between Maxine and Luke, the next section will 
introduce WellCity as an organisation, mainly through the 
account of one of its senior leaders, Lorraine. 
5.4 Organisational focus 
WellCity’s primary business is a contract to provide support 
planning for people receiving personal health budgets; part 
of council offer to disabled people and people with long-term 
health conditions. This support service is tied to council 
structures and processes. The project relevant to this 
particular case study was the ‘Best Life’ project, funded 
separately through the local Clinical Commissioning Group 
(CCG) Innovation fund.  The ‘Best Life’ project aims to take a 
two-pronged approach: 
• working with individuals in one-to-one relationship 
with support workers, and   
• working with communities to promote the important 
ways they already welcome and support each other 
and growing this as a community movement.   
The Best Life project is the part of the organisation through 
which Maxine was supporting Luke. This research seeks to 
understand the workings of the one-to-one aspect of this 
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social intervention at an organisational, service delivery and 
recipient level.   
Whilst outcomes are seen as important by WellCity, their 
view of outcomes, as articulated by Lorraine (Business 
Development Manager), is person-centric, with the assertion 
that outcomes are not about what the organisation wants to 
achieve, but instead, what is vital to the individual: 
“we want them to be empowered to feel that ‘this is my 
life’ and ‘this is how I am going to live it well’...all Olivia 
and Maxine [practitioners] are doing is being alongside 
them to support them...they are not setting the journey 
– it has to be person-led in order to be successful.” 
“it’s not so much the activities that people end up going 
to…it’s more about how they move on as a person...and 
their confidence and their self-esteem – that’s what we 
are trying to grow.” 
Lorraine characterises outcomes as personal growth towards 
an expression of agency rather than pre-defined goals or 
activities. Her position echoes the outcomes principle that 
Grönroos (2011) describes as value-in-use: ‘value-in-use 
means that value for the user is created or emerges during 
usage, which is a process of which the customer is in charge’ 
(see 2.8, p35). The implication is that the organisations 
cannot specify outcomes, as the nature of the ‘value’ is 
emergent of the person on the receiving end of support.  
Lorraine’s description above indicates that the WellCity focus 
is one of personal growth for the individual. We will see that 
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structural and cultural conditions are vital in enabling care 
relationships. These conditions include how practitioners 
think about the people they support and how to support 
them. The following section will draw on Lorraine’s interview 
for insight into the culture and structures within which this 
social intervention and its relationships operate. As one of 
two senior leaders within WellCity, with influence internally 
through the service design and direct management 
relationship with the support workers and external influence 
through relationships with system leaders at county level, 
Lorraine’s account provides essential insight. 
After establishing an understanding of the role of the 
organisational culture and structures, Maxine, Luke’s support 
worker, will be introduced. Her reflexivity will be examined 
to understand her reflexive tendencies in light of the cultural 
and structural influences of the organisation.  
5.4.1 Lorraine, Business Development Manager 
Lorraine was lively, enthusiastic, encouraging and 
challenging during our conversation, appearing to relish the 
opportunity to share her ideas. She has been working as the 
Business Development Manager for WellCity since 2014, 
when she was recruited to extend the community 
development offer within the organisation. Lorraine 
explained that the current WellCity approach was a 
significant shift in practice for the organisation, fuelled by an 
“epiphany” that swung the organisational model from a 
needs-based to a strengths-based mindset, informed by 
Asset Based Community Development (ABCD) principles 
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(Russell, 2020). These principles focus on people’s strengths 
and capacities as a starting point for support rather than their 
needs. A mantra of the ABCD movement is to focus on 
‘what’s strong rather than what’s wrong’. Lorraine’s example 
below illustrates their shift from one to the other, contrasting 
their approach with the same individual (a) before and (b) 
after this transition: 
(a)“we were working with a person and….she lived in a small 
village…she’d said she was interested in crafts and our offer 
to her was this arts group in a town 15 miles away and we 
then focussed all energies on trying to organise transport to 
get there to this arts...but she didn’t wanna even go to an art 
group- she was interested in crafts….”  
(b)“we piloted the ‘best life’ conversation …. and she talked 
about the fact that she was a school governor … and what she 
really wanted was some more youth opportunities in her 
village – because her daughter was a teenager and really 
bored – and oh my god – we have been so dumb – we have 
been looking at people as a list of needs whereas actually 
they are a list of strengths – and this woman is a massive 
asset to her community and we start working with her about 
how she could work with her community to make it stronger 
– and then it all started make sense – and it all started – like 
we just had to turn everything upside down and it’s so 
simple.”   
This shift sparked a fundamental change to the organisation 
because it revolutionised their emphasis on outcomes from 
connecting people with community activity groups to 
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prioritising the recognition and development of individual 
agency. Although this was, in practical delivery terms, a sea 
change for the organisation, Lorraine was clear that despite 
the change in approach, it also fitted well with established 
organisational values, which were rooted in their user-led 
origins and disability rights activism.  
5.4.2 Maintenance of a strengths-based culture 
Lorraine’s interview showed in several ways that for her, this 
strengths-based approach contrasts sharply with incumbent 
ways of thinking and practice in the health and care system, 
which in Lorraine’s view, draw power away from service 
users by professionalising help and support. A thread running 
through Lorraine’s narrative is the unhelpful nature of 
‘professionalised’ and ‘expert’ roles.  At times she uses strong 
terms, speaking of the “dehumanising of professionals” and 
“it’s like they put on that lanyard and they walk into that big 
council building – and they lose their humanity”.  
In WellCity, she consistently challenges the legitimacy of this 
power differential and advocates for its subversion. She sees 
the value of WellCity’s offer as scaffolding the growth of the 
agential powers of each person, even if it is only initially 
evident as a “glimmer of motivation”:   
“what the 1:1 workers are trying to do is say – ‘you are 
brilliant..I have no special skills or knowledge to give you 
but...we do understand that things break for people and they 
just need that help to get back into their community’”   
Maxine (practitioner) articulates the contrast between 
WellCity’s methods and the way that other local 
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organisations operate, here describing informal comments 
from staff from other organisations: 
“…we get told a lot by people – other organisations – ‘we love 
the work that WellCity does – you are so good at working 
alongside people and promoting good aspects’..…..but 
sometimes you feel that there is....competition 
professionally.” “….sometimes…it can come across as being a 
bit fluffy and a bit woolly – and ‘you just do the nice…’– you 
know and what not..” 
Maxine’s further explanation reveals that the key to this 
difference, for her, is the assessment processes. These are 
typical in many intervention models and are focused on what 
the person cannot do – rather than what the person can do; 
a deficit versus asset-based approach: 
“you ... speak to people and they’ve had 7 assessments in one 
year ...they [other services] are talking to them about what 
they can’t do – nobody’s talking to them about what 
they can do.” 
Lorraine works to establish and manage a strengths-based 
approach and resists any encroachment of needs-led 
thinking within the service. Lorraine achieves this by 
managing the roles, expectations and behaviours of the 
support workers and in the design of recruitment, training 
and supervision processes. Recruitment of support workers 
emphasises the applicants’ values, and Lorraine implies that 
professional social care experience may put them at a 
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disadvantage, with “the one caveat…that they don’t come 
across as ‘professional knows best’”.   
In managing day-to-day practice, Lorraine emphasised a 
careful balance between practitioners having autonomy in 
their role and “keep[ing] an ear to the ground about who they 
are working with and how they are working”, stipulating 
supervision every six weeks for this purpose. A key intention 
is to steer practitioners away from thinking or acting for the 
person being supported. This intention extends to limiting 
the training practitioners are offered (avoiding, for example, 
counselling training): “I didn’t want them to think that they 
are a professional and I didn’t want them feeling that they 
were going to save these people”.  In the same vein, Lorraine 
talks about ‘managing the ego’ of practitioners who may 
otherwise become over-zealous about their life-changing 
roles and usurping the person’s agency. Lorraine says, “..its 
constantly reminding them who they [practitioners] are – it’s 
tricky– I don’t always get it right – I am not always on it 
enough – but it’s trying to use those everyday examples and 
trying to use reflective practice..to realign them”.  
Lorraine’s use of the term ‘realign’ suggests she sees her role 
as influencing how the practitioners think about service 
users, their role, and how they then deliver care. Of the four 
study sites, WellCity is the one that shows the most 
intentional and purposeful influence on the nature of the 
reflexive deliberations of the practitioners.  
Lorraine has introduced regular evaluative ‘reflective 
practice’ centred on one question, as she describes here:  
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“..I wanted to make the reflective practice dead simple so 
they could use it on their visits – all the time – it could be going 
round in their head – it could be based on that question – how 
has the work you’ve done today helped that person to live 
the life they want to live? I wanted it to be really relevant to 
their day – and that...changed their thinking of how they 
work..” 
5.4.3 Structure as ‘process-light’ 
Lorraine’s efforts are directed at how the practitioners think 
about themselves in their role and how they think about the 
person receiving support. Structure and process are 
purposefully limited in the service. Ways of working are at 
the discretion of the practitioner, as the service is wholly 
responsive in design. Lorraine speaks of the service 
being “incredibly process-light and...open in terms of lengths 
of time….it has to centre on the person rather than any other 
system and unfortunately it’s really easy to get seduced by 
systems and processes”. She clarifies that the intervention 
“comes after all that real in-depth reflection and thinking – 
then we put that stuff [processes] in – we don’t start with that 
– unfortunately a lot of places start with that stuff because 
it’s easy”.  The reliance on the strength-based ethos provides 
limited structural support, which results in a greater need for 
oversight of how practitioners are maintaining the approach, 
mainly because it is counter-cultural to the wider system 
approach.  
For this reason, Lorraine is reluctant to scale up this approach 
or to package it and sell it, and the reasons she gives are 
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consistent. The way the service runs is not founded on 
replicable structures and processes; it is based on how the 
practitioners think about the people they support and how 
they think about the best way to support them:  
“I wouldn’t think it was ethical to put this in another 
environment and just say we’ll take the money…there isn’t 
really a set of rules – there’s a set of principles which underpin 
this work and the principles have to be adhered to...if it is 
done wrong – all you’re doing is adding another layer of 
professional in their life who is trying to do good to them – 
yeah so we have no plans for global domination.”  
The organisational ethos and values are a crucial component 
to the service design and delivery. Lorraine’s account 
confirms that culture is a priority over structure and process 
“the processes have to fit with the values – as opposed the 
other way round.”. Lorraine does not consider this a 
straightforward process in care settings because of the 
inclination of carers to appropriate the power of the 
individual.  “It [adherence to organisational cultural norms] 
comes after all that real in-depth reflection and thinking”. 
 
5.4.4 In the context of the wider system 
Lorraine's awareness of the fragility of a model which relies 
heavily on cultural understanding and emphasis on 
relationships is underlined by her gratitude towards the new 
CCG lead who, for this project, has limited the structural 
constraints and expectations in financing this initiative: 
"it's really been amazing working with the CCG and I never 
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thought I would say that – but they've been so hands off – so 
they did this innovation fund...they said have a play and see 
what worked which was brilliant – it's what we need – we 
need to be trusted.."   
Lorraine reflects on the juxtaposition of WellCity's "radical" 
approach and the systems which ultimately govern their 
work through commissioning processes. The definition of 
radical is 'concerned with fundamental aspects of a 
matter' (McLeod, 1987), and in Lorraine's account of 
WellCity's ethos, she describes their approach as 
fundamentally different; their emphasis on creating 
conditions that give and do not usurp power from service 
users as a principle which subverts the typical helped/ helper 
relationship. Lorraine articulates a particular risk of 
professionalising help, even at a community level. She wryly 
recounts telling a story (at a Local Authority event) of a man 
in his eighties who was taking the bins out for all his 
neighbours and a director asking if the man had had a risk 
assessment.  
In Lorraine's view, this tendency to look at community life 
through a service lens obstructs person-centred thinking and 
action and is generated by "protectionism": "it's almost as 
if…they constantly feel they will be shown up for doing 
something wrong – or sued….it has completely influenced 
their practice and...made them put their guard up". However, 
to be commissioned, she also acknowledges the need to fit in 
with the wider system processes. In a recent bid to provide 
social prescribing services, she described the need to follow 
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tight governance terms: "we've had to use their language in 
order to gain their trust", even though in developing a 
service, governance procedures are at the "bottom of our 
list"…"because actually that doesn't create a free relationship 
if your worker is constantly worrying about whether the 
person has filled in the right form".   
The above examples from Lorraine illustrate a tension 
between the cultural bubble that is nurtured within the 
organisation and the contrasting cultures and structures of 
the broader system within which they operate. A further 
challenge that she believes threatens to undermine the 
integrity of WellCity's principles is the appropriation, and 
therefore the risk of undermining, terms such as 'strengths-
based' by organisations who do not embed the principles as 
fundamental to practice. She is critical of a local charity in this 
regard: "…it's got them their new tender and everything but 
their work has not changed – they are still working the same 
ways".  Lorraine concludes that the goal is to stay as 
independent as possible from the system and not to 
become "paralysed along with the system", "there are too 
many hoops to jump through – we started the Best Life 
project with no funding – and then we built enough that we 
are now getting funding attached to it".  The values and 
adherence to principles expressed by Lorraine demonstrate 
a meta-reflexive core within the organisation. Organisations 
cannot be reflexive, and it is the meta-reflexive tendencies of 
those running the organisation that maintain their principles 
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of equality and subsequent practices. The culture is shaped 
and reproduced by the people within it.  
5.5 Introducing Maxine 
Maxine has been a support worker for WellCity for 5 years. 
She earned a degree in social care and subsequently worked 
in a day centre for people with Learning Disabilities. A five-
year break from paid work to raise her two children ensued 
until she returned to work, firstly as a support worker in 
social care during evenings and weekends, and then once her 
youngest child was at school, gaining a support worker 
position at WellCity. As has been established (see 3.14, p81-
82), Archer’s (2000) characterisation of ‘personhood’ 
incorporates our relations with the natural, practical and 
social orders of reality and how we reflexively respond and 
proceed, adjudicating between our interests in the context of 
our lives. Person-centred care relationships in social 
interventions aim to support people in navigating life and are 
therefore engaging with this process. This research maintains 
that the nature of both people in the care relationship is 
important because the care relationship as a structure brings 
together two different personhoods and two shifting 
expressions of reflexivity. 
Reflexive tendencies can change throughout life, as was 
evident in the analysis of Luke’s patterns of reflexivity above. 
Archer (2017b) proposes that we may switch between modes 
in a single day. However, she also proposes that people can 
have a general tendency towards a particular mode in their 
responses to situations. It is therefore essential to 
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understand Archer’s reflexive modes as loosely tethered 
rather than anchored. Maxine’s interview also illustrates this. 
The following account reveals shifts in her reflexivity 
influenced by different life stages and contexts, including the 
influence of WellCity as her current work environment. The 
ORRAC model again provides a visual tool within which to 
represent these shifts, with its particular focus on relational 
reflexivity and agency for change within Archer’s described 
modes. Seeking to understand Maxine’s reflexive tendencies 
is an important first step in investigating whether these 
aspects of her personal reflexivity influence how she 
operates within the organisation and in her relationship with 
Luke. This first section seeks to establish Maxine’s reflexive 
tendencies and begins to consider how these influence her 
home and working life.  
5.5.1 Natal context and reflexive tendencies 
On the second part of the ICONI, Maxine wrote that her three 
primary concerns are family (specifically noting this was 
husband and children, excluding wider family), being happy, 
and physical and mental independence. Maxine’s deliberate 
exclusion of her extended family is explained in her 
interview. Her account shows an emotional distance from 
them, linked to a time when she perceived their lack of 
awareness and support during difficult and unhappy years. 
This is compounded by a continuing ‘difficult’ relationship in 
the present. When she talks about family, she emphasises 
the tight nuclear family “…[husband] and I have quite a good 
game plan with the kids ..the four of us are quite strong 
together...external family are a different matter...”. 
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Maxine’s focus on being happy as a primary concern is 
underpinned by her account of her life experiences. She 
alluded to times of significant unhappiness during her late 
teens and early twenties. She later cites contentment as 
something that is of central importance: “contentment is 
quite important to me - [I] don’t ask a lot - just - laughter - 
dogs, chickens”. The concern of independence is a theme 
that is detected qualitatively throughout Maxine’s account 
and is consistent with an expression of autonomous 
reflexivity. 
Archer (2007:195) describes two precursors of autonomous 
tendencies, both representing a contextual discontinuity in 
early life. One is that the subject has had the ‘freedom to 
encounter novel situations’ generating early experiences of 
self-sufficiency, and the other is ‘dysfunctionalities within the 
natal context’ linked to family relationships. Maxine’s 
account of her early life incorporates both elements at 
different times, and both can be seen as having an influence 
on the way she thinks about life in important ways. To make 
sense of these two contrasting aspects of Maxine’s account, 
they will be described separately, even though these two 
tendencies co-exist in Maxine’s experience of life. 
5.5.2 Freedom to ‘be’ 
Maxine describes her life before comprehensive school in a 
way that evokes a sense of complete freedom:  
“..I never had a care in the world…you know, I was happy - 
always been very much an outdoor person out climbing trees 
- probably a bit tomboyie.” 
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This sense of freedom to ‘be’ is echoed throughout Maxine’s 
narrative. In terms of her future, her aspirations are modest 
and comfortable. She anticipates, and with her husband is 
working towards, a life that centres on home and family but 
includes travel and modest adventure: 
“I don’t tend to have big dreams of long holidays or villas 
abroad...it tends to be quite centred around being home - 
but...being busy within that daily living aspect..” 
“he’s [husband] restoring a classic car so...we will be able to 
go adventuring together - I’ll have my tartan rug - flask - so 
that sort of image of how life can be..” 
These aspirations may seem idealistic and more aligned to 
the dreaming that Archer (2007:231) associates with meta-
reflexivity. However, Maxine’s account confirms that for her, 
these aspirations are achievable and part of a plan: “yeah 
without making it too idealistic [that] I suppose you can’t 
achieve it” and sets out some of the practicalities of the 
mortgage paid off, going part-time to facilitate her ideal 
lifestyle. 
Maxine’s freedom orientation extends to her aspirations for 
her children. She asserts the importance of her daughter’s 
autonomy: “I don’t want her to be doing things just to please 
me”, “she’s got to have her own motivation and make her 
own decisions”, but she also wants to see them “being happy 
and living life and experiencing life”.  Echoing her own happy 
memories of childhood freedom, she says she “just want[s] 
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her to go out and have a good time – so she can look back at 
her childhood – and she’s got the memories”. 
Although Maxine’s future aspirations are temporally distant, 
now her children are 13- and 10-years-old and starting to 
become more independent of her, she has “picked up 
hobbies again as such and brought a little bit of me-time back 
into the equation”. Maxine is a keen wild swimmer. Her 
detailed unprompted description of the experience 
emphasises the importance of the self–sufficiency involved: 
“.. it’s a very testing time as it 1) helps you think about your 
resilience and what your body is physically doing - but 
2)..pushing boundaries...your endurance...it’s very individual 
when you are out there”. 
For Maxine, this is embodied self-sufficiency: a concern of the 
natural order. Physical independence and self-reliance are 
strong drivers for Maxine, who later shared her worry, due to 
a hip replacement four years prior, about losing physical 
independence, unsure about how she would cope with being 
a recipient of care: “if the time comes when I’m gonna need 
others around me to be strong - I am not sure how good I am 
going to be letting them take control.”  
The examples above show that for Maxine, autonomy is less 
about agency for change or strategically ascending life’s 
ladders and more about building a sense of self-sufficient 
security through hard work and planning. There is, however, 
a further dimension to Maxine’s sense of independence, 
emanating from contextual discontinuity rooted in 
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unhappiness at comprehensive school and university and a 
distancing from family relationships during this time.   
5.5.3 Distancing from family relationships 
In contrast to her idyllic early childhood, which generated a 
developed sense of freedom, Maxine summarises her life as 
a teenager in the following terms: “..whereas when you went 
to comp - you became that teenager - and you just had to 
grow up - couldn’t keep climbing trees all your life.”9 
Maxine describes her years as a teenager and young adult as 
being difficult, also reflecting that those around her failed to 
notice her unhappiness or offer support:  
 “I didn’t enjoy being a teenager to early twenties - didn’t like 
life at all back then…. I found Uni incredibly hard – if I turned 
back the clock would I go again?  
“why didn’t those around me pick up on what...on helping me 
to be happy, but in all honesty I probably hid it really well so 
they would only see what was on the outside wouldn’t they - 
not the inside”. 
Maxine’s account of this period of her life is echoed later 
when she talks about the WellCity service. It suggests that 
she may have experienced a period of fractured reflexivity as 
a young person and believes that she may have benefited 
from some additional support: 
 “I do think even compared to some of the people I work with 
- I think gosh, maybe I should have had a little more support 
 
9 It is of interest that Maxine uses a second person pronoun ‘you’, distancing 
herself from this viewpoint 
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along the way - it wasn’t there or I didn’t think it was such a 
big issue - it probably really was - but I’ve come through..” 
5.5.4 Planning and control 
Maxine’s autonomous traits are rooted in these early 
challenges, which distanced her from her family. She 
suggests that she did not live up to her parents’ standards, 
recalling that they “…were always really hot on being 
organised - I don’t think I was a very organised young person 
or teenager…and then I kind of went - and overtook them”. 
Her interpretation is that due to the pressure of expectations, 
she found herself “over-compensating” as an older teen and 
young adult by “making sure everything was in order – 
everything was planned – controlled..”.  
Maxine’s well-developed control strategies may have helped 
her to manage the challenges she faced and gain a sense of 
stability. Her planning tendencies are still evident in her 
family life: “planning a week ahead with teas..”, and in her 
current work-life: “I will think about all the nitty gritty things 
- I’ll probably turn up early...it frustrates me if I don’t have all 
the right things with me..”.  Maxine notes that being so adept 
at planning can have disadvantages in work relationships: “I 
can be really - too advanced with the planning - and then 
other people turn up and they are not on that level- and I’m 
like – ‘haven’t you done anything then - why aren’t you 
ready?’ – [laughs] - and that’s how I come across like I might 
not be chilled out”. 
Maxine herself reflects on these two contrasting aspects of 
her autonomous reflexivity; a sense of freedom, calling 
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herself ‘free-spirited' and “I would kind of…hop on a plane 
and see where it goes” and a tendency to plan meticulously. 
Her own reflection is: “yeah it’s funny - I like rules. But I kind 
of don’t like rules because I like to see how things go...you 
yin/yang...there’s always two sides to things really.”  
5.5.5 Working with WellCity 
Maxine sees the ethos of WellCity as a good fit, incorporating 
a sense of freedom both in terms of how she organises her 
work and how she works responsively with the client group, 
in contrast to the way she has been required to work 
elsewhere: 
 “…WellCity are quite happy for you to take positive risks...I’ve 
always felt there are too many boundaries for people when 
they have [Social Care] support - I’ve found that really difficult 
in the past..” 
“I wonder if that’s ...why I like working for WellCity...you can 
just plan as you go along – [it’s] just relaxed..” 
There is also evidence that the ethos of WellCity has enabled 
Maxine to feel confident to relinquish control and be more 
responsive in her work. When discussing imaginary 
conversations in her internal conversation, she reveals that 
this has changed with experience and that care conversations 
are more spontaneous and less scripted:  “I think I used to 
imagine conversations a lot more... I would try to perceive 
what would be the answer was if I had asked a question - 
whereas nowadays I tend to...not worry so much..” 
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Maxine acknowledges that her autonomous tendencies do 
feature in the way that she works with people: “to have my 
own strength is important to me …that has probably 
influenced me within my role … because I am very good at 
saying well what is your vision for moving forward … because 
… that’s important for me as a person …”.  However, this 
autonomous bent does not diminish Maxine’s relational 
traits, which are considered next. 
5.5.6 Work context and relational reflexivity 
The above account of Maxine’s reflexive tendencies has 
highlighted autonomous aspects but has not touched on her 
openness to relational reflexivity: the vertical axis of the 
ORRAC model. Maxine’s key relationships are her tight knit 
immediate family; her husband and two children. The way 
that Maxine describes her future with her children “coming 
through the back door with whoever in tow..” suggests that 
although she has forged a separate path from her natal 
context, she places high value on family and relationships, 
perhaps nurturing a tendency towards communicative 
reflexivity within her nuclear family. However, ultimately 
Maxine prizes autonomy. During the Jack exercise, she was 
clear that (fictional) Jack had no responsibility for his parents 
who should address their own needs rather than being reliant 
on him. She also talks about her children’s independence in 
the present and future, albeit maintaining positive 
contact: “they’ll be doing what they are doing and perhaps 
their own working lives, but I can still support them”. 
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Alongside a freedom-oriented autonomous reflexivity, 
Maxine has an open approach to relationships with the 
people she supports. She describes this as a natural 
tendency, and in some ways a function of WellCity approach. 
This openness is evident in the way she describes herself in 
her personal context: “people always come to me with things 
all the time.…I can’t even go shopping ..without somebody 
offloading a problem…I’ve always been that character in life”. 
In a work context, Maxine relates the skills which help to 
forge relationships with people: “..I can pick up what is 
important to people very quickly - and I...hope helps them 
relax when I am working with them …”   
Orientation to relational reflexivity in Q2 of the ORRAC model 
extends beyond being approachable and a good listener, 
although these skills are facilitative. It is also the extent to 
which a person is oriented relationally to how others 
experience the world, inclusive of any other person (as 
opposed to Q1’s relational orientation to ‘known’ 
family/community ‘others’). The next section proposes that 
although predominantly autonomous, Maxine is influenced 
by the meta-reflexive propositions and practices of WellCity 
which guide the way that she provides care.   
5.5.7 Organisational culture influencing personal 
reflexivity and action 
Maxine described the ethos of WellCity and a recent business 
strategy exercise clearly but hesitantly, suggesting that she 
was getting to grips with a set of new concepts. She described 
the importance of the person they are working with living the 
life they choose: “to be as independent as possible in making 
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decisions and choosing daily life.” She highlighted the 
principles of equality and fairness: “we want everybody to 
have the same opportunities and also not –not to think 
themselves above anybody – keeping that groundedness”. 
Maxine’s words evoke the principles outlined by Lorraine in 
her interview and evidence a link between the two, 
supported by Maxine’s acknowledgement that Lorraine is 
‘quite a big influence’. She particularly mentions the 
introduction of reflective practice: “The reflective practice 
which Lorraine encourages makes you look back and see: why 
did you go for that? - why did you this? - what influenced this? 
- was that a good idea? - would you do it again?”.  This 
introduced practice of ‘thinking about thinking’ is described 
here by Maxine as a learned skill rather than an approach 
that she would have adopted unprompted. 
Lorraine also described a situation where Maxine and a 
Physiotherapist had planned to act on behalf of a person they 
both supported. This plan challenged a core organisational 
principle; that power is held (and action taken) only by the 
person being supported themselves. Lorraine explains this by 
saying that “… it’s easy to get sucked in isn’t it, to this 
professional role” (referring to the power imbalance of 
typical professional/person relationships). It is also feasible 
that Maxine’s autonomous tendencies towards ‘getting 
things done’ influenced her response in this situation. Once 
they had discussed the situation, Lorraine reports Maxine 
responded, “oh my god – you are absolutely right”.  
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Evidence for Maxine’s autonomous tendency in her work 
context also comes from Luke’s comment about Maxine’s 
support in the early stages: “she tried a few things with me – 
which in retrospect were a bit early – but she didn’t appear to 
be disheartened by that – she wanted me to get healthier and 
get swimming and do this and do that..” 
These nuances in Maxine’s reflexivity are interesting because 
they show how reflexive thought and subsequent action are 
influenced by culture, structure, relationships and 
circumstances.  They support the idea that people are pre-
disposed, partially shaped by personal biographies, to certain 
patterns of thinking (reasoning and relational), which play a 
tangible part in shaping their actions. There are aspects of 
Maxine’s developed autonomous nature which serve her role 
well; her organisation, her drive to move things forwards 
with people, and an understanding of the importance of 
personal freedom and autonomy. The meta-reflexive 
influences within her organisation expose her to ways of 
engaging with the personhood and reflexive capacity of 
others, which are core to organisational culture and 
supported by the structures within which she works.  
 
5.5.8 ORRAC Model, Maxine 
Figure 14 below presents a visual representation of the shifts 
detected for Maxine on the ORRAC model. It shows in Q3 her 
freedom-oriented autonomous traits (T1), her period of 
(near) fractured reflexivity (T2), which drew her to (in her 
terms) ‘over-compensate’ and gain some control through 
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planning – a less relational, more strategic period (T3). 
Although these tendencies remain, she has found ways to 
regain her original sense of self, and her work with WellCity 
influences how she approaches her work, being increasingly 
open to the reflexive potential of the people she supports 
(T4).  
FIGURE 14: ORRAC MODEL, MAXINE'S REFLEXIVE SHIFTS 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
The ORRAC model proposes that the extent to 
which relational reflexivity is implicated in personal 
reflexivity is critical to the way that our reflexive 
deliberations steer our lives. It suggests that Archer’s modes 
of communicative and meta-reflexivity represent 
mechanisms more open to relational reflexivity than the 
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autonomous reflexive mechanism. This does not intend to 
convey that those with autonomous traits cannot engage 
with the reflexive processes of others. However, their 
reflexivity has a primarily autonomous purpose and is 
therefore less relationally oriented. Fractured reflexivity 
represents a temporary or long-term absence or loss of 
reflexive capacity, which, whilst experienced, precludes 
independence of action or social connection. We cannot use 
these four quadrants to reduce human complexity to ‘types 
of people’. However, if it is agreed that individuals have 
reflexive capacity, then the extent to which relational 
reflexivity is implicated in their patterns of thought and 
subsequent actions is of interest. 
Luke and Maxine’s cases have illustrated that different 
personal experiences shape different expressions of the 
reflexive mechanism. The account of their reflexive 
tendencies has demonstrated that openness to the reflexivity 
of others creates the potential for influence, in this case, 
between organisational lead and practitioner and between 
practitioner and service user. Suppose the care recipient is 
experiencing a fracturing of their reflexivity. In that case, a 
practitioner’s orientation to relational reflexivity may enable 
a relationship that meets the criteria set out by Donati (see 
section 4.9.5) for relationships that generate relational 
goods.  How these conditions are met in a care relationship 
and how this can lead to personal change are considered in 




Chapter 6: Case Study 2, AllCare 
6.1 Introduction 
AllCare is a User-Led Charity and is led primarily by disabled 
people, people with health conditions and carers. People 
with direct experience of the services make up most of the 
Board of Trustees, some of whom also draw on support from 
the services. AllCare delivers several services, including Direct 
Payment, banking, recruitment and payroll services to 
support people employing Personal Assistants, a care and 
respite service. In this case study, the practitioner-service 
user pair are Fiona and Fran. In AllCare, however, the terms 
used are Adviser and Customer, so this chapter will adopt 
these terms. Fiona supports Fran with the management of 
her Personal Health Budget, so this service is the focus of this 
case study. Peta, the Chief Executive, has worked for AllCare 
for 15 years in that role and has a history of care and 
leadership roles in the disability sector. 
In contrast to Case Study 1, which focused on the way 
reflexive modality can change in response to life experiences 
and cultural contexts, Case Study 2 emphasises how lived 
experience, through developed personal identity and 
reflexivity, is implicated in care relationships. It also applies 
Donati’s concepts of Relationships that generate Relational 
Goods (RgRG). It does this through analysis of: 
• The reflexive nature and care relationships of Fiona, an 




• Fran’s experience as a customer of AllCare. Fran 
contributes an understanding of how a functional capacity 
for reflexivity operates in care relationships, at times in the 
context of uncertainty and vulnerability. 
• The organisational conditions within which these care 
relationships operate, in ways that enable and constrain 
them. 
6.2 Introducing Fiona 
Fiona is a practitioner in AllCare and has worked there for 
over five years. She is in her mid-50s and lives with her 
husband Ken and daughter Katie. Fiona also has an older son, 
Craig, who was expecting his first child at the point of the 
interview. When Fiona was first married, she moved away 
from the family home to a Royal Air Force base where her 
husband Ken was posted, and subsequent moves took them 
to Belgium and then back to the UK. Fiona worked as an NHS 
administrator before moving to Belgium. After Craig’s birth, 
she did not seek paid work until he started school, when she 
worked as a Personal Assistant (PA) for a company director. 
Unlike Maxine and Luke, Fiona’s account of her life before 
Katie’s birth did not include many details of who she was 
before then, apart from the brief comments on family life, 
referred to in section 6.2.2 below. She does remark, 
however, on the amount she has changed in the interim: 
“[after Katie had left school]…I couldn’t have seen myself 
going back and becoming...a clerical type PA as I had changed 
a lot...and so to go into a standard office and work for a 
director. I’d have..been likely to go in and say really? Is that 
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really important?”. Her lived experience during Katie’s 
childhood led to a substantial change in her worldview and 
how she employed her reflexivity. 
Fiona’s account of her day-to-day life showed that by any 
standards, it is busy. She works part-time with AllCare, has 
voluntary commitments, including running a weekly toddler 
group at her church and delivering parent support sessions at 
Katie’s previous school. She is a lynchpin for her wider family, 
providing support for her brothers and her friends. Fiona also 
has Multiple Sclerosis and needs to manage the energy she 
expends to conserve it. This is a balance which she owns that 
she doesn’t consistently achieve: “…I try and make sure I am 
giving a bit of myself to everyone which sometimes means 
that I am giving too much…I am not very good at prioritising 
emotionally  where my support should go..but I think that’s 
human nature isn’t it – if you can help someone – you do..” 
Fiona’s daughter Katie lives with Fiona and Ken, and has full-
time care from a Personal Assistant, Joanna, who is not much 
older than Katie. Although this relationship is a paid care 
relationship, Fiona’s description suggests that by virtue of 
their similar ages and interests, it may well be a care 
relationship that (in Donati’s terms) generates Relational 
Goods: “[Joanna] is into all the modern music and clothes and 
so it works really well for Katie to have someone who she can 
view more as a friend..” Katie’s support is funded through a 




6.2.1 Internal conversation 
Fiona acknowledged an active internal conversation and, in 
the ‘Jack’ exercise, was adept at imagining his internal 
deliberations. She was able to readily describe the ways her 
internal conversation features in her home life: “it’s those 
things that you ponder about and..quite often in the middle 
of the night…when I try and be still and quiet...that’s when I 
will start to think things through..”. It features equally 
persistently in her work life: “I try when I switch off my 
computer…I try to take that as my signal to log off from those 
things but sometimes I manage it more successfully than 
others”. Fiona was open about her life, sharing experiences 
that have shaped her reflexive development over time. Her 
account gives insight into the extent to which personal 
experience can deeply connect to reflexive tendencies. Later 
in this section, it will become evident how this lived 
experience is embedded in her practice. 
6.2.2 Reflexive nature and family 
Fiona’s early life lacked the contextual continuity which may 
have otherwise fostered a communicative tendency, 
disrupted by both by marital separation and Fiona’s much 
older brothers leaving home: “..my dad left when I was 6 or 7 
and that tied in quite closely...with my eldest brother going 
off..to..work and my middle brother..to join the Royal 
Marines. So we went from having this very full household – 
with my mum and dad and 3 brothers and myself – to...very 
quickly becoming mum, myself and the next up brother”. 
Despite these changes in family life, Fiona did not adopt a 
position disconnected self-reliance, at least not in the long-
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term. She remains committed to her extended family 
relationships, making the connection between the effective 
halving of the family group when she a child and her love of 
getting everyone back together now: “I think that’s why I … 
like to bring people back together….Katie had a big party for 
her 21st where….my brothers and nephew and nieces...came 
down…I’m in my element with that”.   
She also describes supporting, emotionally and financially, a 
younger brother with gambling problems. She says that since 
their mum died, she has assumed a maternal role: “although 
I’ve got 3 older brothers I kind of stepped somewhat into 
mum’s role”, indicating that with a maternal role to fill, there 
were familial relational goods to maintain. 
6.2.3 A significant life event 
Case study 1 illustrates that patterns of reflexivity can shift 
over time, sensitive to internal reflexive capacity and external 
life context and influences.  An event in Fiona’s life appears 
to have engendered strong self-sufficiency and, with it, 
autonomous reflexive tendencies. Katie’s birth brought 
about considerable changes in Fiona’s family’s life and plans. 
Katie, who is now in her mid-twenties, incurred a brain injury 
at birth during a difficult delivery, which resulted in 
significant physical and cognitive disabilities, requiring long-
term care. Fiona doesn’t dwell directly on the personal 
effects of this event. Still, she does, in the second one-to-one 
interview (session 4), reflect on the enormity of the 
experience for other families in a way that shows her 
experience-based understanding:  “…Sometimes I think 
205 
 
customers have been through...really traumatic 
experiences...they’ve been through a really stressful and 
traumatic birth – everything in their life has been completely 
thrown up in the air – everything has changed and then 
they’ve had to fight and battle for everything..” 
6.2.4 Autonomous self-reliance  
Fiona is clear that she tends to make most of the decisions at 
home: “I will talk things though with him [Ken] but I often feel 
like I am taking the lead if that makes sense..”.  There is a 
strong theme of self-reliance in Fiona’s narrative, in 
particular at decision points, revealing her experience of 
decision-making as intense and autonomous:  “I put so much 
pressure on myself that I’ve got to make the right decision...I 
wish sometimes I could say - well this doesn’t really matter so 
much …but I put a lot of pressure on myself... I want to make 
the best decision and the right decision at that time.”. 
Fiona’s anxiety to be fully confident of her decisions may 
have been exacerbated by a biographical event that Fiona 
shared as an example of ‘reliving’ in her internal 
conversation. She describes reliving her decision not to have 
a planned caesarean, one that may have changed the 
outcome for Katie: “…I revisited that one [appointment] 
where I agreed to not go straight for the Caesarean section – 
I think, could I have done that differently? Should I have been 
more adamant and not allowed myself to be bullied when I 
was accused of being middle class [laughs]?”  
Fiona then says: “I am not the world’s best at sticking to my 
guns… I allow myself to be influenced by someone face to 
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face”. Fiona is transparent with others about her reasons for 
decisions, not to gain guidance or confirmation (as might be 
the case in a communicative mode), but to justify why she 
has made it: “..once that decision has been made I like to feel 
that people know why I have done that – whether it be right 
or wrong as viewed by them..”. Fiona’s thoroughness in 
decision-making and wish for vindication is also detected in 
her work life, as evident in this account of successfully 
supporting a family to gain appropriate funding for their 
son: “you are able to think that yes – now they can see that 
what I was saying about how this could work and how this 
could help – that I was right .. that what worked for me could 
also work for them”. 
6.2.5 Meta-reflexive engagement with others/ outward 
looking 
Fiona’s internal conversation is autonomous in her 
ownership of decisions. Yet, the above examples show that 
she is also critical of her thinking and anticipates critique 
from others in a meta-reflexive way. As a senior in the team, 
she considers the need for peer support in decision-making 
and has set up case discussion meetings: “..it’s ..just to be 
able to give everyone that forum of: ‘I’ve got this case – that 
a bit tricky – how might I tackle that’...I think it is really 
important that people are given the opportunity to work 
things through with other people sometimes.” The 
autonomous tendency shifts to meta-reflexivity when our 
internal conversation shifts in emphasis from self-oriented 
reflexivity to relational reflexivity, engaging with the 
personhood and reflexivity of others. Fiona demonstrates 
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meta-reflexively in her attention to multiple perspectives in 
her interactions in a current friendship group: “ I’ve got… 
three close friends… of the four of us, I was always the one 
who saw the other side – putting the other points of view 
across – one of my friends says – ‘it really bugs me that you 
do that but then I go away and I have a think about it and I’m 
like – she’s actually got a point’.” 
Fiona’s meta-reflexive tendencies are also evident in the way 
she thinks about her career choice. When she describes 
returning to work after 19 years of caring for Katie, she says 
she could have worked in a supermarket or returned to a 
corporate Personal Assistant role. However, neither of those 
jobs would involve what was important to her. Her current 
work enables her to use her “personal experiences to positive 
effect so it kind of makes a bit more sense of what I have 
been through – that there is a purpose and reason...that I can 
use – going forwards”. Fiona’s words hold a poignant and 
meaningful point; her work serves to ameliorate the pain of 
her own experience. Archer’s (2007) account of the meta-
reflexive mechanism is characterised by an orientation 
towards life purpose and values, which is evident in Fiona’s 
explanation. This could be seen as an autonomous motive, 
one which aligns with reasoning such as that supposed in 
rational choice theory (Mouzelis, 1995): the idea that helping 
others ultimately benefits oneself and one’s own sense of 
identity. However, this interpretation would omit the 
contribution of the relationship to both parties, the integral 
role of relational reflexivity and the generation and sharing 
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of relational goods. It would define care as purely 
instrumental and deny that there are ‘people for whom the 
pursuit of values is an end in itself, regardless of 
considerations of costs’ (Archer, 2007:309).   
6.2.6 Lived experience, concerns and reflexivity 
Fiona’s primary concerns extend to those of her family and, 
in particular, incorporate her daughter’s: “for Katie .. she is 
very dependent...so she’s always going to be the main 
centre...for my life...so whenever I am planning or doing 
something I will be considering…is she being well looked after 
– has she got a really good quality of life – is she able to get 
out and do things – is she healthy ... it’s a layer on top of the 
concerns I have with Craig [son] obviously”. This extra ‘layer’ 
is Fiona’s attention to the personhood of Katie: the natural, 
practical and social concerns that Katie cannot express in a 
way that affords her independent governance over her own 
life. Fiona’s role as parent and advocate means that Katie’s 
concerns are entwined with her own. This has seeded 
meticulousness in her reflexive nature, which she describes 
as a practical necessity. The following example of planning a 
family cruise is an illustration of this: “..I will make lists ..: 
we’ve got to do the insurance...make sure the meds are 
ordered, have I got an up to date prescription request, 
..ordered the equipment...contacted the… special needs 
department… There are some things in life where you can say 
– that really doesn’t matter – for all Katie’s medical 
supplies...and hiring the equipment...that’s not a case where 
you can turn up on the boat and think we’ll pick one of these 
up when we next land”. 
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This personal praxis has developed through long-term 
experience of managing Katie’s life and wellbeing. Schon 
(1994) demonstrates through detailed examples how 
experienced practitioners ‘reflect in action’, their experience 
providing ‘a repertoire of examples, images, understandings, 
and actions’ (Schon, 1984:138) enabling them to respond 
when confronted with a novel problem. He says that their 
‘capacity to see unfamiliar situations as familiar ones… en-
ables [them] to bring [their] past experience to bear on the 
unique case’ (Schon, 1984:140). Fiona’s engagement with 
Katie’s concerns, the merging of these with her own, and the 
subsequent navigation of life have afforded her frameworks 
of thinking, which help her engage with her customers’ novel 
challenges. Therefore, her lived experience is a valuable 
resource alongside her meta-reflexive tendencies, enabling 
her to more deeply reflect on and engage with her 
customers’ natural, practical and social concerns. It is 
proposed, then, that lived experience has the potential to 
deepen engagement with the personhood of others in care 
relationships if combined with a tendency towards meta-
reflexivity. This is not to imply that lived experience ‘gifts’ a 
capacity for meta-reflexivity, but instead that it can enable 
and enhance it. 
The nature of this all-encompassing practice subsumes 
Fiona’s home, work and voluntary life, as illustrated by her 
need for an outlet. Fiona runs a weekly toddler group at her 
church and explains that is a welcome change from her 
identity of being Katie’s mum: “I’ve always felt it’s really good 
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to have somewhere where you go and do something where 
you are just you … so you’re not always known 
as ‘Katie’s mum’ if that makes sense”. This comment evokes 
Fiona’s assertion about how much she has changed since 
Katie was born, suggesting that aspects of her personal 
identity are distinct from her developed social identity and 
that she gains rest from decoupling them for a while. 
6.2.7 Care relationships and the value of lived experience 
Fiona acknowledges that her lived experience is valuable in 
forming care relationships: “..I think being able to share with 
people…really helps with bonding with the relationship – 
because they see you do understand..”. She describes a 
problematic case of a young man whose residential care 
home gave notice of closure within four weeks. Fiona was 
charged with helping his parents, at short notice, set up a 
Personal Health Budget (PHB), which would enable him to be 
housed and supported independently.  
She said of his parents: “our young people had both been in 
the [same] school – so I think that helped – because they 
knew that I totally understood their concerns and the 
anxiety..so we had a bit of a communal ground..”. This 
‘communal ground’ was a helpful starting point, but it took 
time for her to tune into and appreciate their emotional 
state. It began with the practicalities and evolved as 
discussions reached a “deeper level”, enabling Fiona to 
perceive an otherwise obscured vulnerability: “..at the 
beginning I wouldn’t have actually had a complete 
understanding of why this was so scary for them….but 
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by...listening to them – I really began to understand – 
because yes if you thought you had done this contingency 
planning, because as a parent of anyone with a high level 
support needs you are always aware of ‘what’s going to 
happen as I get older?’… they had done all of that – they had 
done everything right…...and as you break down some of their 
barriers more....you get to see more of the real person and 
the fears and anxieties around things – so it evolves..”  
Fiona’s description shows intentional engagement in 
relational reflexivity with the parents, being open to and 
sharing in thoughts, emotions, and experiences that are not 
her own. The outcome of this relational reflexivity is the 
commitment to a shared concern, a sense of shared, rather 
than instrumental purpose: “seeing me as someone that 
…was interested in then whole package for the young man, 
not just: ‘I am here to write a support plan and produce a 
budget – set that up and then, here you go’..”. Fiona’s 
involvement helped this family navigate a stressful situation 
in a way that enabled them to maintain control in 
circumstances where the management of their son’s care 
arrangements had again become their responsibility. 
Engaging with them on a relational level helped them, in 
Fiona’s view, to adjust to the new reality “..you really felt that 
they were acknowledging and feeling that this was the best 
solution – rather than feeling that that solution was being 
foisted on them..” 
Fiona characterises the relationship as ‘evolving’, evoking 
Donati’s requirement that relationships that generate 
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relational goods (RgRG) develop over time (see 4.9.5). This 
suggests that RgRGs form iteratively. A process during which 
each person reflexively assesses the connection and moves 
towards or away from it. The relational goods in this example 
are variously described by Fiona as ‘trust’, ‘reassurance’, and 
‘understanding’, though these goods cannot be limited to 
verbal description. 
These relational resources supported the parents’ 
adjustment to a different long-term support model than the 
one they had planned for their son. This ‘we-relation’ was 
hard-won, and Fiona recounted times when the parents 
reacted with frustration during this process: “they were both 
very intelligent – very capable of challenging things – so there 
were times when an email would come in, and it would be – 
we want this – we want that.”. However, ultimately, this 
situation was satisfactorily resolved. Fiona describes the 
effects for both herself and the parents: “it’s taken that initial 
huge strain and worry off of them – because you don’t just 
care about the customer…you also care about the outcomes 
for the people supporting them as well – for their parents – 
so those two are very much connected, and I can identify with 
that from my own situation as well.” 
6.2.8 More challenging care relationships 
It is proposed then that lived experience can open up 
relational reflexivity through an enhanced capacity to reflect 
on the personhood-in-context of those with similar 
challenges and enable relationships that generate relational 
goods. However, Fiona reflects that this is not always so. She 
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shares a case where building a connection has been difficult. 
The customer is the parent of a young woman with high-level 
support needs, like Fiona's daughter, and Fiona's role is to 
help her organise care through a PHB. Fiona's view is that 
"she [the customer] does tend to feel…that nobody is in the 
same situation as her – that nobody else's child – well young 
adult – is…as complex to support...". Before Fiona took the 
case, the customer had requested two changes of advisor: 
".. I've actually been supporting her for a couple of years – so 
in some respects I take it as a positive", however little 
progress has been made in this support relationship, and 
Fiona observes: "you'll think yeah – I've made a bit of a 
breakthrough here and then when you return its gone – 
because I think it's very much tied into her emotional – 
um..situation..".  
This situation is a challenge for Fiona reflexively. Her 
autonomous tendencies toward problem-solving and 
practical action are juxtaposed with her recognition that the 
parent is not ready to work to achieve the outcomes that 
Fiona can envisage. Fiona's reflection on this suggests a 
tension between these competing mechanisms within her 
own mind and that she ('mindfully' and with effort) makes 
attempts to apply relational reflexivity, tempering her 
autonomous tendencies: "You have to be very mindful .. 
when in your interactions with someone like that because I 
sometimes think: 'ok..you [customer] are not doing yourself 
any favours', but you can't exactly say [that]…..as 
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that's my perception of things and I'm not the person that's 
there, going through it on a daily basis..." 
In the first example, the relationship was a facilitator of 
change in a challenging situation, utilising a 'deeper level' of 
understanding in the relationship to work towards a 
solution. This negative example also supports the idea of the 
iterative development of a care relationship, involving both 
progress and setbacks. It also suggests that a we-relationship 
can only develop and (potentially) influence change if there 
is a level of bi-directional openness to the relationship and 
limited resistance. If this is not the case, there is the risk of a 
'stalemate' between the service and the customer. In her 
interview, Peta, CEO of AllCare, describes a contractual 
performance indicator that she re-negotiated for just this 
reason. She negotiated a reduction in the six-month 
completion target for PHB delivery from 100% to 95%. This 
structural change created conditions that accommodate the 
small number of challenging care relationships like this one 
while also enabling the service to meet its contractual 
obligations.  
6.2.9 ORRAC Model: Fiona 
In contrast to Case Study 1, analysis of Fiona’s data did not 
reveal a pattern of reflexive development over her life course 
for reasons of methodology (see 4.8.11). However, Fiona’s 
reflexive tendencies at the time of data collection are 
identifiable. On the ORRAC model in Figure 15, her reflexivity 
is plotted between Quadrant 2 and 3. Meta-reflexivity, as 
relational reflexivity, strongly influences her life and work 
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thinking and autonomous reflexivity is evident in her self-
sufficiency and orientation towards action. Her reflexive 
tendency is represented at the right-hand side of the model 
due to the intensity of application of agency in response to 
the challenges presented by her circumstances and a 
developed need for thoroughness and control.  
Analysis showed that Fiona’s lived experience has shaped her 
practice. Her concerns and practices in the natural, practical 
and social orders have provided her with frames of reference 
that support an approach incorporating both agency for 
change and relational reflexivity.  
FIGURE 15: ORRAC MODEL, FIONA 
 
6.3 Introducing Fran 
Fran is in her early sixties. She used to be a critical care nurse 
but has not worked for many years. Twenty years before the 
interview, Fran had an accident which resulted in a spinal 
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injury: “I had a car crash - it was my own fault I was driving 
too quickly round a bend - I was in a bad mood …. luckily I was 
the only one involved .. cos if I’d hurt anybody else it would 
have been devastating.” As a result of the accident, Fran has 
paraplegia and spends daytimes in a wheelchair, needing 
support for all physical aspects of life. She can use her hands 
but struggles with fine motor tasks such as writing with a pen, 
although she can type using technology. She had had a 
Personal Health Budget for just over a year. This change in 
eligibility and provision meant that Fran’s care situation had 
improved significantly. For the twenty years before the 
introduction of her PHB, Fran had comparatively minimal 
levels of support: “they [Care Agency carers] just came in four 
times a day for a while and then went again - whereas now 
there is someone here from seven in the morning til four in 
the afternoon, so you can do more…”.  Fran is an avid Chelsea 
fan and enjoys going to ’70s and ’80s rock concerts and on 
trips (e.g.) to National Trust gardens with her Personal 
Assistant (PA), Karen. 
Fran’s interviews generated some biographical detail, as with 
Fiona, but not to an extent where it is possible to draw any 
conclusions about chronological reflexive shifts on the 
ORRAC model. Fran’s account provided insight into her life 
before and after her accident. This showed the extent to 
which her world had since contracted. Fran had travelled 
extensively and had seriously considered emigrating to 
Canada or New Zealand: “We’d been to Canada and we really 
loved it out there...cost of living was cheaper at the 
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time..more places to explore - people seemed friendlier..” 
Fran did travel again after her accident, but the impetus 
diminished due to the limitations presented by her disability. 
She said: “I had been to New York before so that was fine … 
San Francisco – it was ok but it wasn’t as enjoyable as it would 
have been normally..”. Fran is deterred from future travel by 
the practicalities involved: “well I would like to travel again - 
but it’s just not practical...it takes a lot of planning.” The 
scope of Fran’s plans are pragmatically contained within the 
limits of her circumstances: “I tend to live day to day really - 
um yeah the only thing in the future that I want to do is [plan] 
my funeral…I’ve already got my plot on the [hills] overlooking 
the windmill…but otherwise I don’t really think of the future”. 
6.3.1 Reflexive tendencies  
Although she doesn’t provide a detailed account of her early 
family history, Fran indicates that her extended family are 
now quite separate. She says:“..when it comes to family I just 
think of my two children - I don’t think of the extended 
family..”, even though that was not the case when she was 
growing up: “I don’t think our family are as close as they 
should be - in fact we are not a very close family at all, 
whereas when I was growing up we had all the aunties and 
uncles close by”. Fran is not in close contact with her brother 
or sister and their families, who do not live locally, and she 
says they are “all so busy”. Fran’s travels and aspirations to 
emigrate also suggest that she did not, in her earlier life, prize 




In line with an autonomous tendency, Fran was observed 
throughout the data collection sessions as self-sufficient. She 
manages her personal budget, which involves employing a 
Personal Assistant, and organises additional carer support 
through an agency. The processes involved are technical and 
require organisational and people-management skills, 
evident from the observation of Fran and Fiona’s ‘business 
and process focussed’ (observation notes) meeting, where 
Fiona took Fran through a checklist of the multiple aspects 
involved providing advice and examples, where helpful. 
When asked about Fiona’s role, she explains that Fiona 
“knows the way things should be ….the way that [AllCare] 
want it done and so she’s telling me the right way to do it” but 
says she takes advice about the ‘how’, but is not influenced 
in ‘what’ she needs:  “..I am independent in what I want and 
need”.  At the point of data collection, Fran was due an 
annual reassessment of her needs, and this, causing some 
anxiety for her, was one subject during the observation 
session. Her concern was that the goalposts: the process, the 
form and the assessor had all changed. Fran’s response was 
a need to plan. She had delayed the date of the assessment, 
so she had adequate time, and requested that Fiona get her 
a copy of the form in advance to prepare as well as possible. 
6.3.2 Vulnerability, agency and context 
Fran’s case provides an important reminder that being a care 
recipient can never entail a presumption of ‘fractured’ 
reflexivity, even in circumstances that may appear to present 
an increased risk of vulnerability. The introduction of 
Personal Health Budgets and support from AllCare has 
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enabled Fran to materially improve her day-to-day life within 
the scope of what she thinks is possible and warranted: “I 
have it in my mind that it’s [funding] just for care….I don’t 
think it should be for equipment and holidays...I feel guilty 
taking it as it is as I think its money coming through from the 
NHS - and they haven’t got any.” She employs active and 
autonomous reflexivity to manage aspects of her life. Having 
reflexive capacity does not make people invulnerable to 
either circumstances or internal change. Despite tangible 
self-sufficiency, Fran does comment that she has changed 
since her accident:“…I don’t have a lot of confidence any 
more - whereas I used to have... She’s [daughter] always 
moaning at me for not being as strong as I used to be and 
things that I wouldn’t have put up with before I put up with 
now..”.. Despite this observation, Fran continues to manage 
her care and defend her quality of life. From Fiona’s account, 
the process of gaining the support Fran has was challenging: 
“..she had quite a fight to get that [eligibility for support] – 
sometimes people are initially told that they don’t meet 
criteria…and then they have to challenge that … and I think it 
was a bit of a battle for Fran”.   Fiona recalls that when she 
and Fran first met, Fran had anxieties about being alone for 
most of the day: “..She had to remain…connected up to 
things, to be able to drain urine and to be able to drink …she 
was very anxious..if being left on her own – so getting to know 
her and discuss ways that could be improved was really 
beneficial..”.  The anxiety of this situation was resolved by 
the funding awarded for Fran to recruit a PA, but the annual 
reassessment process was now due. Autonomous reflexivity 
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in this context of uncertainty is protective, and Fran is 
mitigating the threat through preparation. Her relationship 
with AllCare and Fiona provides necessary instrumental and 
relational resources whilst navigating this difficult period. 
6.3.3 Managing relationships and avoiding relational evils 
Fran’s nursing experience enables insight into how her carers 
are thinking and feeling, which has implications for 
relationship management. She gives the example of her Care 
Agency carers who come in at night to help her to bed.  
It is vital to Fran to be positioned correctly: “it’s a case of 
getting sleep or not getting sleep sometimes… because I am 
lying in that position for 12 hours I need to be right – and a 
little tweak here or there makes a lot of difference to 
me.”  She says that she understands the job the carers are 
doing and can anticipate what they are thinking: “I know 
what they are probably thinking underneath – and that they 
are trying to grit their teeth….I am sure a lot of them think 
that I am just being fussy…so I try not to go overboard but 
also I want to be comfortable at the same time..”.  
She can sense by their “mannerisms” that they are getting 
fed up, so sometimes curtails her requests, even if it means 
risking a night of discomfort.  “I suppose you don’t want 
repercussions – them coming in and thinking well she’s a 
pain...and then totally ignore what you say”. Fran trades 
insistence on a short-term outcome (a good night’s sleep) for 
maintaining a relationship in the long-term where the Agency 
carers continue to listen to her. In Archer’s terms, Fran is 
‘dovetailing’ her concerns here, compromising a concern in 
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the natural order (physical comfort) whilst safeguarding a 
concern in the social order (retaining influence). This 
compromise is reflexively calculated. The relationship she 
describes here is an instrumental one and not a ‘we-
relationship’ involving relational reflexivity. This is in direct 
contrast to her relationship with Karen, her PA. Asked what 
Karen would do in that situation, Fran immediately 
said, “well, she would understand and she would do it”. 
6.3.4 ORRAC model: Fran 
Similarly to Fiona, it was not possible to identify any temporal 
shifts in reflexivity for Fran. However, her reflexive capacity 
and autonomous reflexive tendencies were apparent, placing 
her in Q3 of the ORRAC model. Fran’s life and circumstances 
had contracted significantly during the history that she 
shared, and she appeared to have adopted a pragmatic 
acceptance of her position. Although she described a 
lessening of confidence during that time, Fran maintains an 










FIGURE 16: ORRAC MODEL, FRAN 
 
6.3.5 Care relationships and relational goods 
This research explores the causal role of care relationships, 
through the biographically shaped reflexive nature of 
individuals, within their ever-influential circumstances. The 
causal aspect of care relationships rests on the idea that 
through relational reflexivity and the ‘we-relation’ present in 
each person’s internal conversation, a relationship that 
generates relational goods (RgRG) may form. Relational 
Goods (and their counterpart Relational Evils) are proposed 
by Donati (Archer and Donati, 2015) as emergent properties 
of a ‘real’ connection between people. Recall that he has 
proposed a set of requirements that characterise an RgRG. 
Two relationships in Fran’s life will now be considered, 
followed by the application of Donati’s criteria/ requirements 
for RgRGs in Figure 17 below.   
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6.3.5.1 Karen, Fran’s PA.   
Fran actively recruited Karen from a local care agency, so 
they had an established relationship before Karen became 
Fran's PA. Fran describes her relationship with Karen 
as "comfortable" and although she thinks she shouldn't 
"because it's professional", she says "well I see her as a friend 
I suppose…it's impossible not to get involved...I know..they 
are told not to talk about their family and things but you can't 
help it after a time otherwise what do you talk about? – 'hello 
it's raining again'…".   There is little doubt from Fran's 
account that this is a relationship with positive emergent 
properties (an RgRG).  
Fran's comments on the nature of her relationship suggest a 
comfortable co-existence in their respective roles in the 
relationship: "although she's a lot younger [26] … she's very 
mature...she sees things the same way as me…I can tell her 
anything and know it's not going to go anywhere…since I 
have had her things have been totally different…she 
understands my needs a lot of the time before I speak 
them...things have improved so much with it". Fran shows her 
autonomous nature when describing this relationship, but in 
a way which evokes a sense of banter, and 'give and take'. At 
one point she says that "she [Karen] was determined that I 
was going to buy a maxi dress...and I said no I wasn't, I 
wasn't, I wasn't, and then I did cave in this year...whether I'll 
ever wear it is another matter - she hasn't won on taking me 
on holiday yet..". 
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6.3.5.2 Fran and Fiona 
Fran and Fiona’s respective reflexive tendencies are relevant 
in the analysis of their relationship. Fran and Fiona both have 
autonomous tendencies, and the relationship observed 
between them is currently a practical and instrumental one. 
However, Fiona’s description of the early stage of their 
relationship highlights a time before Fran’s eligibility for a 
PHB was agreed upon, where it is likely that an RgRG formed. 
Fran took Fiona into her confidence at this time: “when 
coming...to understand her current situation...she was feeling 
very vulnerable because of the lack of support during the 
day...I soon got to know that she had a lot of anxiety...related 
to that time being on her own..”. Fiona’s meta-reflexivity 
enabled her to tune into Fran’s vulnerability, understand her 
anxiety and jointly plan a budget that funded care during the 
day.  
There is no corroboration from Fran about Fiona’s support 
during this difficult time. Still, it is feasible that their 
relationship then, had a different nature to the one that 
subsequently formed, once the PHB resolved the reasons for 
Fran’s anxieties.   Fiona’s support led to stability for Fran, and 
their level of contact has been relatively minimal as a 
result: “she’s always very helpful if I – luckily I haven’t really 
had to contact her that much over the year – but she explains 
it all, if I do have a problem..”.  Fran speaks about Fiona in 
mainly formal terms, although she does describe Fiona’s 
warmth: “I thought she was very bubbly – nice person – easy 
to get on with...explained everything well – 
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professional…”. Although, as concluded above, their 
relationship is not currently one that fulfils the requirements 
for an RgRG, it is proposed that, having been one in the past, 
the foundations would enable its reinstatement if required. 
Fran illustrates by example that there is a difference between 
an RgRG between two autonomous reflexives and an 
anonymous care interaction that is wholly instrumental in 
nature: “I had had another lady come before when I had 
Direct Payments…very similar things to Fiona – and I was very 
confused when she left and I was none the wiser a few years 
later either..”, compared with Fiona who “.. took more time 
to explain things and contacted me a few times to make sure 
everything was alright – whereas the other lady just went 
through everything and said you need this, this, this and this 
– and left”.  Fran interprets this unsatisfactory care contact 
as: “it was the nature of the job probably”, rather than it 
being a reflection on the person: “it was just a ‘get in get out’ 
sort of attitude – not saying that was her attitude, but that 














6.4 AllCare: Organisation and system influences 
The case study theoretical framework (see 4.6) extends 
beyond the people and the relationship itself to include the 
influence of the organisational and broader system cultures 
and structures, acknowledging the effects of contextual 
forces on individual reflexivity. Data from Fiona and Peta, the 
CEO of AllCare, provides insight into these layered influences 
and how they create the conditions within which care 
relationships operate. 
6.4.1 AllCare: Peta: Organisational culture and values 
Peta began the interview by talking about values-based 
recruitment and ensuring they recruit “the right type of 
people – be approachable – someone who can build 
trust…being able to support that person in a selfless 
way”; the term ‘selfless’ here resonating with an orientation 
to relational reflexivity. A recent staff survey had found that 
98% of staff answered ‘yes’ to the question: ‘if you didn’t 
know something – would you feel confident asking one of 
your colleagues?’ Peta concluded that this was indicative of 
the “atmosphere you build…if you end up with a staff team 
who help each other – they’re going to be the kind of people 
that help – they are the right kind of people”.  
A thread throughout Peta’s interview was the role of values 
across all levels of the organisation. The value placed in 
equality is evident in the way that customers can also serve 
on the Board of Trustees, or become members of staff, as we 
saw with Fiona. Peta explained that: “some have ended up 
becoming trustees or members…one of our trustees has an 
advisor that supports them – but I am answerable to them 
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[the Trustee] at the same time …”.  Peta also articulates shifts 
in expression of agency for people who have accessed the 
service and who then want to contribute: “it’s really nice to 
see that growth…[the person] maybe arrived at our service in 
crisis...and then work with someone over a period of time to 
build all of that up…and then they…apply to do other things 
in the organisation and...give something back..” This 
patchwork of roles and relationships is imbued with lived 
experience and supported by a leadership approach that 
encourages agency and self-determination at all 
organisational levels: “..how you take control and make 
decisions…regardless of your role you will have autonomy 
over certain things, and owning that, and feeling confident 
that you can.”. Peta explicitly links this approach and the 
sense of agency that the team encourage in customers 
through the care relationship.  
6.4.2 Individual agency and autonomy 
Peta’s description of the role of relationships in the service 
resonates with Lorraine’s at WellCity, highlighting the Adviser 
role in building ‘confidence and self-reliance’, supporting a 
person with information and skills to assert control in their 
lives. She presents the expectation of the service as 
relationally bland “we are...just supposed to give 
employment information and advice and tell people how to 
open a bank account”.  She contrasts this with the outcomes 
that they prize as an organisation: “..you [the customer taking 
charge of their PHB] take that money...you take control and 
you recruit your staff - it’s about building their confidence and 
their self-reliance and it’s like managing a team of people – 
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it’s quite senior complex things that are marketable skills..so 
I think that level of confidence builds up”.    
People who were accessing the WellCity ‘Best Life’ service, 
described by Lorraine and Maxine, are referred due to mild-
moderate mental health needs, often struggling to cope with 
day-to-day life. As such, their internal reflexive capacity is 
more likely to be limited or fragile. Customers of AllCare are 
accessing support to address the practical challenges of living 
with illness and disability and are no more likely than anyone 
to experience a fractured mode of reflexivity. As such, the 
nature and emphasis of the support is different. As a result, 
whilst Lorraine’s focus was on promoting a value-set that 
encouraged her team to nurture an individual’s reflexive 
capacity, AllCare’s strategy is more focused on building 
structures of stratified support: “you build the services to 
meet all the different needs that people have – some people 
might arrive feeling very capable of running everything 
themselves – and then something might be happening in their 
health or their lives which means they might have to 
handover bits of autonomy..”. Therefore, the service enables 
the titration of support to respond to variation in need, 
opportunity, and preferences. Peta is clear that their role is 
not to advocate on behalf of someone. Neither is it to instruct 
them: “we also talk about it quite a lot around person-
centred support …it being advice – and not advocacy and not 
instruction.. they [Advisers] are not in charge of that package 




6.4.3 Relationships, roles and boundaries 
Three out of the four case study sites identified the 
importance of being explicit about relationship boundaries to 
ensure these were clear and delineated the care relationship 
from a ‘friendship’ relationship.   Peta talks about the need 
for clarity. For example, Advisers are not allowed to do extra 
jobs for their customers: “you’re not allowed to volunteer for 
...your customers – cos there’s that boundary issue – so [for 
example] watering the garden would be considered 
volunteering”. Lorraine from WellCity described a one-page 
guide that they had developed, which, at the beginning of the 
first contact, was shared with the service user to establish the 
relationship rules, supplemented with additional 
conversations with clients about boundaries along the way. 
Maxine shared that Luke handed her a letter to post after 
visiting him in his new flat. She restated the boundary by 
offering to support him to find the local post box and go with 
him, but it was not her role to do things for him. In the 
following case study, the GamePlay practitioner similarly 
describes a continual process of re-establishing boundaries in 
a considerably less formal context, based around sports 
activities  
Fran’s disquiet about the relationship being a friendship 
whilst also being ‘professional’ evidences the dissonance 
between these concepts from a service user perspective, 
particularly for someone like Fran who has held a 
professional nursing role. Luke (Case Study 1), in a similar 
way, was hesitant over this distinction. He talks about Sue, a 
support worker from his previous GP practice, who helped 
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him at his lowest ebb: “…I will always…be in touch with Sue 
..just some sort of contact...for somebody like that to come 
into your life at a key time…you kid yourself it’s a special 
relationship but it’s probably just a professional one – but 
they are good at the boundaries – keeping it professional but 
making you think that they are a friend – and I don’t have a 
clue whether…[tails off]”. Both relationships are RgRGs, and 
the dissonance for Fran and Luke is emergent of the cultural 
and structural norms of professionalism contrasting with the 
more natural form of an RgRG. Fran is pragmatic, realising 
that the unwelcome consequence of resisting an RgRG is 
talking about the weather. Luke is unsure, and his sentence 
tails off, uncharacteristically unable to form a conclusion. 
Although an issue at the interpersonal level, the organisation 
and system contexts can, to some extent, manage the 
conditions that create this confusion.   
It is proposed then that these types of care relationships 
entail the use of relational mechanisms, which occur typically 
in reciprocal social rather than professional relationships. 
They engage, more so than a wholly ‘professional’ 
relationship, in ‘we-relationships’ in which practitioners 
invest more of themselves, with greater immersion in and 
focus on the concerns and circumstances of the care 
recipient, and in which the care recipient experiences a 
greater connection and sense of being ‘seen’. These types of 
relationships can generate relational goods that have 
positive effects for both parties. However, to avoid confusion 
and manage expectations, the purpose and structure of the 
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intervention require rules and boundaries. These explicit 
boundaries, employed by three of the four case study sites, 
delineate the relational mechanisms typical of a friendship 
from those entailed in care and support. 
6.4.4 Wider system relationships as enabling of care 
relationships 
According to Peta, the ongoing stability of the organisation is 
due to the longevity of the leadership team and their long–
term positive relationships with commissioners: “we’ve had 
the same commissioner for one of our services since 2010 – 
and then the person who was commissioner before her – who 
was also very good – is now commissioner for one of our other 
services”. The equality in relationships which characterises 
the customer-adviser relationship is also seen in Peta’s 
description of these commissioning relationships: “we’ve 
discussed how we would approach targets around 
throughput, and it did feel very equal and we came up with 
ideas and they came up with ideas..” and “they can come to 
us when they’ve got a priority...I can talk about that”.  Peta 
acknowledges that this is not typical and that other charities 
have more challenges: “other organisations I’ve spoken to 
who are similar to ours have had a really hard time with their 
commissioners….[e.g.] might put things out to tender without 
talking to them first”. 
Fiona acknowledges the role of AllCare in ‘keeping the 
understanding going’ about, for example, the flexibility in 
budget use: “it’s not been static… you might have one lot of 
[partnership] management who really sort of ‘get’ the choice 
and control and the flex – because you’ve been working with 
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them….but as people leave and somebody new comes in, it’s 
keeping that understanding going..” and “…hopefully…you 
can chip away…and help that understanding”. Fiona 
promotes maintaining influence on the culture-shaping 
attitudes of the system managers who set and implement the 
rules. Her use of the phrase ‘chip away’ indicates that she 
does not anticipate any wholesale cultural and structural 
system change. Fiona also highlights the pressure from the 
next managerial layer up, where a lack of understanding of 
person-centred principles can undermine their hard-won 
cultural influence:“..they [Continuing Healthcare (CHC)] get 
audited by people who are financial people – and those 
financial people .. don’t have any understanding around how 
a PHB would work – and being person-centred – so that 
drives then how CHC make their decisions – that’s the 
impression I get and obviously that is only my impression.” 
Fiona underplays her viewpoint here, accepting the 
boundaries of her role. 
6.4.5 Structural forces affecting care relationships 
Fiona’s insight into the wider social care systems stems from 
being a practitioner and drawing on support services. She 
describes locally-determined limitations in the rules for 
Personal Health Budgets (PHBs) which constrain choice and 
control for customers: “there are certainly times when I think 
it’s a shame that we can’t be more open to the choice and 
control side of things but each CCG [Clinical Commissioning 
Group] makes its own decisions as to how PHBs can be 
funded..”.  Fiona’s account reveals that there is little leeway 
for the flexible use of funds that enable people to spend their 
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budget creatively: “it can be...a challenge to actually get 
things approved that are anything other than paying for PAs 
…and a perhaps small amount of social activities..” and her 
description indicates that the choice of activity needs to 
satisfy the ideas of the system rather than the individual: “we 
have got budgets where there are social activities 
included…things like going to the cinema and bowling…. they 
[CHC] don’t want people to be saving it up to go, say...for a 
concert…what they want to see is people being able to access 
the community regularly...”  Fiona expresses some 
discomfort with this position: “I tend to think..well if they 
wanna save it up and actually do that – but I know that it is 
not.. [possible]– because that’s recently come up that 
someone has done that [applied to do that]..” Fiona is clear 
that she understands her role in the context of these 
structures and has little power to influence: “Sometimes you 
are giving that information and you are thinking ‘yeah that is 
crazy – I can’t see why they can’t do that’ – but that is not 
your role..” .  
With any mode of reflexivity, rules and processes can operate 
as a ‘proxy’ for individual reflexivity, where deference to roles 
and rules embeds in reflexivity). For those with meta-
reflexive tendencies, this may cause discomfort with rules as 
with Fiona or a propensity to challenge or subvert the ‘rules’ 
and systems-thinking, as we saw with Lorraine and 
WellCity.Fiona’s view of the wider system, therefore, 
influences her approach to care relationships. These 
constraints temper her engagement in relational reflexivity 
235 
 
with customers, but she can still achieve a positive result for 
her customers within them.  
Fiona acknowledges that being part of the system can risk 
damaging the support relationship. She describes her role as 
part of a “three way communication triangle” between the 
customer, herself and representatives of Continuing 
HealthCare (CHC) panel, who make funding decisions. Fiona 
says that this structure has inevitable consequences for the 
relationship. “I think it’s bound to affect your 
relationship..because you are the one that is ultimately 
saying, ‘ I’ve gone to panel and … we’ve fought for it but the 
answer is still no’,  and it’s not ‘panel’ dealing with them – 
it’s you...”.  Fiona’s description illustrates the challenging 
balance between inhabiting the structure, and maintaining a 
strong advocacy position: “we walk a fine line with a 
customer...because we are there to advocate for them – but 
ultimately we are commissioned by CHC… so it is part of our 
role to manage expectations with people…but also I think it’s 
important that they do know that we will try and fight for 
something...and make a good case and explanation about 
why that would work for that person..”. 
6.4.6 Instrumentality and Relational Goods 
Peta echoes the challenge of maintaining care relationships 
in some care contexts, giving the example of the Continuing 
Healthcare nurses who make funding decisions. For them, 
Peta says, the relationship can be compromised. “I think you 
can do it with fairness and honesty – so there’s parts of the 
relationship that could be carried through – but there is that 
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extra challenge that you are making the [financial] decision, 
not just advising”.   This indicates that the more a role has an 
instrumental purpose, the less likely an RgRG will form, in line 
with Donati’s requirements. In such a relationship, an 
instrumental motivation undermines the potential for 
‘reciprocity’ and ‘total sharing’ of Relational Goods. Indeed, 
such an intention may be inappropriate given the 
requirement for funding decisions to be impartial. However, 
for responsive and accurate funding decisions to be made, 
tailored to individual needs and circumstances, Donati’s 
other requirements are facilitative and arguably good 
practice. These are, as Peta says, ‘parts of the relationship 
that could be carried through’, such as:  
• the personal and social identity of each person to be 
‘present’ in the relationship, enabling 
• relational reflexivity, enabled by  
• adequate time for a relationship to develop.  
Fran’s experience of the Direct Payments Adviser who visited 
on a wholly instrumental mission to impart information is an 
excellent example of where the practitioner met none of 
these requirements and where the outcome, for Fran, was 
being “none the wiser”.  
6.5 Summary: 
This case study has demonstrated connections between the 
reflexive nature of individuals in care relationships, the 
nature of care relationships, and the causal nature of the 
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contextual conditions organisationally and at the system 
level. Key insights drawn from this case study are that: 
• lived experience can be facilitative of orientation to 
relational reflexivity, whilst not guaranteeing 
relationships that generate relational goods (RgRGs) in 
each case. 
• RgRGs are possible in care relationships where the 
instrumental purpose is subordinate to relational 
purpose 
• organisational and system cultures and structures can 
influence care relationships by creating conditions that 
either support or constrain them. 







Chapter 7: Case Study 3, GamePlay 
7.1 Introduction 
GamePlay is part of a nationally and internationally 
networked charity that aims to positively engage young 
people from disadvantaged communities in sports activities 
to support them to develop skills and achieve positive 
outcomes. The local programme is funded through a 
combination of national, regional and local commissions. It 
offers a weekly timetable of organised sports and arts 
activities, registering contact and building relationships with 
and between young people.   
The case study firstly presents the service model through 
Ian's perspective (GamePlay’s service lead) with 
contributions from Zoe (one of GamePlay’s practitioners). 
Then the study introduces Carly, a young person accessing 
support, and finally returns to Zoe. This case study explores: 
• Aspects of organisational structure and culture and 
their role in creating conditions in which care 
relationships are embedded.  
• The reflexive nature of practitioner and service user 
and their relationship within this context.  
• Where applicable, connections between the common 
themes across the first three case studies. 
7.2 Service Lead: Ian and the GamePlay model 
Ian is responsible for the provision of GamePlay in a city 
locality. He has a long history in delivering youth work 
oriented around sports activities, having worked for the Local 
Authority, a Football Club and local charities. Since 2014, the 
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charity he was running joined forces with Gameplay and since 
then Ian has provided county-level leadership.    
The service model centres on community-based sports 
activities held in accessible venues across the city, although 
their offer also extends to activities such as arts, photography 
and computer programming. The service structures are loose 
and responsive, led by the interests of the young person 
being supported. They work to the GamePlay ‘methodology’, 
which represents core facets of the programme. As Zoe 
explains: “it’s flexible in that somebody can come into our 
methodology at any point”. It is not a progressive sequence 
but more a guide to the elements of the programme offered. 
These include access to: ‘positive activities, informal 
education, promoting volunteering, skills development, 
creating opportunities, and outreach’. The service is open 
access. Young people can freely engage and disengage and 
can decide how regularly they want to participate. Ian says 
that the ‘outreach’ aspect of the methodology does enable 
them to check in with young people they are concerned 
about or those they have not seen for a while: “but we are 
not forcible – ours is a voluntary project so young people 
realise that and I feel that young people benefit from that 
offer”. He asserts that their longevity and sustainability in 
local communities are due to ‘word of mouth’ that supports 
their reputation. He also believes that they have an 
advantage over statutory services because their activities 
hold natural incentives for participation. 
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7.2.1 Structural factors 
Ian’s account suggests that the organisational structure is 
enabling the agency of young people, emphasising the 
relational rather than the operational. Of all the case studies, 
GamePlay’s structure is the most open access, meaning 
young people engage on their terms. Although processes are 
light-touch in terms of engagement, Ian is clear that they 
adhere closely to safeguarding procedures and take this 
responsibility seriously, not least because their relational 
approach can spark disclosures that need to be addressed, a 
fact that young people are made aware of: “our most prime 
responsibility is to protect young people, so that we make 
that pretty clear with any disclosures”. In addition, Ian says 
that basic skills and training in other core aspects of youth 
work are essential. Ian contrasts GamePlay’s service offer 
with statutory services with the phrase: “we have the 
carrots”. The service structure encourages voluntary 
participation, and Ian’s account reveals how they do this. 
7.2.2 Activities and time 
The most tangible of these ‘carrots’ are the activities 
themselves. Ian says: “we have got the sports ...the arts and 
drama...the ‘Go and See’ rewards...the training and opening 
doors for young people...that is massive in supporting young 
people with relationship building”. Zoe’s description builds 
on this, contrasting the personal impression GamePlay staff 
give with that of statutory service providers: “..we play sports 
with them…so they already they have a different perception 
of us…we come in in sports gear – and we are throwing balls 
around and having a laugh...there’s very few staff members 
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which are above the age of 35”.  Ian and Zoe’s work involves 
partnering with statutory services at times, and both contrast 
the limiting operational structures of statutory services with 
GamePlay’s relationship-based model. Whilst acknowledging 
they have a different role in supporting young people, Ian 
sees these operating rules as constraining creativity and on 
the time that services can commit to young people: “they 
can’t be as creative as we can be” and “their time is 
limited...where with ours it can be anywhere from three 
months to seven years..”.   
7.2.3 Fun and progression 
Structuring their service offer to generate opportunities for 
‘fun’ is a crucial part of GamePlay’s model. Ian raises this as 
an aspect that is overlooked in the sector: “it’s very rare that 
I go to a conference...and anybody talks about – our work 
that’s fun…if you’ve experienced vulnerability...and your 
relationships with adults haven’t been particularly great – the 
professional side has got to be there but also they’ve got to 
have a bit of fun – that’s a core aspect”. Ian talks about ‘fun’ 
in terms of “soft skills” for practitioners, referring to the 
personal and relational aspects of fun, but a key observation 
is that the service offer is structured for fun. The role of fun 
in this case study is further discussed regarding Carly’s 
support (p265). The structure also ensures the focus is on the 
activity rather than directly on the young person. Staff find 
out about young people gradually, through their 
participation in a naturalistic context within which a 
relationship can evolve, at a pace that is not pre-
determined.   
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A further aspect of the structure that Ian says is attractive to 
young people is the progressive pathway. Young people can 
opt in to informal and formal training from levels 1-6, some 
of which are accredited. This route can lead to recruitment 
and, he says: “young people see that we are employing young 
people from the local community”. This aspect of the model 
is tangible for young people as 50% of the GamePlay staff are 
locals and have come through the programme. This built-in 
progression provides young people with a focus for their 
aspirations. In terms of individual reflexivity, this opportunity 
engages with the internal conversation’s ‘you-relation’, 
creating the idea of what-may-be-possible, to reflect upon. 
The existence of role models is, therefore, a structural 
enabler. The way the organisation employs young people 
from the programme demonstrates this as a possibility, 
rather than an outcome. Zoe explicitly mentions this in our 
conversation, that young people are: “…trying to find 
someone to look up to someone to be that kind of role model 
– take them forward – and a lot of the young people we work 
with don’t have that..”. In Carly’s case, we will see how the 
organisation’s role models support her to think about her 
future.  
7.2.4 Cultural factors 
The structural enablers within the service model interact 
with the principles and values that underpin the work of 
GamePlay. Both Ian and Zoe shared examples that showed a 
recognition of the lived experiences, perspectives and agency 
of young people engaged with the service. Zoe explains 
that “the core value of GamePlay is to give every child equal 
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opportunity to succeed – regardless of their social status or 
their background – or whether they have had trauma…to 
succeed in whatever way is important to them.” Ian 
evidences this differently, with an example of a teenager they 
worked with who had relocated with her mum to escape 
domestic violence and had flourished, ultimately going to 
university to study Social Work. In particular, Ian recounted 
the strengths that they discovered early in their relationship 
with her, aged 14: “it quickly became apparent…that this 
young woman had...resilience, and empathy for other young 
people who were being affected by a whole range of 
issues”. This reflection evidences an active engagement with 
what this young person could personally offer. The 
articulation of a person’s assets, that is, what they value, 
and their value in society, evidences an engagement with 
their personhood that suggests a meta-reflexive approach in 
those providing support.   
Haudenhuyse et al. (2012:449) sought to understand how 
sports interventions can reduce vulnerability in socially 
vulnerable youth. They conclude that despite ‘peeking into 
the black box’ and proposing valuable themes for further 
research, there is more to understand about the different 
mechanisms and contexts which effect change for 
individuals. In line with the current study, they propose the 
fundamental importance of understanding the ‘wider 
processes of social vulnerability’: what is it about the people, 
their relationships, and their contexts which converge in their 
social being? The quote they use from one of their 
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practitioner participants captures also the meta-reflexive 
ethos of GamePlay: 
‘The ability to put yourself in the world of these youth, 
and how they experience it, is very important. We want 
to do so much good, change so many things for them 
and give them so many chances...but we have to be 
honest that we don’t understand their world, nor can 
we put ourselves in their positions. Every young person 
is unique within the system and the context in which he 
or she finds him/herself. You can only help if you are 
able to feel the heart of social vulnerability (youth 
welfare worker G).’ Haudenhuyse et al. (2012:450) 
The insight here is that the ‘reflexivity in context’ of young 
people is central to who they are and how they experience 
life; that regardless of the aspirations and plans of 
practitioners for their outcomes, personal change cannot be 
directed or done for individuals. Zoe captures this idea when 
describing GamePlay relationships: “..most of GamePlay’s 
relationships with young people…[are] nurturing.. there are 
so many different aspects that we are trying to develop in a 
person whether it’s…their interpersonal skills or whether it’s 
their career pathways or whether it’s…just personal growth.”  
In this view, helping involves accepting that young people 
have their own sense of self in their unique context, and 
through relationship, tuning into their concerns, experiences, 
feelings and reflexivity. This insight leads back to the 
questions being asked in the current research. In 
particular, can a better understanding of relational 
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mechanisms and associated mechanisms at a cultural, 
structural and agential level help us design, deliver and 
evaluate interventions that aim to support personal change? 
7.2.5 Relationships as structured  
The relationships between GamePlay workers and young 
people are not left to chance. Just as Lorraine (case study 1) 
talks about actively managing care relationships, Ian 
describes the need to support the coaches in forming 
effective relationships with young people. In particular, he 
reflects that his team of young coaches naturally vary in their 
relational approach: “some practitioners have got a natural 
...empathy…an understanding of...the effects of some of the 
things that affect young people. Whereas some staff are 
determined and passionate but may need...extra 
..supervision – mentoring...reflection in terms of how 
they...build relationships up with diverse groups..”. Ian is 
describing the variation he observes in the applied relational 
reflexivity of GamePlay practitioners. He concludes that 
some practitioners need to learn and adopt an orientation to 
relational reflexivity.  
GamePlay’s relational approach is not limited to young 
people accessing the service. Ian accommodates the 
development of newer recruits in paid roles, in the same way, 
accepting their nascent ability to form effective care 
relationships: “..even if there’s a few lapses there….we are 
proactive and...try not to be over-critical … so we don’t 
damage their confidence – cos sometimes it is a learning 
[curve]..ways of communication – language being used”.  Zoe 
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comments more directly on the personal qualities of the 
practitioners, referring to the need to have a “thick skin”. She 
says that she’s worked with people who “take it [something 
the young person has said or done] personally and that then 
affects the relationship going forward… so you’ve just got to 
be able to brush it off”.  Zoe’s comment here identifies the 
risk of ‘relational evils’ where a young person has said or 
done something which affects the practitioner personally. 
The capacity to not take something personally is emergent of 
a meta-reflexivity that can depersonalise the offence by 
attributing it to the struggles and frustrations of the young 
person. In addition to the open-access activity model, the 
intervention care relationships are also structured through 
the service culture and supervisory support. 
7.2.6 Practitioners-as-people 
The above examples indicate that these types of 
relationships are not easy to achieve because they rely on the 
nature of the individuals involved, in the case of 
practitioners, how they think about and respond to young 
people within the care context. GamePlay’s culture and 
supervision methods aim to support practitioners to consider 
the context, experience, and interests of the person they are 
supporting. Ian expects that practitioners are flexible in the 
way they tailor the opportunities, responsive to the interests 
of the young people rather than being led by their own 
agenda: “workers themselves…they’ve gotta be creative 
…build the ability and skills to have 360 vision … so they’ve 
got to think outside of their own… [interests]..they’ve got to 
think about the other pathways for young people”. 
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Ian describes the skill involved as being like a “social 
chameleon”, moving flexibly between very different 
relationships. He says: “. I’ve been in Westminster – talking to 
…a Tory conference – no disrespect – and I’ve come to [City 
centre] and... I’ve had to go out and talk to a load of 16-year-
old lads...”. He is clear that this is about both adaptability and 
authenticity: “you can’t pretend to be someone you’re not – 
but you’ve got to be adaptable.”. Ian suggests, then, that 
applying relational reflexivity involves being 
oneself and being responsive to the reflexivity of others. Zoe 
illustrates the challenge of this when asked if she is 
‘completely herself’ when working with young people, to 
which she answers that she is when working with most 
groups, but with certain groups, she needs to adapt her 
approach:  
“if I am working with…15 year old boys…who are very very 
street smart … I sometimes adapt my language to be able to 
be a bit more relatable – or like my body language..”. 
She explains that: “unless you do kind of …. put that front on 
– they won’t even listen to what you say”. 
 Ian makes a resonant observation about a social worker who 
he had worked with: “she was brilliant...but she could not get 
rid of the plum in her voice...she said ‘you are asking me to 
talk like I’m from [City] aren’t you?’ And I said no I’m not 
asking you to do that – but you’ve gotta take this into 
consideration…it’s difficult isn’t it – how do you address 
that?” Although Ian cannot offer a solution for this particular 
challenge, GamePlay manages this issue internally by 
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recruiting local young people who have built skills through 
their involvement with GamePlay. Just as seen in Fiona’s 
account, in case study 2, lived experience provides a basis for 
being more ‘relatable’, providing cultural commonality as a 
shortcut to relational connection. However, it is not the only 
aspect. 
7.2.7 Relationships as structure 
Structures led by relational rules operate a different type of 
accountability than those emphasising operational rules. 
GamePlay is only minimally reliant on operational structures 
to influence young people’s behaviours. There are 
behavioural expectations, but these rely on mutual respect 
and accountability within relationships. There are different 
examples of this. One is from the observation session where 
Zoe prioritises what is important to Carly, and in the second, 
she allows a young lad to make his own decision, evidenced 
by observation notes below:  










FIGURE 18: OPPORTUNITY FOR AGENCY 
 
In each example, Zoe provides the opportunity for agency in 
the relationship, particularly in terms of who decides. The 
young people are exercising their reflexivity in a small way. 
Zoe is making space for them to experience decision-making. 
Zoe articulates this idea in her interview (session 4): “I do try 
to…embed that...trying to give young people some…agency 
and some responsibility over...how they access our service...I 
try and treat them as equal as possible...I don’t demand 
respect from them – just because I am in a position of power 
or authority”. In another example, Ian shares his response to 
discovering that a young person stole a bike: “I’ve said – 
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‘you’re still part of the programme – but you are not going 
to..QPR Football Club – on the weekend – that’s it – I expect 
that bike to come back’...and I’ve had all the abuse you can 
imagine – then two weeks later – they are back in sheepish – 
back in the programme”.  
The programme’s expectations and boundaries are strong, 
showing that this relational structure does not equate to ‘no 
structure’. However, instead of distinct operational rules, 
relational expectations take precedence.    
7.2.8 Commissioning relationships  
Where possible, Ian also employs a relational approach with 
commissioners. In his view, where funders take a more 
flexible approach, there are opportunities for tackling 
complex issues collaboratively. An example is the growth of 
‘County Lines’: criminals recruiting vulnerable young people 
to transport drugs into regional areas. Ian said: “I think 
funders have woken up to the fact that ...they wanna know 
warts and all...what barriers that are there...how can they 
contribute to finding a solution…rather than penalise the 
[grant] beneficiaries”. Ian’s response is one of 
transparency: “where I am allowed, I will give a really honest 
appraisal…I might say ‘well we’ve hit our KPIs but…more 
work-time has had to be put in... for these particular 
reasons’”.  For Ian, the benefit of this approach is the value 
of stakeholders working collaboratively to address external 
threats to communities such as County Lines.  
Allcare CEO Peta also raised positive relationships with 
commissioners as a necessity. She spoke about the longevity 
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of local commissioning relationships as facilitative for 
negotiating contracts and service redesign. Equally, in 
WellCity, Lorraine touched on the importance of 
commissioning relationships and the value of trust in 
enabling creative approaches. When asked why 
commissioners were becoming more engaged in 
understanding the factors that affect programmes, Ian 
says: “I just think that...over the last 5-10 years...they’ve seen 
some brilliant work…but maybe they’ve been too rigid in their 
funding processes…I think they are [now] very quick to whittle 
out now those that are chancers and those that do quality 
work..”. Positive longer-term relationships and collaborative 
learning at a system level may create conditions that are 
amenable to flexibility in service and contract design and 
monitoring. Reliance on commissioning relationships, 
however, comes with its risks where other priorities 
supersede the values that underpin the work for any party. 
When asked if there were times in seeking funding that 
GamePlay’s core values were compromised, Ian gave an 
example of an opportunity to be a lead partner in a bid, 
where GamePlay may not be in a strong enough position to 
ensure the intervention quality and where the contract 
period was relatively short, potentially curtailing the benefit. 
This was an opportunity to extend the methodology, but Ian 
saw inherent risks for quality aspects of provision central to 
their model.  
7.2.9 Summary 
This analysis of GamePlay’s structure and culture has begun 
to articulate the structural affordances that can shape 
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positive care relationships, both internally and in association 
with external partners:  
• Design that prioritises fun,  
• Structures that support the development and 
practice of relational reflexivity,  
• Approaches that promote individual agency, equality, 
and mutual respect.   
• Commissioning relationships that are open to 
examining relational and operational aspects of 
design and culture and their effects.  
These design features are entwined with cultural values. The 
structure and culture operate through the ideas and actions 
of people, including their relationships.   
This research is exploring the application of social theory and 
is not designed as an evaluation of practice. However, this 
research proposes that using this approach could help 
organisations better articulate and interrogate the role of 
relationships in their intervention models and help those 
commissioning services understand and assess the nature of 
and inter-relationships between fundamental contextual and 
agential mechanisms. 
The following section introduces Carly, one of the young 
people involved regularly with the organisation. After 
examining Carly’s reflexive capacity and nature, an analysis 
of her care relationships will draw upon further insights from 
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Ian about how care relationships within GamePlay operate, 
followed by the introduction of Zoe, Carly’s support worker. 
7.3 Introducing Carly 
Carly was seventeen years old when we met. She presented 
as outwardly quite confident; however, she quickly showed 
vulnerability in areas outside her comfort zone. When she 
learned at the first session that she and Zoe would be 
interviewed separately at the next session, Carly responded, 
“on my own? [looked a bit shocked]” until reassured that Zoe 
could stay in the room if she preferred (though ultimately she 
did attend on her own). Also, when talking about leading 
some of the games sessions in the hall, she showed she is still 
learning to feel confident:  
“Carly –it’s hard – especially with the kids that are…  
Gail – especially with the kids – so what’s the toughest 
thing? 
Carly – it’s just...it’s like - you just pray to God that they 
behave for yeh.” 
Carly’s life is rooted in her family connections and the local 
community. She lists ‘family’ as one of the things that are 
most important to her, qualifying this with “..just we’re such 
a big family and we’re all there for each other every day.” She 
is streetwise in a very literal sense, showing independence in 
and around the city streets: “..I walks everywhere – 
everywhere... I’ve lived here my whole life – I lived in [suburb], 
[suburb], [suburb]…my mum’s got like so many kids – my 
mum’s got nine”.  
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When asked if she was in touch with them all, she gave an 
overview of her siblings: “yeah my older brother – he’s moved 
out cos he’s got a girlfriend – and a baby – she’s erm two – 
my brother – [other] older brother – he’s moved out because 
his girlfriend’s overdue with her baby – she’s pop it out – my 
other sister – she’s with me, with my nan – two of my brothers 
and my other sister’s with my dad – and two of them’s been 
adopted somewhere...and mums over there (points in 
direction) in [local suburb]….cos I’m the fourth oldest – I 
looked after my brothers and sisters..”.  This last comment is 
particularly poignant as in the following interview, Carly 
touches on her distress at this loss of her two siblings to 
adoption. Her close connection with family members was 
also evident on the day of the first research interview. Carly 
had been called unexpectedly to the hospital that morning: 
“..well I just got a phone call – cos my little cousin got rushed 
into hospital yesterday..and then he had to stay over – so I 
got my aunt’s phone call saying can I go up there ..she can’t 
leave the baby there by himself”. When asked about the 
family relationship, she explained: “..she’s always round cos 
it’s my Nan’s niece…and I takes him out to the park…I love 
kids – I always want kids – I’ve always got other people’s 
kids…my cousins, my niece – so yeah – my next door 
neighbour’s kids..”  
Although strongly connected to her family network, Carly 
articulates the differences between her view of herself and 
others in her family and friendship groups. When talking 
about the future, she sets herself apart from others in her 
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family, saying that “my mum and my nan and my dad said to 
me – that I’m the only one that’s trying - doing 
something..”. She distances herself from some of the 
activities which she says some family members and friends 
are involved in, in particular drinking and drug-taking, again 
citing the need to focus on her life: “well to be honest I don’t 
really do a lot – I just comes here [youth club] – and just sits 
round with family – friends – play a bit of music – say if it’s 
where they drinking and something – I won’t go – I don’t drink 
or do drugs ... I just smokes fags and that’s it – so if someone 
goes – gets called up – say come down - I won’t go ….I just 
think I just need to focus on my life – not get drunk on the 
streets – or somewhere..” 
Carly’s statement here indicates she wants something 
different from her life, but her experience to date means that 
her starting point is a source of frustration for her: “I so wish 
I’d done well in school – I actually do – I wouldn’t be down this 
road – I wouldn’t be stuck [notable emphasis] – like in a traffic 
jam….I want to – I’m so bored I just wanna do something – 
I’m just so bored..”.  Carly had just found out that she had 
failed the maths foundation course she needed to have 
passed to start the sports coaching course she had applied 
for at [city] College. She had passed the English one but had 
needed both. Her connection with GamePlay provides a 
scaffold, but her starting point is peppered with challenges, 
emergent of her current context, and earlier life experiences. 
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7.3.1 Carly’s reflexive nature 
Carly did not express any awareness of having an internal 
conversation as such. In the Jack exercise Zoe [practitioner] 
talked about her own tendency to think things over and she 
said: “oh all the time..yeah literally all the time – I’m always 
talking to myself” then she asked Carly: “I don’t know about 
you Carly...if you have to make a decision – how do you think 
through it? Carly answered: “speak to family”.  When asked 
if she does both: “do you sometimes think things over in your 
mind as well?”, she replied “yeah” in a way that the 
researcher noted at the time as being ‘non-committal’ and 
‘unsure’. Also, earlier in the Jack exercise10, the example of 
‘imaginary conversations’ was introduced, and Carly did not 
seem familiar with this mental activity:  
Gail: yeah imagining conversations with other people 
Carly: but he won’t know anyone 
Gail: but with the people we’ve been talking about – 
girlfriend… is that something..? 
Carly: ah what he can’t speak to em..? He can’t call em and 
say it to them…? 
At this point Carly’s interpretation is you would only do this 
if you can’t speak to the other person directly. Zoe helps out: 
Zoe – Ah ok so its like…kind of thinking what they might say – 
Gail – yeah preparing yourself – by having like – do you ever 
do that – do you do that [to Zoe]? 
 
10 The Jack exercise is explained in section 4.8.5. 
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Zoe - yeah – I don’t know if you do it [to Carly] but if I have to 
tell someone something then I might imagine what they 
might say back to me so I can sort of.. 
Carly - they might say – don’t go and that – they obviously 
don’t want him [Jack] to go.” 
Carly continues to answer in relation to the present 
discussion about Jack, suggesting she is not familiar with the 
practice of ‘imaginary conversation’. Carly also did not 
recognise the idea of rehearsing something that she might 
say or do in advance. When asked about this, she 
responded: “when I have an urgent text message I’m well - 
what am I doing today? So yeah”. 
Similarly, Carly was asked about ‘mulling things over’:“Gail: 
thinking about a problem – or a relationship – is that 
something that – do you sit and do that? Carly – (long pause 
– non-verbal dissent)”. This is not to conclude that Carly does 
not think things through at all, and when prompted to talk 
about thinking things over she gave the example of when Zoe 
had asked her to help at the Community event: “ah yeah I 
had to think about that a little bit – I was like ahh – ahh – cos 
it was such a long day and it was really hot – and all my family 
was coming down – all my family [cousins] was down and I 
hardly see them cos they live in [distant Town].” Thinking to 
support planning, however, is less evident.  Carly speaks in 
the present, is responsive to events and does not seem to 
engage with reasons. She uses the term ‘for some reason’ as 
a substitute for explaining, for example, she says of 
supporting the local football team: “only been there once – to 
258 
 
be honest I didn’t like football – for some reason .. but now I 
like it” and “I’m a really strong swimmer – I can swim……. I’ve 
just always been able to swim – for some reason..” Her 
tendency to live in the present is evident in her attitude 
towards money – reflecting simply on what is, rather than 
thinking about it in terms of earning, budgeting, 
spending: “to be honest with you I haven’t been a money 
person – I get 20 pound a week for college – that’s it – with 
that I buys a pouch of baccy and with the change – I just – 
have a drink when I’m out”.  Equally, Carly reveals that she is 
not strategic about her approach to working to earn. She had 
had a few jobs but said: “load of crap to be honest – shops an’ 
that…..I walk out after a day or so - that’s why I wanna do 
something that I like”. 
Carly’s connection with GamePlay has provided her with a 
focus on what she likes and wants to do. She knows she likes 
children: “I love kids – I always want kids – I’ve always got 
other people’s kids..” and she likes sports: “I love sports as 
well – so yeah..” and working towards a job like youth sports 
coaching which will involve both of these elements is her 
plan. However, when asked about planning for the plan, 
Carly’s inexperience with reflexive thought is again evident. 
For example, when asked the course content, how she would 
spend her week, she knew it was about coaching: “..obviously 
learning about coaching – ah.. don’t know what it’s called - -
- coaching and development in sports or something like that 
..and I’ll also do my maths and english while I’m there”, but 
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she said she did not know if it was one year or two, or if there 
was a practical aspect.  
When asked about preparing for a previous college interview, 
she responded, laughing: “yeah, no went straight in”, and 
when asked about preparing for her functional skills maths 
exam (the next day), she shook her head, indicating that this 
was unlikely, saying: “see my house is very busy”.  By the time 
of the following interview a week later, Carly had found out 
that she had failed that exam, meaning that she lost her offer 
from the college. 
7.3.2 Communicative reflexivity 
More detail about Carly’s biography would improve our 
understanding of the factors which have influenced her 
reflexive development, but even with the information 
gathered: her siblings living in 3 different homes, two of them 
taken into care in recent years, expulsion from school (“I was 
chucked out of school and that cos I was bad”), it is evident 
that there has been disruption in her natal context, 
compared with the anchored family relationships typical of a 
communicative presentation (Archer, 2003). Despite this, 
there is evidence of the existence of relational goods 
between Carly and her family. There are aspects of Carly’s 
responses that suggest a communicative mode of reflexivity, 
particularly her reliance on family to support decision-making 
and her assertion that “we’re such a big family and we’re all 
there for each other every day”. She is close to her Nan whom 
she lives with, and when asked about the future, she 
jokes: “I’ll be living with my Nan til I’m 40”.  
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7.3.3 ‘Expressive’ Fractured reflexivity  
Archer (2012) proposes different presentations within the 
mode of fractured reflexivity, and the ‘expressive’ 
presentation appears particularly relevant to Carly’s limited 
use of an internal conversation and her tendency to think and 
live day-to-day. This mode of reflexivity is described as 
‘under-developed reflexivity, ie without any fully developed 
mode of internal conversation enabling them to diagnose 
(fallibly of course) the relationship between their personal 
concerns and their social circumstances, as is necessary for 
designing constructive courses of action’ (Archer 2012:250).  
Archer says that rather than taking a dialogical approach, 
‘expressives’ are reactive, relying on gut feelings:‘They live by 
‘presentism’ because to them there is no ‘big picture’ but 
simply a succession of events that command their attention 
from day to day’ (Archer 2012: 279). 
Does this mean that Carly has no option other than to live as 
best she can, with underdeveloped reflexive capacity? The 
data suggest that the answer is no, not least, because both 
within Carly’s account and Zoe’s, there is evidence that she 
wants to progress beyond her current position. In response 
to a recent difficult time, she decided that she wanted to go 
to college: “when I went downhill – just wanted to get up and 
do something with my life..” and this is supported by her 
earlier comment that both her parents and also her Nan had 
noticed that she was trying to do this.   The consistent 
presence of GamePlay in her community has introduced new 
relationships and opportunity, offering the scaffolding 
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required for Carly to understand and evaluate more options. 
Carly has identified an aspiration to be a sports coach and 
believes that there is a possibility of achieving it with their 
support. It is already clear that this is not a linear path, and 
there will be setbacks and false starts11. Carly’s background, 
external influences, lack of engagement with education and 
her under-developed reflexivity mean that the obstacles to 
achieving this goal are still significant. GamePlay is there for 
support and encouragement, but within the GamePlay 
methodology, ongoing commitment to development is 
required of Carly, as it involves a commitment to learning, 
voluntary work, and maintaining her support relationships.  
7.3.4 Carly and the ORRAC model 
The ORRAC model represents both orientation to relational 
reflexivity, and agency for change as key factors in the 
expression of reflexive capacity. Carly’s agency for change is 
embryonic, at this stage it is simply a will to ‘do something’ 
with her life. She is not experienced in the mental activities 
typically employed by those with an active reflexive capacity, 
and so is currently not represented in Q2 or Q3. Carly’s 
‘expressive’ reflexivity places her in Q4, because those who 
live reactively cannot conceive of, or operationalise a plan for 
moving forward. However, Carly’s data also places her 
partially in Q1. This decision has been made for two reasons:  
 
11 Pawson (2013) rejects the idea that support interventions are a ‘springboard’ to 
change and uses the term ‘runway’, acknowledging contingencies (agential, 




• Carly expresses ‘communicative’ traits in her 
commitment to her family and her intention to always 
be near them, specifically saying of her future: “I 
wanna be like - close to family”.   
• Carly looks to the role models available through 
GamePlay: Zoe and others, wanting to align herself 
with that group, by doing what they do: “what she 
does in general – like with the kids n that – that’s what 
I wanna do in life..” and later “I needs to speak to Zoe 
cos … I wanna see what course Zoe did to become like 
– youth worker”.  




7.3.5 Communicative reflexivity and role models: 
Carly’s wish to gain Zoe’s counsel and follow in her footsteps 
suggests that role models embedded in the local community 
are, as such, associated with the communicative reflexive 
mechanism (the arrow in the diagram depicts the ‘role 
model’ contribution). This feature is not evident in the other 
case studies but appears pertinent to this one. It suggests 
that GamePlay’s long-term community-based relationships 
can (for young people) offer the type of relational goods that 
occur naturally in family and close community relationships 
by offering contextual continuity. This analysis has 
implications for the structure of local provision and supports 
the relationship-centred longevity of community-based 
interventions. This introduced interdependence can, through 
exposure to relational reflexivity in positive relationships, 
scaffold individual reflexive capacity. In other words, the 
intervention is fostering Carly’s reflexive development.12 
7.4 The role of relationships 
Carly’s limited reflexivity appears to be both a product of and 
contributor to her circumstances, but the relationships she 
has developed through the youth club and GamePlay may 
offer her routes to developing her reflexive capacity and may 
create opportunities within which to exercise it; increasing 
her employability and chances of social inclusion in the 
longer term 13  Therefore, this research proposes that 
 
12 This raises a question, not for elaboration here, about whether reflexive 
development in expressive fractured reflexives could be targeted through thinking 
skills training as part of the organisational offer. This was suggested by Hung and 
Appleton (2017) in their findings about fractured reflexivity in care leavers. 
13Morgan and Parker, 2017:1038, in their study of sport-based interventions for 
‘marginalised’ young people, suggest a shift away from employment-based 
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reflexive development, capacity, and the role of care 
relationships are critical considerations in designing services 
that specifically support young people to develop a sense of 
belonging and agency. The next section explores the role of 
GamePlay and her relationship with Zoe in scaffolding her 
development.  
7.4.1 Carly’s care relationships: GamePlay and Zoe 
The analysis of Carly’s relationship with Zoe has the 
advantage of descriptions from three perspectives: Ian’s, 
Zoe’s and Carly’s. Firstly, Ian, the organisational lead, sets the 
scene with Carly’s involvement with the organisation:  
“…in terms of Carly’s case …she probably …recognised that 
we were genuine in our intentions and committed ...in terms 
of our support for her welfare….I think probably that does 
come over time – and from her point of view – ‘ok there’s 
people here....who have been with me through high and low 
.. and they are there to look out for me’.” 
Ian, when asked for a way to describe the nature of the 
relationship with Carly, he said ‘a positive connection’, and 
when it was suggested that this was perhaps hard to 
describe, he responded: “Yeah, but I’ve seen it hundreds and 
hundreds of times”, going on to try to describe it: “you could 
say trust – you could say a level of appropriate friendship – 
you could talk about [pause] – a positivity..” 
 
understandings of inclusion to those that foreground ‘interpersonal 
acceptance’. They assert that this different perspective may ‘provide a foundation 
upon which access to the formal structures of recognition that dominate the social 
inclusion landscape can be built.’.   
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Essentially, Ian is describing relationships that generate 
relational goods, and in her account, Zoe talks about the long 
process of getting to that point with Carly; initially: “..I think 
cos I’d just come in and – yeah –she didn’t know me – she was 
just a little bit reserved…but I tried to make sure that I was 
always there that she could always – always say hello … the 
first session you say hi – maybe introduce yourself – maybe 
have a little bit of small talk – and then I’d just leave it – 
wouldn’t want to push it too far..”. Carly opted out of 
GamePlay for a while due to family issues, but Zoe 
maintained contact, checked in about how she was, and let 
her know what was on offer. After a while, Carly returned and 
the relationship continued to develop: “..it wasn’t until about 
summer last year that we really…started to have that positive 
relationship where…she would straight away run up to you – 
and wanna tell you everything … and that’s when I think you 
know – you’ve had a breakthrough with a person…so it’s been 
– been nearly two years that I have been working with 
her..and…she is continuing to volunteer for us – she says she 
wants to work for [GamePlay]”.   
Zoe’s account suggests that the achievement of such a 
relationship is an interim outcome, consistent with the idea 
that the relationship, if maintained, generates ongoing 
relational goods. Ian’s following comment supports Zoe’s 
analysis: “..a young person might come in and its – sometimes 
they might have done something particularly great...they are 
taking pride in telling that professional – now that for me 
indicates that there is some sort of friendship….” 
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The example of Zoe and Carly’s relationship illustrates 
Donati’s requirement of RgRGs as those that form over time, 
in this case, a long period with advances and setbacks. Later, 
in the Discussion chapter (see 9.2.1) the Relational/Reflexive 
Mechanism (RRM) model will propose this as an iterative 
process. Next, Carly’s view of the relationship elaborates 
further on why people’s reflexive nature and relationships 
are important factors in understanding personal change. 
7.4.2 ‘Expressive’ reflexivity and the care relationship 
We have heard from Carly that Zoe is a role model for her. 
When asked what she likes about Zoe, Carly’s response was 
typical of her ‘expressive’ and ‘in the moment’ reflexivity. To 
Carly, what most readily comes to mind about Zoe is her 
energy and sense of play: “..she’s like up, forward [gestures] 
– like as soon as we come in – she’s like come on ‘up’... she’s 
got loads of energy int she – she bounces about and like 
whaoah..[Gail/Carly laugh]..”. Carly’s description of her 
relationship with Nick, the youth club manager, also showed 
that she values this concrete immediacy and that the ‘fun’ 
elements of Nick are important:“it’s the way he’s hyper – I 
dunno – he’s very like – aww what’s the word – like he does 
everything to make everyone happy –he is funny and he’s 
there if you need him”. 
Zoe suggests that generating relational goods in this way 
opens Carly to her influence: “..you just gotta try and 
persevere sometimes – just try to talk about the positives and 
bring her up a little bit you know. If you get a giggle out of her 
as well – you just slot a piece of advice in after the 
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giggle...”.Zoe elaborates on this strategy of earning influence 
through play and fun:“if you are trying to be an authority 
figure …I think it’s...difficult for them to take that [advice] on 
board...if you...can have a laugh with them...when you do ‘get 
real’ – you say...you know maybe we can have a little talk 
about...what you gonna do...they ...are more likely to take 
heed of your advice”.   
The above supports the proposition (see 7.2.3) that 
structures that enable ‘fun’ offer causal potential by 
nurturing a relational mechanism, one that works particularly 
well for those with under-developed (expressive) reflexivity. 
It may be that structuring services to prioritise fun and 
positive feelings holds more causal effect than the facilitative 
function that is currently ascribed to ‘fun’. Therefore, fun (its 
immediacy of relational connection) may be fundamental to 
engagement with individual reflexive capacity and 
development. In identifying that fun and responses to it 
constitute mechanisms for reflexive growth through 
relationship, these factors may be a more central 
consideration in the design, commissioning and evaluation of 
services. 
7.4.3 Reciprocity and Total Sharing  
Zoe and Carly’s relationship has been presented as a 
relationship that generates relational goods (RgRG), as it 
meets Donati’s requirements of knowing each other, being a 
relationship that has developed over time, that is 
characterised by caring and involves relational reflexivity. 
The requirements of reciprocity and total sharing of 
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relational goods are more difficult to evidence within the 
context of a care relationship. This challenge forms part of 
the discussion in chapter 9. However, the following 
observation provides some, albeit non-verbal, evidence of 
these within the context of this relation-based intervention.   
FIGURE 20: RECIPROCITY AND TOTAL SHARING 
 
This observation was of a moment of mutual connection and 
a sense of ‘in it together’ linked to the shared goal of Carly 
keeping her appointment: Carly’s pleasure at Zoe’s pride, 
Zoe’s pleasure at Carly’s commitment. This is a ‘good’ that 
both contribute to and enjoy, and which may, through the 
internal conversation (I-, me-, you-, and we-relation) be 
embedded in each person’s sense of self, adjusting or 
reinforcing the way they think about themselves, in the 
context of the relational good which they share.  
GamePlay creates the conditions within which Carly retains 
her autonomy and chooses whether to turn up, and in this 
instance, she chose to, and the observed effect was that she 




7.5 Zoe: GamePlay practitioner 
Although Ian revealed that fifty percent of GamePlay’s staff 
come through the programme, Zoe is not one of them and 
has joined the team in the last three years, working part-time 
alongside her studies. Zoe is 27 years old, and at the point of 
interview, she was completing a master’s in criminology. At 
GamePlay, Zoe is one of the more senior team members, 
taking a supervisory role with the coaches, overseeing the 
group sessions and case-managing new referrals. She had 
recently been offered a full-time job at GamePlay for August, 
once she had finished her dissertation.  
Observations of Zoe’s care relationships have already 
indicated, in the analysis above, a meta-reflexive approach to 
her work. This conclusion is drawn from evidence of her 
openness to relational reflexivity and how she promotes a 
culture of mutual respect. In addition, her sensitivity to how 
young people experience life, and the challenges they face, 
often compounded by difficult circumstances. We have seen 
that the cultural context of GamePlay creates conditions that 
are aligned with Zoe’s approach and are likely to have 
influenced her practice, just as she takes her part in 
reinforcing and developing the organisational ethos and 
practice. So what can we learn about Zoe’s reflexivity, which 
helps us understand why she is comfortable in this meta-
reflexive organisational ethos?   
7.5.1 Autonomous leanings 
As a younger adult, Zoe’s biographical account shows she was 
a driven individual: “if…you have an end goal – and there are 
certain paths that you can take to get that result – yeah I kind 
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of debate in my own head –ok well what’s gonna get me there 
the quickest … what’s going to guarantee the most chance of 
reaching that end goal?”. At university, she had made a 
decision to undertake a study year abroad because she knew 
that this would improve her employability: “just to like add to 
my CV cos I was career, career, career..”, aspiring as she was 
at that time to work for the United Nations. There is a strong 
sense of self-sufficiency in the above comments, indicating 
that Zoe started her young adult life with a strong 
autonomous tendency. She also indicates a sense of 
contextual discontinuity in her upbringing: “..I didn’t have the 
best upbringing – I’m not particularly close with certain 
members of my family”, which is consistent with the 
development of autonomous tendencies (see 3.17). We will 
see that Zoe has retained aspects of this autonomous mode 
of thinking. However, even in the way she qualifies this 
statement about her family relationships, her internal 
evaluation of these shows a meta-reflexive turn, asking 
herself what her experiences mean for whom she wants to 
be: “..so I think how do I want that to be different for other 
people – what have I learned from that and what can I take 
forwards?”.  
7.5.2 Meta-reflexivity 
On the second part of the ICONI, Zoe designated her three 
primary concerns as her partner, travelling and the 
environment/ animal rights, but unprompted, asked for the 
recorder to be turned on again after we had finished. She 
wanted to explain why she had not nominated her family, 
friends and job as important: “…so like, I love my family, I love 
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my friends, I love my job – but the way I am seeing the most 
change in me as a person…the way I see the world – those 
three things on there [indicates list of concerns] have had the 
most impact for me.”  This statement evidences Zoe’s meta-
reflexive tendency. She is thinking about the recent shift in 
her personal and social identity: whom she is becoming. She 
has become less career-focused, talking in much more 
general terms about her values and purpose: “[you can] 
spend your whole life working towards a career...but what 
are you like as a person – and what impact have you had on 
other people – so for me I think those three things have 
changed me to a point where I have a positive influence on 
the people around me…I think I’m a better person..”. 
Archer’s (2007:93) summary of those with meta-reflexive 
tendencies is ‘those who are critically reflexive about their 
own internal conversations and critical about effective action 
in society’. Zoe appears to incorporate both in her concerns 
and internal conversation, which she reports is very active. 
When asked about the mental activity of ‘reliving’, Zoe 
explains: “you go to bed at night, and you start thinking about 
things that you did or said…I…am constantly like playing 
situations back...I think that’s probably one of the things I do 
most”. Her critique of society is evident in the importance she 
places on environmental and animal rights issues, which she 
embeds into her work with young people when they are 
curious: “I try to live my life according to those...I’m not 
preachy and I’m not pushy…but kids hear that you are a 
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vegan and they start asking…so I always have an open 
discussion about it”. 
7.5.3 Zoe and the ORRAC model: reflexive tensions 
Zoe’s meta-reflexivity evidences itself through her 
descriptions of her changing patterns of thinking. She 
appears to be at a stage where she is exercising different and 
sometimes opposing modes whilst she establishes her 
reflexive preferences, all the time attempting to identify and 
adjudicate between her primary concerns. It is possible to 
demonstrate this on the ORRAC model, as Zoe talks through 
the tensions and shifts in her thinking patterns. This is of 
interest partly because we meet Zoe at a relatively young age 
amid these shifts and because it reveals, within the 
biographically rooted nature of reflexive tendencies, their 
responsive development and growth. 
Zoe identifies her relationship between herself and her new 
partner (of seven months) as a strong influence in her current 
thinking: “..all our aspirations of where we wanna be line up 
perfectly....I was always quite career-driven.…then I met him 
and.….the things that were lower down on my list…..he made 
me like realise that.…I cared about these things but I wasn’t 
living my life in accordance with my values”. This relationship 
has prompted a meta-reflexive realisation that she is most 
satisfied when living a life rooted in her core values. In doing 
so, Zoe has tempered her more concrete ambitions: “..we 
would have lots of…debates together and I kind of just got to 
a point where I was like – realistically...nothing I do really 
matters cos I am just one person on a small rock in the middle 
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of the universe - and I think well yeah I’m doing a bit of 
good…but really what am I doing it for?”. Her ambitions now 
are more focused on being a good person and a positive role 
model: “I honestly think it’s just about being the best person 
you can be...so other people have good role models to go off”. 
Despite this meta-reflexive turn, Zoe has not lost her 
autonomous tendencies, and there appears to be some 
ongoing tension. Her focus on ‘being’ is interrupted by her 
tendency to set goals for the future, despite advice to herself 
to live for the present: “I look to the future a lot...I don’t know 
if that’s because like I’m not where I want be now – so I’m 
constantly thinking about where I wanna be..”. Yet she also 
meta-reflexively challenges her own tendency to do 
this:“..sometimes I stop myself because I think sometimes you 
can think too much about the future – and...appreciate now – 
but then I guess you need to think about the future cos 
otherwise you’ve got nothing to work towards – do you know 
what I mean?”. Zoe acknowledges the tension between these 
two positions and her struggle with not wanting to ‘pin 
herself down’, yet also wanting to plan the detail. She even 
alludes to a risk of a fracturing of reflexivity if she does not 
corral her thoughts: “you can just spiral because there’s too 
much to think about…you’ve got too many options – and you 
can’t sort of – clarify – ‘this is the best pathway’…cos I don’t 
want to pin myself down…so sometimes I do struggle with the 
clarifying part – [needing to think about] the finer detail.” 
On the ORRAC model, the data analysis places Zoe in Q3 at 
T1, in her earlier adulthood, and a few years later, in T2 in her 
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current life and the way she thinks about and operates in her 
work context. The arrow between T1 and T2 depicts the 
tension that Zoe is experiencing between modes as she 
considers the next stage of her life in the context of a new 
relationship and shifting aspirations.   
FIGURE 21: ORRAC MODEL, ZOE 
 
7.6 Summary 
This case study has built on the concepts developed about 
care relationships in the first two case studies, showing their 
relevance across different people, relationships and social 
interventions.  
In this ‘Sports for Development’ context, the following 
insights have been drawn: 
• GamePlay’s structure and culture are instrumental in 
shaping the relationships that support young people, 
275 
 
particularly because their model is open access and 
attendance is voluntary.   
• GamePlay is structured for fun, and fun is utilised to 
create opportunities to influence and support the 
reflexive development of young people. 
• Role models are integral to the service model, and in 
Carly’s case, appear to provide support for her 
expressive fractured reflexivity. It was suggested that 
community-based role models might engage the 
communicative reflexive mechanism and 
relationships that enable aspirational thinking. 
• Supporting the findings of case study 1, Zoe’s 
reflexive profile on the ORRAC model demonstrates 
shifting reflexive capacity over time, a finding that 
may relate to her age and stage of life. Despite this, 
she operates a meta-reflexive relational reflexivity in 





Chapter 8: Case Study 4: CareConnect 
8.1 Introduction 
This case study is the final one, and there are some critical 
differences in the structure of the care and support in this 
case that provide an interesting comparison with the three 
preceding case studies. This social intervention is a long-term 
placement, a live-in arrangement where the person shares 
the home and the lives of a family.   
The social intervention model is called CareConnect, and its 
purpose is to coordinate support and accommodation for 
adults with additional needs, including people with 
disabilities, mental ill-health, and older people. Local 
schemes become providers of the CareConnect model, 
promoting family-based care in ordinary family homes. A 
national charity, CareConnect Plus, is the UK support network 
for CareConnect schemes, carers, and leaders. In each 
locality, CareConnect carers are matched with people 
requiring support using a thorough process to ensure the 
suitability of the match for both the carer’s family and the 
person moving in. Most recently reported figures reveal that 
around 14,000 people are supported through CareConnect 
schemes across the UK (A.Fox, 2018). These arrangements 
can be long-term, some placements extending over decades. 
The ethos of CareConnect centres on the importance of the 
nature of people and the power of relationships in achieving 
wellbeing for CareConnect carers and the people they 
support (A.Fox, 2018). Fox, CEO of CareConnect Plus, 
criticises the ‘shallow and transactional relationships’ 
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produced by the statutory health and care system (A.Fox, 
2018:4), emergent of recent decades’ public service 
modernisation. He instead promotes ‘real’ relationships 
(A.Fox, 2018:141) of the type fostered in family, community 
and friendship groups, and attention to the recruitment of 
carers for their ability to listen, communicate and empathise. 
The CareConnect model takes as its cultural base the 
caregiving culture of the family.  
Built on this foundation are structures and processes that 
facilitate the selection of carers, matching carers with people 
needing support, and processes that equip carers to support 
residents, as needed, with aspects of progress, such as 
independence, relationships, and engagement with the local 
community. Like any adult care provision, CareConnect 
schemes are regulated by the Care Quality Commission (CQC) 
and are required to undergo regular inspection with 
assessment against CQC standards. Barbara, the scheme 
manager, in this case, provides insight into the practicalities 
and challenges of implementing a relationship-centred 
scheme in the context of the wider social care system.   
The first section will introduce the intervention and its 
context understood through the insight and experience of 
Barbara, the service manager. The case study then introduces 
Harry and Una, the CareConnect family member and carer, 
respectively.  
The care relationship and the structure of the context in this 
case study are markedly different from the others. However, 
the same analytical tools and process are used to analyse the 
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care relationship and the role of reflexivity, offering new 
insights:  
• The adaptability of Archer’s theory for understanding 
people and relationships of different kinds and in 
different contexts 
• The value of understanding personhood as 
biographically emergent of our relations with the 
natural, practical, and social orders.  
• An opportunity to consider communicative reflexivity 
in a care relationship, where, in the other case 
studies, meta-reflexivity has been dominant.  
8.2 Registered Manager, Barbara and the 
CareConnect scheme 
The CareConnect scheme is under the management of the 
Local Authority (L.A.), and Barbara, the registered manager, 
is ‘responsible for the quality and safety of care and support 
of all CareConnect arrangements’14 within the local scheme. 
The scheme is managed within the Provider Services arm of 
adult social care and is grouped with Day services, a Learning 
Disability Respite Unit and an Older Person Care Home for 
people with dementia.  
8.2.1 Protecting the model: structural and cultural 
challenges 
Barbara reflects that practical management issues arise from 
being grouped with services that are quite different, in 
particular adapting more traditional policy directives to such 
 
14 Reference from service documentation 
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a unique service model: “it’s such an unusual way of 
working.... it’s explaining that to other professionals... that’s 
quite difficult for the CQC inspectors…[for example an] 
inspector said to me about meal times...and I sort of said – 
well they haven’t got a menu because its someone’s home”. 
Although there are challenges, these structural differences 
are accommodated. However, Barbara also raised the 
difficulties brought about by the recent financial cuts and the 
struggle defending the ethos of CareConnect in this context. 
At times, she needs to manage pressures from those who see 
opportunities to cut costs in the model, made more 
challenging by parts of the organisation not fully 
understanding the ethos: 
“I would say that a lot of the financial people...find it difficult 
to understand… One of the hardest things is with all the 
funding cuts and there are a lot within Learning Disability – is 
for example – Day services – so they [finance team] go out 
and do reviews and say... ‘I don’t think they need Day services 
any more – why should they – they are at CareConnect – why 
should we double fund?’ – because they don’t understand 
the ethos of CareConnect and...I have had to properly fight 
and show things from the Local Government ombudsmen and 
things from CareConnect Plus – to say...you can’t expect one 
carer to have two service users 24/7...what about their right 
to a family life? ”  
To some degree, the service is protected because it is less 
expensive than other forms of adult care (A.Fox, 2018:118-
19). However, this also creates pressures in the form of 
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increasing numbers of referrals, some of which are 
inappropriate: “cos we are seen as the cheaper option…that’s 
hard because you are getting...referrals that you know that 
you can’t meet that [need]...so we’re batting back a lot of 
things because they wouldn’t be suitable”. 
Barbara is clear that who her senior managers are, is an 
essential factor, referring to a ‘win’ where she had achieved 
an increase in the annual allocation of respite care for 
CareConnect carers: “I made the most of having a different 
Director”, and at the time of the interview was cautiously 
optimistic about a new Director of Adult Social Care. Barbara 
gains support from CareConnect Plus, the national leadership 
network for schemes, to manage these challenges, and in the 
case of the double funding example above, she requested 
support from them. She says: “I had a barrage of things 
through – plus things from CareConnect Plus - plus things 
from the Local Government Ombudsman…. and that was 
really good so I could do a report using all that 
information.” Barbara emphasises that although the 
structures of each of the CareConnect scheme is different, it 
is the ethos which provides the collective strength: “every 
CareConnect service is different, but the ethos is the 
same...it’s really important that we use them because I don’t 
think we would be as effective...if we didn’t have that behind 
us”. 
8.2.2 Adaptive reflexive responses 
Barbara’s account suggests that Local Authority systems can 
pressure the viability and integrity of local CareConnect 
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practice. The model is defined at a national level by 
CareConnect Plus and locally, is reliant on leadership 
resilience to defend and maintain the ethos in the context of 
pressures on the social care system. A.Fox (2018) sees the 
longevity and quality of care relationships delivered at a 
lower cost as inherently protective to the ethos and 
practices, suggesting that local leaders of good schemes 
realise that ‘twisting the model into a conventional ‘service’ 
quickly becomes a false economy’ (A.Fox, 2018:114). This 
message resonates with Barbara’s challenges: “it is about 
protecting - and all of us are like mother bear – protecting 
[against] those cuts…what you don’t want is to upset the 
carers…cos there aren’t many people who will do a job 24/7 
for the money...they get”.   
This challenging context requires adaptive reflexive 
responses, which are evident in Barbara’s management of 
the service. The way that Barbara and her team are working 
to maintain and reproduce the culture and structures of the 
model in a sometimes hostile context shows a 
communicative reflexive approach. They are working for 
contextual continuity within a changing environment, 
reaffirming the model’s ethos and protecting the structures 
that enable its realisation. Relational reflexivity is utilised in 
discerning external threats emergent of people with a 
different ethos and conflicting agendas, and in seeking to 
influence them, Barbara employs autonomous reflexivity in 
making protective decisions. For example, Barbara refuses to 
sign off a CareConnect agreement until Day services have 
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been allocated to an individual, a defensive mechanism 
where a relational approach with the finance team is not 
possible.   
8.2.3 Team relationships and the matching process 
It is evident from the above that it is not simply the 
relationships between the carer and the care recipient that 
are important, but also relationships at other system levels. 
Barbara can protect the value generated by the ethos 
because, at a national level, the leadership and support 
network of CareConnect Plus remains independent of the 
local pressures and offers valuable external support.  
The relationship between the team’s three CareConnect 
Officers and potential carers is also important within the 
scheme itself. Before the matching process has got 
underway, Barbara allocates the CareConnect Officer whom 
she thinks will most suit the applicant: “..so if it’s a young 
person...I choose Caitlin because I think they might get on 
better...again its matching even before you’ve started the 
process..”. The matching process for carers takes three to six 
months, meaning applicants can get to know the assessor 
and vice versa. Barbara says: “the wall comes down and then 
you see the real person so you can get to know their 
personalities” and “you can tell the warmth if that makes 
sense”. The matching process involves a thorough insight 
into the nature of the carers, their family and home life, and 
into the people being supported “those layers that you are 
peeling – its massive – its lots of little onions all over - 
sometimes it works brilliantly – the majority of the time...we 
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know the carer well enough...the issue is whether we know 
the service user well enough...we have to dig deep to get 
those answers sometimes”. Barbara is clear that finding a 
suitable match is not just about personalities or relationships, 
it is the whole context: “it’s the whole family so it could be 
the way the whole family lives – it could be their interests...it 
could be that they have a nicer bedroom or that they are 
better at cooking so its unpicking what it is that makes it 
work”.  
The matching process Barbara describes suggests that it 
requires a high orientation to relational reflexivity within the 
team, to understand the nature of all individuals involved, 
building relationships with potential carers and people who 
require support, and in the intuitive work of perceiving 
whether a potential match may or may not be suitable. This 
intuitive work draws on a necessarily meta-reflexive culture 
and raises a further question: is there a way to specify this 
intuitive process through a theoretical understanding of 
personhood and reflexivity? 
8.2.4 A note about context 
The CareConnect model differs from the other three 
intervention types as the central aim is to find a placement 
that achieves a relationship of belonging, to provide a person 
with stability, safety, contentment and opportunity. In the 
previous three case studies, ‘the reflexivity in context’ of 
each practitioner and service user were unique and separate, 
even though the value of lived experience was identified as 
valuable. In the CareConnect case study, Una and Harry do 
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not share exactly the same context. Most aspects of who they 
are; their concerns, and histories are unique to them; 
however, there is much more significant overlap between 
their contexts than in any other case study because 
their home environment is shared. The relationships in the 
other sites were structured through work roles, whereas in 
this model of care, the roles are family-oriented, and as a 
result, the aspects of identity that Una shares represent a 
wholly ‘home’ rather than a ‘work’ identity, and as such is 
more personal. Equally, her relationship with Harry operates 
more like a family member relationship than a practitioner 
one.  
Therefore, it is essential to read this account mindful of this 
difference and its significance for the relationship. The 
following sections of this case study will consider how 
relational reflexivity operates in this shared context, given 
Una’s and Harry’s capacity for reflexivity and their reflexive 
nature. 
8.3 Introducing Harry 
Harry was 26-years-old at interview, and he had been living 
with Una, his CareConnect carer and her husband for eight 
years. Harry has a diagnosis of learning disability and autism, 
which he talks about openly. He explained that this has 
resulted in him remaining ‘younger’ than other 
people: “because of my disability making it difficult to grow 
up in my head”. He also, however, has particular strengths in 
learning and retaining information, spurring interest in 
history and historic ships. For example, during the interview, 
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Harry shared some detailed knowledge of the Titanic, HMS 
Victory and the Mary Rose.  
When Harry moved in, Una and her husband already shared 
their home with two other CareConnect family members; 
Maggie and Martin. From both Una and Harry’s account, the 
trigger for moving out of his family home to Una’s home was 
a challenging relationship with his younger brother. Harry 
had felt increasingly frustrated with his brother and had been 
violent towards him at home, and everyone was concerned 
about the risk, including Harry himself, of hurting his younger 
brother: “I didn’t want my brother thinking 
thinking...thinking to me – ‘what’s happened to the kind 
childhood Harry?’…and thinking..thinking that – ‘firstly 
Harry’s kind and .. now he’s just mean..mean…mean’”. 
Throughout the accounts from Una and Harry, there were 
indications that Harry had had instability and loss in his life. 
He had been very close to his grandparents who had brought 
him up, and both of them had recently passed away: “my 
grandad took me trainspotting – my nan taught me to cook 
…and I also used to go to church with my grandad.” Harry’s 
relationship with his parents is more erratic, and at times 
gives Una some concern: “I got to keep mum happy cos I 
worry about him going home...and how’s she gonna be with 
him and I think there’s often Uncle around and...he can be 
quite nasty”, although Una acknowledges that his mum has 
done a good job in some ways: “cos he’s very clever and she 
does take him out here there and everywhere”.   
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Conversely, Una’s home life has provided stability for Harry 
both in terms of his health and social well-being. He 
says, “this home is a lot cleaner, not so smelly – the food 
better – everything – whereas mum’s house is dirty, dusty, 
smelly – not as good food” and also remarks on the weight 
that he gained early on: “…she[Una] does healthy food 
because when I first arrived...I was not the guy with the 
healthy body like this – I was thin…extremely 
underweight”. Having had a complicated relationship with 
his brother, Harry reflects positively on the relationships he 
has with Una, Jeremy and Una’s children: “I used to watch 
[Una’s son] play on his PlayStation…and they like saw me as 
a big brother in terms of [Una’s younger son] or a younger 
brother cos of [Una’s older son]. Una explained that her son 
had recently had a new baby and that Harry was an “honorary 
uncle”. Harry had some trepidation about holding the 
baby: “it’s the fact I’ve never been an uncle before and I was 
actually a bit nervous at first about how I would react around 
baby”, but identified the new baby as important to him: “I 
sort of fallen in love with the little fella..” 
8.3.1 Learning disability, autism and reflexivity 
Harry’s diagnosis of learning disability and autism raises a 
question about capacity for reflexivity in the context of these 
diagnoses, which in themselves vary greatly in presentation 
in any individual. Aspects of Harry’s learning disability and 
autism may have implications for his reflexive development, 
such as developmental difficulties with language and 
communication and executive functions (attending, 
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planning, sequencing information, regulating emotions) 15 . 
These developmental differences may affect his internal 
deliberations, but they do not prevent him from having them. 
For example, Harry acknowledges his internal conversation 
when thinking about his grandma: “I used to imagine life 
without my grandma as a child because my grandma outlived 
my grandad …now my nan’s gone I have to face up to…having 
- no responsible kind adults around and…having to have...my 
mum and dad..”. Archer’s definition of reflexivity as a 
capacity of all ‘normal people’ (Archer, 2000:221) is unhelpful 
in its lack of specificity; however, she qualifies this, in 
parentheses, as ‘(not addicted, fixated by trauma or 
otherwise incapable of reflection)’. Harry is very capable of 
reflection, and this research starts from the assumption that 
his diagnoses do not preclude a capacity for active reflexivity. 
In fact, Harry’s data provide an interesting insight into the 
way that his reflexivity operates. 
8.3.2 Developing ‘personhood’ 
It is Archer’s account (Archer, 2000: chapters 4-7) of the 
formation of personal identity through our embodied 
experiences in the natural order and developmental relations 
with the practical and social orders of reality that underpin 
the following analysis; an analysis that reveals individual 
personhood in the context of limited cognitive, language and 
communication development.  
 
15No information about Harry’s abilities in these areas was required for this study. 
Like the other participants, Harry’s reflexive nature was considered in the context of 
what could be learned from observation and interview.   
288 
 
Where the other case studies have focused on participants’ 
capacity to evaluate their priorities in context reflexively (i.e., 
how shall I act in the light of my established concerns), the 
insights that Harry provides enable consideration of 
the developmental process of adjudicating between and 
establishing the concerns that anchor personhood. Harry’s 
account shows he is engaged in doing this but that it is 
challenging. His learning disability and autism, within his 
social context, create obstacles to satisfactory calibration of 
his core concerns.  
Harry’s contribution to this research is unique in that his 
thoughts are quite often externalised, and during his 
account, he repeatedly returns to certain topics (see example 
‘concerns’ in Figure 22 below). As a result, we have a 
privileged insight into the struggle that he has, aligning his 
concerns to fit in with societal expectations, particularly 
where his keenest interests conflict with them. Analysis 
reveals an ongoing struggle in reconciling these positions to 
establish a way of ‘being’ or personhood that ‘works’, both 
for himself and within his social context. Figure 22 lists some 
of the concerns that Harry spoke about most and proposes 
the relation(s) (natural, practical, social) that each concern 





FIGURE 22: HARRY: EXAMPLE CONCERNS 
 
Example 1 
Harry enjoys playing with plastic toys of the type designed for 
very young children, for example, farm animals and 
‘plasticky’ toy cars, as part of his desire to be still young 
enough to play with them. When asked what he likes about 
them, he says: “..playing with cars, train sets, ships, that 
because of my disability making it difficult to grow up in my 
head” (1).   
  Example ‘concerns’ from 
Harry’s account 
Natural Practical Social    
1 Wanting to be younger/ buy/ play 
with young children’s toys 
      
2 Being healthy       
3 Being sporty and a fast runner       
4 Avoiding being bullied/staying 
safe 
      
5 Family relationships 
(grandparents/ parents/ siblings 
      
6 Being looked after at Una’s/ 
belonging/ 
Being a good influence for 
nephew (Una’s baby grandson) 
      
7 Love of cars/ mechanics/ robots       
8 Managing own strength, 
aggression and impulsivity  
      
9 Following rules and guidance eg 
school policies/ public health 
messages/ keeping the house 
clean and tidy 




This is a concern of the natural order in the physicality of play 
(eg. Una said that he likes to lay on the floor to play with the 
train set to feel the vibrations) and the practical order: the 
act of playing with the object itself. Harry suppresses these, 
or is working to, in order to preserve: 
• Una’s approbation (6) and broader social 
acceptance (social order) 
“I don’t want to risk getting in trouble with Una just because 
I bought something that’s meant for youngster like... maybe 
a toy car” 
“I do check out childish toys [on the internet] but…I’m an adult 
now and...I know that there’s a danger – with my nephew 
around now that ..I could always end up being a bad 
influence” 
• Physical safety (4) (natural order) and avoiding 
bullying (social order).   
“I know if I keep taking toys out in public there’s always a 
danger of being mocked” and “I’m afraid that somebody will 
then turn..to a bully at me….or come up behind me and...push 
me over...”  
Example 2 
Harry moved into Una’s family home because his relationship 
with his brother became difficult as Harry had become 
aggressive towards him at times: “through my teenage years 
I went from kind gentle playful teenager – from a mean nasty 
you know bully of…an aggressive brother – to kind, young you 
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know playful adult again – meaning I had...you know...two 
sides to me – kind side as a child – aggression as a brother 
then back to kind adult”.   
• For Harry, the risks associated with impulsivity and 
aggression in the natural order (8) compromise one of his 
social order concerns (5), and he remains anxious about 
this: “I do see him – but I don’t want to – but I don’t want 
to stay like in his bedroom just in case the aggression is 
waiting to loom out at him – you know as in history 
repeating itself.” His placement at Una’s house allays this 
anxiety, and he says that Una has helped him, meaning 
that he can stay at Una’s (6): “Una actually helped me 
keep the...unpredictable aggression…at bay…I know if I 
became aggressive at Una’s then I would risk 
being...kicked out.” 
The tensions between Harry’s concerns help explain the 
challenge that he has in articulating a satisfactory way of life. 
This, however, does not deny Harry a capacity for 
reflexivity. He has an ‘inner perspective’, a sense of “me in 
my social context’ considering what I should do there’ 
(Archer and Morgan 2020: online). He is, however, in the 
difficult position of navigating the expectations of an ‘adult’ 
world within the limitations of his cognitive and linguistic 
development. At times, this means Harry is subordinating his 
concerns in the natural and practical orders to ‘fit in’ socially. 
This may heighten the risk of ‘fractured’ reflexivity where the 
problem of irreconcilable interests may lead to ‘internal 
conversations which intensify distress and disorientation’ 
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(Scambler, 2017). We will see that Harry’s current 
circumstances work to mitigate this risk through his 
relationship with Una and her family. 
8.3.3 The ORRAC Model and Relational Reflexivity 
The ORRAC model is helpful here because it proposes a 
continuum of relational reflexivity. The idea will be 
elaborated upon in the discussion chapter that a capacity for 
relational reflexivity is present in each quadrant, but on the 
continuum, relational reflexivity is applied to a greater or 
lesser extent by different people. We saw that Luke and Fran, 
each within an autonomous mode, used relational reflexivity 
to achieve outcomes that were important to them, and this 
will be described in the Discussion (chapter 9) as 
‘autonomous relational reflexivity’. It is the way any of us 
may use relational mechanisms to our own ends. Due to his 
autism, Harry struggles with this important reflexive skill, 
essentially because the ability to perceive other people’s 
intentions and likely actions is part of setting any 
autonomous goal that involves other people. An 
independent capacity for meta-reflexivity is perhaps even 
less possible because it involves a synthesis of new 
contextual knowledge, imagination and a perceptive 
engagement with the agential interests of others.   
8.3.4 Harry’s reflexivity 
It is therefore challenging for Harry, just as it was for Carly, to 
achieve the self-sufficiency afforded by autonomous 
reflexivity or to meta-reflexively engage with the 
opportunities presented by novel people and contexts. He is 
currently reliant on stable relationships to help him interpret 
293 
 
the social world and support his reflexive deliberations. This 
is evident in the support he gains from Una to make 
decisions, with both Harry and Una talking about Una’s role 
in helping him to think things through: 
 e.g. Una: “I said to him right you go off….check out the prices 
and think about it so .. do you want to spend 20 pound on this 
ship – or do you want to save that 20 pound for...when we are 
away..” 
Una’s support extends to how to think about things and 
behave, highlighting to Harry what others may think. This is 
directly reported by Harry, for example: “Una says if I want 
to go to Uni – stop bringing toys out in public because people 
will just laugh at me…because they will be thinking – ‘does 
that young man think he is a kid?’”. In other examples, it is 
possible to detect Una’s counsel reflected in Harry’s 
reasoning: 
“it’s [living with Una] made me more like social…and actually 
reserve the sportiness for public ...I didn’t want to run around 
like silly lunatic…when I could have accidentally fallen to 
death.”  
“in winter when it’s raining it would be silly bringing back a 
damp soccer ball…cos it be too…wet to bring back in the 
house – so that’s why I never take chances with soccer ball in 
the winter.” 
Barbara (CareConnect Manager) says that it is common for 
people who move into a CareConnect family to use language 
adopted from their carers: “..sometimes they come out with 
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things – little phrases and you think ‘that’s what the carer 
says’.” Una’s counsel is scaffolding Harry’s reflexive 
deliberations, using her own, helping him structure his 
thinking around his interests in the light of his context. We 
will learn in the next section that Una’s reflexive tendencies 
and family culture tend towards communicative reflexivity 
and that this mode is, in many ways, suited to supporting 
Harry. 
FIGURE 23: ORRAC MODEL, HARRY 
 
On the ORRAC model, Harry is represented at T1, in 
‘Fractured’16 mode, which is a risk (due to his disability) in an 
unsupported context, but at T2, whilst in his current context, 
 
16 “The fractured reflexives are those whose internal conversations intensify their 




Harry’s reflexivity is drawn away from a fractured expression 
when he is supported in a context of communicative 
reflexivity. It could be reasonable to conclude that, because 
Harry is interdependently rather than independently 
reflexive, his reflexive mode remains fractured. Yet, the same 
could be argued for Una, as without the family and 
community relationships that host her communicative 
reflexivity, she would perhaps also lose reflexive traction. 
We, most of us, are interdependent beings. With the 
relational support that Harry draws from his life at Una’s, he 
operates in a communicative mode, consistent with his 
context. The following section expands on Una’s reflexivity 
and why this is relevant to her care relationship with Harry. 
8.4 Introducing Una, CareConnect carer 
Una has been a CareConnect carer (or the equivalent Adult 
Placement carer) for over 25 years, and Maggie, one of her 
current extended family members, had been living there for 
24 years at the point of our interviews. Una is in her late 
fifties and has resided in her local area all of her life. She is 
married with grown-up children, and she and her husband 
Jeremy provide a home for and share their lives with three 
people through the CareConnect scheme. One of these is 
Harry, who is now 26 years old, having moved in with Una 
and her family when he was 18. He has lived with the family 
for eight years, and Una says, “…I wouldn’t be without 
him...we have such a laugh”. 
Archer’s reflexive modes reveal differences in the way people 
deliberate about, and therefore navigate life. In case studies 
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1, 2 and 3, we have met those with fractured, autonomous 
and meta-reflexive tendencies and understood: 
• how these reflexive patterns have shaped their lives 
and  
• the implications of these reflexive modes for their 
care relationships within the context of the social 
intervention.   
 
This final case study finds that Una aligns strongly with the 
mode of communicative reflexivity. There are three core 
features of communicative reflexivity outlined by Archer 
(2003:170). These are contextual continuity, the dovetailing 
of concerns and contentment. Additionally, the tendency of 
‘thought and talk’, a reliance on collective decision-making, 
which fosters a cultural consensus. The following section 
outlines the evidence from Una’s account of her life and how 
she thinks and decides, which reveal her communicative 
reflexive tendencies.  
8.4.1 Una’s life and priorities 
Contextual continuity versus incongruity or discontinuity is a 
key aspect of personal biography, which Archer describes as 
contributory to the developed nature of reflexivity in adults 
(see 3.17). In the previous case studies, we have seen 
evidence of this in the biographies of Maxine, Luke, Fiona, 
Fran and Zoe. In Una’s case, contextual continuity has been 
stable: a reproduction of her natal context within her local 
community. Una says that her primary concerns are family, 
health and money (in terms of “saving for my pension”). Una 
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is clear that these different priorities do not clash and that 
“they all seem to fit in fine”, conceding that this may require 
some ‘juggling’ at times.  
For Una, contentment arises from simple priorities: “as long 
as we are all happy and healthy and making sure we all eat 
healthy – that’s really important – and keeping things 
clean”. Family is of central importance to her. Her adult 
children live close by, and she is also close to her siblings, with 
all of them and their children coming for Christmas: 
“Christmas we do [get together] – yeah I had 28 in here..”.  
Una’s need to maintain her contextual continuity is evident 
when she talks of herself and Jeremy retiring from 
CareConnect. She has no plans to travel or take up a hobby, 
and when asked what she will do, she thinks that she may go 
and work nights in a local care home “I’d like to go back to 
elderly and do nights..” Caring is part of who she is, and she 
appears to find it difficult to conceive of a life where it is not 
integral. 
Una’s love of caring for and nurturing others started at an 
early age. Her mother was a nurse, and when Una and her 
siblings were young, she opened a rest home for the elderly 
in their family home. Una grew up in this environment, and 
her level of engagement in caring was high even as a child, as 
shown by the personal relationships she valued there: “I had 
loads of nannies and grandads – so before school I used to do 
their cups of tea – they all had a cup of tea in bed, so I used 
to do that before I went to school”. With little idea of what 
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she wanted to do after school, and having grown up in a care 
environment, Una took what seemed like a natural step:  
“when I was at school, I didn’t really know what I wanted to 
do so I ended up working at an old people’s hospital in [place] 
and that was lovely – I really enjoyed doing that”.  
Subsequently, Una and Jeremy married and started a family. 
She and Jeremy had a cleaning business, then Una found her 
way back to care: “Yeah I’ve always worked in care….I went 
and had the babies…and then we ended up having the 
cleaning business and then I got pregnant again accidentally 
….and I thought well I’m at home so I might as well have 
someone in.” Soon after, Maggie moved in and has been with 
Una and her family long-term. Martin, who is also part of 
Una’s CareConnect family, joined in the interim and was well-
established before Una decided to invite a further person 
into the mix and was ultimately matched with Harry.   
8.4.2 Communicative reflexivity on the ORRAC model:  
Una’s life is a tale of contextual continuity, which has been 
worked for within a strong and established family-based 
culture. On the ORRAC model, striving for contextual 
continuity is as aligned with lower agency for change, which 
should not be confused with a lesser capacity for agency.  
Archer (2012:125) is clear that “reproduction now [ie in this 
day and age] entails innovative action” and that maintaining 
one’s context is an active and not a passive endeavour. Those 
on the opposite end of the continuum, with autonomous and 
meta-reflexive tendencies, are instead employing their 
agency to engage with change in response to opportunity. 
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Una’s enacted agency is evident in her description of a ‘sit in’ 
at the Department of Psychiatry to get a prescription for 
Martin when there were no appointments available: “they 
said...we can book him in next week – and I said ‘well no he 
might be dead by then – because this is what he’s threatened’ 
– I says ‘well don’t worry – we’ll come and sit down there until 
we can see one’ – so me and Martin made up sandwiches – 
took a flask with drink – and within an hour they saw us”. This 
passive resistance to the system shows strong agency, yet it 
is not an attempt to create change. It is agency applied to 
overcome an immediate barrier to support a member of her 
extended family group. It also demonstrates the other key 
element of communicative reflexivity on the ORRAC model; 
high orientation to relational reflexivity. Una is engaged in 
‘we-relationships’ with her extended family and focuses on 
being ‘in it together’; ‘your’ concerns are ‘our’ (i.e. mine and 
your) concern. Una’s stance at the Department of Psychiatry 
underlines this. She did not personally believe that Martin 
needed this medication: “the only reason he...wanted the 
anti-depressants - is that mum had said to them all – ‘if you 
are depressed – we are all on fluoxetine…you need to be on 
it’”.  Regardless of her own view, however, she prioritised 
what was important to him at that time and supported him 
to be seen. 
Una combines a tendency to reproduce the ideals and 
structures of her natal context with an orientation towards 
relational reflexivity, engaging in effective ‘we-relationships’ 
with recipients of her care. This combination creates its own 
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tendency in which a typically inward-facing community and 
family culture are valued and reproduced. This is shown on 
the ORRAC model below, placing Una in Q1:   
FIGURE 24: ORRAC MODEL, UNA 
 
8.4.3 Promoting equality within a family culture 
Una advocates for the people she cares for within the 
boundary of her family home, values and culture. This 
boundary is evident in Una’s comparisons of her care 
provision with other carers who support their CareConnect 
residents. Una does not speak about others who, like her, 
provide positive care, citing examples of poor treatment of 
service users from carers she has known in the past and 
distancing herself from all other carers as a result: “it’s like 
they’re the boss – and ‘you do what I say’…. ‘if I tell you to go 
out there and do your colouring you will do it’ – and it’s not 
nice – I think no – just keep away from them all”. Despite 
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distancing herself from other CareConnect carers, Una 
maintains a good relationship with Barbara, the local 
manager, confidently welcoming anyone to come and assess 
her provision at any time without notice: “..you [CareConnect 
Officers] are welcome to come out any time... you can go off 
and speak to my three – I got nothing to hide”. She is keen to 
be seen to be doing a good job but also prefers that the 
organisation let her get on with it unless she approaches 
them for support: “I do ask them to leave me alone – cos this 
is family...I don’t want them pestering me every 5 
minutes”, qualifying this with “they do support me really well 
- but only when I want them to”.  
Una’s values maintain a stable family culture. There are 
regular practices that form this structure, for example, a 
regular Sunday lunch each week, for which preparation 
begins at 7 am “cos we always have Sunday roast here on a 
Sunday so I like to get it all ready”. The family week is also 
structured “they’ve got their routine – I’ve got my routine – 
so on a Tuesday we go and do the shopping – go and have 
coffee – and on Friday its all three of us – with Maggie as well 
– all 4 of us – we all decide what we are doing and we go off 
out”.  This sense of equality is a key part of the way that Una’s 
family operate. Decisions are made by consensus and not 
individually. Archer (2003) describes this communicative 
reflexive tendency as ‘thought and talk’, a tendency to begin 
with an internal dialogue, but to complete the discussion 
with others in a trusted group, rather than in one’s own mind: 
‘the membrane between the life of the mind and the life of 
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the group is highly permeable and there is regular two way 
trafficking between them’ (Archer, 2003:167). Una reveals 
this is the case in the decisions they make as a family “..like 
even with my family – we always do it – we make 
decisions...we sit down and we talk about things...so we make 
it fair”.   
Una is an advocate for fairness and equality. She takes her 
CareConnect family on holiday each year: “..really they are 
not entitled to a holiday and I think that’s wrong...cos I think, 
you know - how would we feel if we didn’t have a 
holiday?”.  In the care home she worked in six years 
previously, Una would break the rules to make a sandwich for 
a hungry resident at 2 am: “a lot of the time in care places its 
breakfast at 9, lunch at 12, tea at 4 – but if you are not hungry 
at 4 – they say no the kitchen closes at 5 – that’s their home 
– and that’s not fair – so I just used to get ’em jam 
sandwiches”. This equalisation of power in relationships 
creates a sense of equal value, and therefore the conditions 
for reciprocity and the generation of relational goods. 
8.4.4 Una and Harry, a relationship that generates 
Relational Goods? 
There can be no assumption that a CareConnect care 
relationship is one that generates relational goods, and the 
next step is to consider Una and Harry’s relationship against 
the requirements set out by Donati (Figure 25). The strong 
family culture lends itself to forming we-relationships and 
Una and Harry provide examples of joint problem solving, a 
sense of ‘in it together’ in home and family life.   
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8.4.5 Natural order concerns and reciprocity 
The practice of caring, for Una, is not simply emergent of her 
practical and social concerns; it also has an empirically 
observable embodied aspect, a concern that emphasises the 
involvement of the natural order in Una’s approach to caring. 
This was not as overtly evident in any of the other 
practitioners in this study, and so it is worth noting in Una’s 
pattern of concerns. Archer’s theory of personhood helps to 
explain this aspect of Una’s caring tendencies, which may 
have otherwise gone unexamined.  
In Una’s biographical account of caring, she shares a memory 
of Benjamin, a retired vicar who was a resident in her family 
home growing up. Her description of him reflects her 
affectionate and tactile tendencies, oriented around visceral 
and sensory experiences of care: “he was so dreamy – you 
know – and his hand used to shake – he used to touch my 
hand and his hand used to shake – and I think…ooh 
(shudder)…bless him”. Una demonstrates an empathy that 
extends beyond the social to the physical comfort of others. 
It is essential to Una to ensure physical comfort: “…some 
lovely ladies and gentlemen down there [rest home] – used to 
tuck ’em up in bed – make sure they were all ok”. Any 
suggestion of discomfort equally challenges her.  
Her son and daughter-in-law had recently brought their new 
baby to visit, and Una expressed distaste over their decision 
to put him in a dark green cardigan and her related hope that 
they would not dress him in jeans “you know they are not 
babies for long so you just need them to look like a 
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baby….thought don’t you dare put him in denim jeans…I think 
how uncomfortable is that?”.  
In further examples, Una reflects on the new care situation 
of a previous CareConnect family member “I just wanted to 
bring her back [home] – you know she had her shoes on – she 
didn’t have her slippers on”. Una’s emotional response to 
perceived physical discomfort in others extends similarly to 
animals. When they volunteer to walk stray dogs in Portugal 
on holiday, she avoids going to the kennels to choose a dog 
to walk: “..I won’t go down there – cos they’re not nice – the 
kennels – it’s like concrete floor – and it’s too upsetting”.   
Donati is clear that reciprocity is integral to generating 
relational goods, meaning ‘…an exchange of something, a 
reciprocal action in which something passes from ego to alter 
and vice versa, which generates a reciprocal link of some kind 
between them.’ (Donati, 2011:73). Una’s account provides 
evidence of reciprocity through the giving and receiving of 
physical care. Her concerns emergent of the natural order are 
met as she draws personal contentment from ensuring the 
physical comfort of others. This entails relational reciprocity; 
there are shared concerns, and the benefit is reciprocal: for 
Una, the comfort of knowing that the person is comfortable, 
and for the person, the comfort itself. It is in no way 
autonomous in nature. Una’s benefit and confirmation of her 
‘raison d’etre’ cannot emerge unless the person she is caring 
for is also deriving ‘goods’, consistent with Donati’s ‘Total 
Sharing’ requirement (Figure 11). This does not mean that a 
person cannot deliver care with an autonomous motivation 
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or that the person receiving that care will not achieve benefit. 
It does mean that the benefit achieved will not be relational 
and, as such, will not be attuned and responsive to the 
concerns of both parties.   
8.4.6 Consequences of natural order concerns combined 
with communicative reflexivity 
Una’s concern for physical wellbeing is an advantage when it 
comes to caring. However, Una herself revealed challenges 
emergent of her values and carefully managed context, 
particularly when it comes to her CareConnect family 
members moving on to other provision. Moving on creates 
discontinuity which challenges Una’s preference for 
continuity as someone with a communicative reflexive 
tendency. Although this does not happen often, it is 
something that Una reports as distressing. Her values and 
focus on providing security, comfort and protection for the 
people she looks after results in a barrier to maintaining 
contact after someone has left her care. Una says this is the 
“horriblest bit of this job” and the only downside she 
mentioned. She is concerned that when the person leaves 
her care, they will not be looked after to her standards. Una 
gave several examples of what this meant to her: 
“Its like Walter – he only moved into to a group home in [place 
close by] – we went to see him but there was no carpet in his 
bedroom – it was lino and on his bed there was no underslip 
– you know - it was just plastic mattress with a cotton sheet 
on and the duvet it had a protective plastic sheet on as well 
and I think – ‘that’s not home is it’ – so I didn’t visit him again” 
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“We moved her [Shirley] out to a nursing home in [place] so 
we went out and it was horrible..…all her clothes had 
disappeared and I thought I can’t come again…luckily enough 
she had dementia so she was forgetting who I was, but I said 
to my boss I can’t go and visit her.” 
For Una, the relationship she has with her CareConnect 
family members works well while they are a part of her 
family. She develops a ‘we-relationship’ with each person 
within which she engages in understanding what is important 
to them and what will make them comfortable and happy, 
which satisfies her core concern of caring. No longer being 
able to influence their environment to her standard of care 
makes visiting impossible, and she has to break from the 
relationship. This can create ‘relational evils’; loss and 
helplessness for Una: “that is the hardest part of doing 
this”, and in all likelihood for the person who has moved on, 
with the loss of previously close relationships. Una consoles 
herself with imagining a more positive outcome for Maggie, 
Martin and Harry when she retires: “I’d like to think I’m 
gonna find a nice carer that’s gonna look after them 
properly”, but to date, from the examples, she gave, onward 
care has always been found wanting. Speaking generally of 
long-term care relationships and not specifically about Una, 
Barbara indicated that this situation was unusual: “the 
majority of the time, they will still have that strong 
relationship once they have moved”.   
308 
 
8.4.7 Disadvantages of communicative reflexivity in 
support relationships 
Barbara talked about the differences in CareConnect carers 
as a positive aspect of the programme, enabling a bespoke 
matching process: “we would put...clients with different 
needs with different carers depending on their strengths 
really, and the carer’s strengths”. She shared an account of a 
different CareConnect carer who was an equally positive care 
provider but with a contrasting approach to Una. This carer 
had explicitly requested to support a young person who 
needed help to develop life skills and confidence. Barbara 
describes the relationship: “..he is finding his feet – she is 
encouraging him to find his feet – at the same time... she’s 
letting him do it at his own pace..”  When this young man 
joined the carer and her existing CareConnect family 
member, Barbara says “he was very monosyllabic in his 
responses”, and eight months later he has a job in a charity 
shop and gets the bus there independently. Barbara 
highlights the difference in carers like this: “...some 
carers...almost – mother – but for somebody like him you 
wouldn’t want that – you would want somebody who would 
say – come on you can do this…not making him feel he has to 
do that – but she’s saying brilliant – well done”.  The 
inference drawn here is that this care relationship is 
characterised by meta-reflexivity on the part of the carer, 
relationally reflexive and oriented towards agency for 
change.   
In contrast, we have seen that Una brings Harry into her life 
and worldview. Una’s communicative reflexivity provides an 
309 
 
environment that is consistent, predictable, routine-oriented 
and where care, comfort and wellbeing are prioritised. There 
are benefits to Harry for whom contextual stability (place and 
relationships) is important. Una supports him with his 
reflexive deliberations to help him make decisions that will 
not later disadvantage him, such as decisions about spending 
money online and taking his ball or ‘childish’ toys out in 
public.   
Notwithstanding the benefits, the extent to which Harry is 
supported reflexively may also present a disadvantage, 
particularly to his unique concerns. Harry’s thinking is 
influenced by Una’s, and as such, there is less opportunity for 
taking an independent or contradictory position within this 
relationship. There is a risk here that for Harry, independent 
thinking may be constrained as decisions and thinking are 
shaped within his relationship with Una and her family. His 
decision-making may be limited by the values and reflexive 
conclusions of Una, which on the one hand, keep him safe 
and well, but on the other may limit his choices and pursuit 
of opportunities and possibilities. This also raises Harry’s 
preparedness for a future that does not involve Una and her 
family if the relationship cannot be maintained after he 
leaves, and a similar family environment is not available. The 
emergent effects of a communicative reflexive culture may 
result in a limited opportunity to develop a more 
independent capacity for reflexivity, which would otherwise 




CareConnect’s ethos sets the conditions for relationship-
based working by using existing family and community 
structures. These are naturally occurring, and in using them, 
CareConnect is harnessing a resource that exists within homes 
and communities and has built a model that operates within a 
changing and uncertain social care system. This case study has 
presented several findings, examining the people and care 
relationships through Archer’s and Donati’s theoretical lens: 
• Learning disability and autism diagnoses do not preclude 
reflexive capacity but do have implications for it. 
• The CareConnect model ‘matches’ people to achieve 
effective relationships, and it is not unexpected that a high 
degree of relational reflexivity is evident in the service 
design and practice.    
• CareConnect provides long-term care in stable care 
environments that benefit from contextual continuity and 
accommodate communicative reflexivity such as Una’s.  
• A communicative reflexive family culture can scaffold 
individual reflexivity through care relationships, but it is 
important to be mindful of the limitations this may 
present, as is likely to be necessary where any mode is 
strongly evident.  
• Examination of the natural, practical, and social aspects of 
personhood in the carer or person being supported can 
provide a greater understanding of their core concerns and 
the implications for care relationships. 
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Chapter 9 Discussion 
9.1 Introduction 
The four case studies have demonstrated the application of 
Archer’s and Donati’s social theories. They have shown how 
they can be used together to examine care relationships in 
social interventions and highlight the conditions that enable 
care relationships to have causal effects. They have also 
demonstrated the use of the ORRAC model, devised in the 
early stages of data analysis. The ORRAC model is a tool that 
emphasises: 
• the role of relational reflexivity and  
• individual orientations towards stability or change, 
novelty, or progression, as core elements of the 
reflexive modes proposed by Archer (2003, 2007, 
2012).  
The model provides a visual representation of Archer’s 
modes on these axes, which also mirror two core aspects of 
person-centred support: relationships and the ability to 
‘move forward’ in life. 
In this discussion, it will be shown that care relationships do 
not fall into a category of their own, as distinct from everyday 
human relationships, but rather that care relationships can 
apply the same mechanisms and, in doing so, can utilise this 
valuable resource of social life, under certain conditions. 
Archer and Donati’s theories assist in understanding the 
mechanisms that release relational resources by providing 
theoretical support for understanding these core elements: 
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• The fundamental nature of personhood, how we 
become who we are, our individual and shared 
concerns 
• How our relationships are entwined with our 
personhood 
• How reflexivity and relational reflexivity are 
implicated and 
• How the interplay between circumstances 
(structure/culture) and agency can influence people 
and (therefore) their relationships 
9.2 Part 1: Relationships that generate relational 
goods 
 The first part of the discussion will explain how the 
relationship has causal effects by enabling or constraining a 
person's ability to move forward. This is only one aspect of 
the research but is being dealt with first because it pertains 
to the outcome that person-centred social interventions 
aspire to. Research into social interventions has already 
established that relationships are a core mechanism for 
personal change (Bertotti et al., 2018) and in research and 
practice have been described as a feature of person-centred 
interventions (e.g. Waters and Buchannan, 2017). However, 
previous research does not explain how this happens. The 
tacit acceptance that care relationships are meaningful was 
raised as a concern in chapter 2 (see 2.2). Few who had 
experience delivering and receiving care would disagree, but 
this in itself risks the relationship being shelved as a by-
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product of care or a peripheral 'nice to have' rather than a 
causally relevant component of care.   
9.2.1 Proposing the Relational/Reflexive Mechanism 
(RRM) model  
This research has employed Archer's theory of reflexivity 
with Donati's theory of relational subjects generating 
relational goods to provide conceptual tools to examine four 
empirical case studies. Using these tools, a connection is 
presented between a mechanism emergent of a care 
relationship (Relational Mechanism) and a mechanism for 
individual action (Reflexive Mechanism) 17 . The Relational 
mechanism is introduced as an addition that places a 
'moment' when something happens between the generation 
of Relational Goods and each person's internal processing. 
Williams (2018:26), in a discussion of 'making up 
mechanisms' in Realist research, distinguishes between two 
types of mechanism, those which are ontological (and real) 
and those which are epistemological (representative of what 
is currently understood), proposing that in modelling the 
world through epistemological mechanisms, we aim to get as 
close to the former as possible. Williams' proposal 
characterises the attempt here to establish a mechanism, 
supported by case study data, which represents a causal 
'moment' between the emergent properties of the 
relationship and the person themselves.   
Figure 26 (below), the Relational/Reflexive Mechanism 
Model is introduced in this research to visually represent the 
 




integration of Archer and Donati's theories because the 
analysis and, therefore, the findings rest on these existing 
theoretical propositions, combined.  
From Archer (Archer and Donati, 2015) the idea is that the 
reflexive mechanism is involved in producing action, 
operating through the internal conversation, a conversation 
between 'I' and the internal relations: the 'me' (what I know 
of myself), the 'you' (my ideas about my future self), and the 
'we-relation' (inclusive of others who are important in my 
life)(see 3.16). The internal relations (I-me-we-you) represent 
our reflexive consideration of continually changing 
circumstances as we think around the issue at hand, in the 
light of our concerns and circumstances. In the case study 
analysis and now in this discussion, the 'we-relation' is a 
central focus because it represents our reflexive 
connectedness, the degree of relational reflexivity entailed, 
accepting that this differs for each person and each 
relationship.   
The role of the 'we-relation' is the primary focus of Figure 26 
in its relationship with the other internal relations.  Archer 
(Archer and Donati, 2015) includes an embedded role for the 
'we-relation' in individual reflexivity. The 'we-relationship' is 
also part of Donati's theory, as described in the theory 
chapter, and he introduces relational goods and 
requirements for relationships that generate relational goods 
(RgRG). Donati says that the relationship is ontological, an 
objective and 'real' entity between people. It is helpful to 
conceptualise this as an 'object' that needs to be mutually 
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'held' between people to exist (see also Figure 27), generate 
effects, and continue to do so. 
FIGURE 26: RELATIONAL/REFLEXIVE MECHANISM MODEL 
 
Therefore, we can think of relational goods being emergent 
of a positive connection 'held' between people, which 
generates feelings for both parties that they are 'in it 
together'; that there is a joint purpose that they have a 
shared commitment to (1). This commitment may be 
experienced differently by each party, as it is emergent of 
different persons and their contexts. For example, Luke and 
Maxine's shared purpose, their 'in it together', is Luke's aim 
to move forward with his life. For Luke, this may be primarily 
a social concern, as how people view him is important. For 
Maxine, the primary concern may be performative; to learn 
how to effectively implement the type of support practice 
unique to WellCity. It is in the overlap of these purposes that 
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people find and hold onto a connection through iterations of 
this model.   
The diagram splits (2), and the upwards arrow indicates a 
mirrored model above for the other person in the 
relationship. The relationship that generates relational goods 
(RgRG) meets the criteria described by Donati (Archer and 
Donati, 2015:211-12) (3), further elaborated below. These 
'begin to be met', because it is proposed that this relationship 
happens through iterations of this process. The box labelled 
(4) lists examples of feelings that emerged for the case study 
participants. These feelings are emergent of connected 
concerns; however, this is presented as an adjunct to 
relational goods because these feelings are experienced 
uniquely by each individual, they are not shared, for example, 
the RgRG may generate feelings of acceptance in one person, 
and feelings of competence in the other. Donati (Archer and 
Donati, 2015:205) describes relational goods as 'an intangible 
good into which energy and resources are invested and from 
which energy and resources can be drawn.' Relational goods 
cannot be reduced to feelings, but feelings may contribute to 
the 'energy and resources' that Donati attributes to relational 
goods. The ‘Relational Mechanism’ being proposed (5) is the 
process by which the relational goods connect meaningfully 
with the internal conversation of the person, resulting in 
either reinforcement or a shift in some idea of oneself, for 
example, what I can do, what I think about something (me-
relation), what may be possible (you-relation), or how I relate 
to others (we-relation). The 'energy and resources' offered 
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by this Relational Mechanism may simply strengthen the 'we-
relation' (6) or may accumulate to, at some point, tip into the 
Reflexive Mechanism (7) to lead to action or deliberate 
inaction.    
Despite the ubiquitous use of the term 'relationship' in health 
and care settings, a care relationship with this causal 
potential is not so commonly achieved when considered in 
Donati's terms. A practitioner could make a genuine 
statement that: 'I have good relationships with all of my 
clients/service users', but it does not follow that all, or indeed 
any of these relationships are those which generate 
relational goods 18 . This distinction is an essential one if 
practitioners themselves are going to discern the difference. 
Discerning the difference is essential if we are interested in 
drawing on the value that these relationships can offer. 
Equally, not all interventions utilise relational mechanisms, 
nor may they need to. However, a better understanding of 
how these mechanisms operate and conditions that enable 
them could promote the capacity to deliver relationship-
oriented care in situations where it is currently not prioritised 
but would be beneficial.  
9.2.2 Requirements for relational goods 
The Relational/Reflexive Mechanism model frames the next 
part of this discussion, drawing on the case study analysis and 
evidence. Donati's 'requirements' for relationships that 
 
18 In this research, RgRGs were evident, however, the research was conducted with 
organisations that specifically adopt relational approaches in their models of care. Despite 





generate relational goods structure this section (Archer and 
Donati, 2015:211-213). These were first introduced in 
chapter three (section 3.17) and are utilised in the case 
studies to examine the care relationships' characteristics in 
the light of the requirements. These requirements need 
further consideration for care relationships because there 
are differences between these and naturally occurring 
relationships that generate relational goods. This research 
does not dispute Donati's core features; however, the case 
study analysis has highlighted the potential for 
elaborating these requirements to further specify them for 
care relationships in social interventions. It is acknowledged 
that this model artificially extracts the care relationship from 
its delivery context, and for clarity, at this stage, does not 
incorporate the analysis of its contextual conditions. 
However, the research design used Archer's 
Morphogenetic/Morphostatic approach to situate the care 
relationships in context, and the part of the discussion 
dealing with context is presented in section 9.3.5, p356. 
9.2.3 Requirement 3 and deferring the reciprocity 
problem 
Further explanation and adaptation are provided later in this 
discussion for Donati’s third requirement. Requirement 3 
states that: "conduct [within the relationship] is inspired by 
the rule of reciprocity." This requirement presents a 
challenge because it is right to query whether the 
relationship is operating reciprocally when there is an 
inherent instrumental purpose underpinning the relationship 
within the context of a social intervention. The second 
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requirement partially assists, in that where a relationship is 
'characterised by caring', the service or professional-level 
drivers take a back seat, prioritising and making space for the 
relationship, subordinating the instrumental characteristics 
of the service. However, although this may create facilitative 
structural and cultural conditions in which the relationship 
can operate, it does not address the nature of the people in 
the relationship and how they think about themselves, their 
purpose and the other person in the care relationship, or how 
the actual structural conditions may influence their actions. 
Reciprocity needs to be in play between people: 'reciprocity 
implies that Ego gives to Alter that which Alter needs 
knowing that Alter will do the same for Ego when Ego has 
need of it' (Archer and Donati, 2015:212). It cannot be 
created artificially but is emergent of the relationship itself. 
This reciprocity problem will be addressed later (see 9.3.4) 
because, to do this, further exploration of individual 
reflexivity, relational reflexivity, and agency is needed. 
9.2.4 Requirement 1: A personal and social identity of 
each person 
Donati's first requirement is that each person has a personal 
and social identity that is known to the other; that relational 
goods 'cannot exist between anonymous subjects, because 
the actions of subjects refer to each other's identity as a 
personal and social being.' (Archer and Donati, 2015: 211). In 
each of the case studies, this was the case. These social 
interventions used personal relationships to facilitate their 
work, and each of the participants were known to each other 
as fellow human beings with their own lives and identities. At 
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point (1) in the RRM model, this personal connection is an 
important factor. At this point, it is established that the 
people in the relationship have overlapping concerns, which 
can lead to a shared purpose. It requires that meetings be 
oriented towards relationship-forming, rather than simply 
information gathering. This requirement is what appears to 
be intended by the NHS Personalisation plan's concept of 
'perspective', or a way of 'seeing people' (NHS England, 
2019:online), but their characterisation does not explain the 
relational element. 
If the connecting of concerns is important, then individual 
concerns must also be. Gaining insight into someone's 
interests and motivations enables a level of engagement not 
available to anonymous subjects. The theory chapter 
introduced Archer's account of the development of our 
unique compendia of concerns emergent of our early, 
formative, and ongoing relations with the natural, practical, 
and social orders. These different concerns became 
particularly pertinent in case study 4, where they helped 
present Harry's difficulty in 'dovetailing' or calibrating his 
concerns. Indeed, Harry's example demonstrated that 
Archer's theory enables the development of personhood and 
reflexivity to be considered for those for whom language and 
social communication skills are limited and may unlock the 
potential for further research into reflexivity, relational 
reflexivity, and interdependence in the field of Learning 
Disability. However, this blend of concerns was equally 
evident in other participants, notably Maxine's affinity with 
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wild swimming, Fiona's drive to solve practical challenges, 
and Una's physical and sensory engagement with care. 
For the service users, sharing about one's life is an accepted 
process in seeking support, but this is not so for practitioners 
providing care. However, for those in caring roles, their work 
itself may be expressive of a core concern and value set, a 
vocation, not simply a role. Care-related concerns and values 
were evident in each of the study practitioners yet differed 
between them. For Zoe, it was a social concern about 
everyone being equally deserving of respect and herself 
being a good role model for others, for Una, it was a practical 
and physical/sensory concern of caring for others. For Fiona, 
it was a practical concern of using her own experience to help 
others and a spiritual one of making some sense of what had 
happened in her own life. For Maxine it was a social concern 
for equality ('everyone needs a bit of help sometimes') and a 
practical concern of helping people move forward. These 
concerns and values may be taken for granted in those who 
operate in caring roles, but they become a crucial part of a 
person's revealed personal and social identity when applying 
Donati's requirement.  
Although beyond the scope of this research, it is noted that 
Donati’s requirement of a ‘personal and social identity’ does 
not overtly include (or exclude) those for whom identity is 
somewhat obscured to others due to developmental or 
acquired language, cognitive or communication difficulties. It 
is an unwarranted assumption that a person does not have a 
personal and social identity simply because others are not 
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able to easily discern it. Archer (2000:138) briefly alludes to a 
continuous sense of self that is anchored non-verbally, 
describing eidetic (visual recall) and procedural memory 
‘which prevent the title of humanity being withdrawn from 
those who never attain speech or who lose it (the autistic and 
aphasic)’. It is in these cases where the care relationship and 
interdependence are most exposed. Davy (2019:109), 
describing her relationship with her sister, illuminates that 
‘knowing’ a person involves ‘concrete, embodied, and 
affective dimensions of communication and connection’. 
Davy’s insights affirm the idea that relational goods can 
emerge from a connection that is beyond verbal language 
and conversation, internal or otherwise.  
9.2.4.1 Navigating professional boundaries 
This first requirement is resonant with one of Carl Rogers’ 
(1961,2004) core conditions for person-centred therapy: 
congruence, which is that the practitioner can show 
genuineness as a person, unobscured by a professional 
façade, and able to draw on their personal experiences to 
facilitate the relationship. This approach may seem dissonant 
with maintaining professional distance; however, the extent 
to which this happened with practitioners in the case studies 
was enough to reveal and share a personal and social 
identity, but not so much that the practitioner’s own life 
became the focus. Luke (case study 1) gives an example of 
this which shows that he values this aspect of the 
relationship, noting that these are ‘little insights’ and 
valuable as a point of commonality between himself and 
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Maxine: “…she gives me little insights into her private life 
..Max might say that her 10-year-old is keen on cricket...I used 
to play cricket, so ... I know a little bit about it – so we have a 
chat about that.” Even where there was significant 
commonality in terms of ‘lived experience’, as we saw in 
Fiona’s case (case study 2), Fiona was clear that although her 
experiences enabled relationship building, that she was 
cautious not to make it about herself, and that there were 
times when she deliberately avoided doing so: “….I will 
share...that I run a PHB (Personal Health Budget) – if...it is 
appropriate – it’s about [whether] what you are sharing is 
beneficial to them - it’s not for your purpose it’s for their 
purpose.” 
In the organisations studied, this risk to professional 
boundaries was managed through pre-set structural and 
cultural boundaries in each person’s understanding of their 
role and the relationship. In WellCity and GamePlay, leaders 
and practitioners talked about active management of 
relational boundaries as an ongoing part of their work. The 
nature of the relationship makes it necessary to redraw and 
maintain the boundaries: “when you start working with a 
young person, those boundaries are made clear from the 
beginning … they start to forget the boundaries a little bit if 
you start having a laugh with them so sometimes you just 
have to reinforce it” (Zoe, GamePlay). In WellCity, the 
boundaries for the relationship are in written form to ensure 
that the expectations of each person are clear at the 
outset. This is arguably no different to other types of 
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relationships in having inherent social rules and expectations 
(e.g., marriage/ team working), some of which are spoken 
and some unspoken. It seems that setting out expectations 
and reiterating roles enables a shared understanding which 
is protective of the relationship, and its purpose, at the 
outset.  
This does not preclude professionalism, but it does, as Rogers 
described, require practitioners to drop the ‘professional 
façade’, in situations where the care relationship is predicted 
to be a significant causal mechanism in supporting personal 
change.  
In acknowledging the relationship as a causal component 
rather than a by-product of care, organisations can formally 
address the management of the challenges it introduces and 
how individuals participate in the relationship. For instance, 
most organisations in this study used a supervisory and 
reflective practice model, where practitioners can share and 
resolve, with colleagues, issues that arise within the 
relationship. If the causal effects of care relationships are 
taken for granted, there is less reason and opportunity to 
focus these supportive discussions on key aspects of the care 
relationship. 
9.2.5 Requirement 2: A non-instrumental motivation. 
The second requirement is ‘a non-instrumental motivation of 
each subject in his/her involvement with the other’ (Archer 
and Donati, 2015: 212), meaning that these relationships are 
‘characterised by caring’. As described in the policy and 
practice chapter, health and social care structures are 
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imbued with instrumentality, focusing on activity and 
performance, and in doing so, side-lining relationships. This 
is arguably more evident in the state sector than in the 
voluntary sector, but each of the service leads still provided 
examples of defending against these types of pressures 
arising from their interactions with funders and system 
managers. For example, Peta from AllCare described 
negotiating flexibility in the timescale for implementing 
Personal Health Budgets because, for a small proportion of 
their customers, the process took longer. This negotiation 
made space for these care relationships to be unaffected by 
a rigid timescale. Lorraine from WellCity took up the 
ideological battle, challenging the local system's values, and 
making organisational values a priority, even if this meant not 
bidding for business where it was evident these values were 
not shared. Ian from GamePlay expressed disquiet about a 
new contract which would see GamePlay working in 
partnership with another organisation, his concern being 
that the nature of the contract may undermine the 
effectiveness of their relationship-based model. Barbara in 
CareConnect described the actions she needed to take locally 
to protect the integrity of their model, negotiating increased 
respite care for CareConnect Carers and fighting for 
CareConnect recipients' access to Day services. These actions 
show that system instrumentality can be subverted where 
there is a cultural will to do something differently, and some 
structural room for manoeuvre. 
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Each of the system contexts within which these leaders were 
operating were different from each other, and again, it was 
relationships that sustained them. Peta from AllCare 
described a longstanding relationship with local 
commissioners, which enabled mutual understanding of 
roles and shared values and purpose: "We've discussed how 
we would approach targets...and it did feel very equal…that's 
not how I think it works everywhere".  At the level of the care 
relationship itself, service model flexibility enables the 
relationship to be central and therefore 'characterised by 
caring'. Luke described the challenge and frustration he 
experienced when faced with practitioners who prioritised 
the system rules and equally appreciated times when 
practitioners broke those rules to prioritise the relationship; 
in this case, when a practitioner met him in a café, against 
the rules. "She said: ‘well, I'll probably lose my job but never 
mind …I won't squeal on myself if you don't’…".   
Donati (Archer and Donati, 2015: 217) affirms that 'how' 
rather than 'where' Relational Goods are produced is 
important, acknowledging that it is more difficult in state or 
market contexts, but not impossible. If actors in those 
environments can meet the requirements, then relational 
goods can be generated. The findings from this research 
suggest that, to enable RgRGs in care relationships within a 
commissioned and specified service, the conditions 
(principles, roles, rules, processes) surrounding the 
relationship are both acknowledged as important and overtly 
managed to ensure that instrumental motivations do not 
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undermine the integrity of the relationship. This recalls 
Unwin's dichotomy of the relational and rational lexicons 
discussed in the Policy chapter (2.7, p31-33), the tension 
between them, and the need to acknowledge and manage 
this. If instrumentality dominates, the conditions for the 
relationship are only possible if (as in Luke's example) the 
practitioner operates outside of the rules, choosing to 
prioritise the relationship. 
9.2.6 Requirement 4: Total sharing of relational goods. 
Total sharing refers to the sharing of the 'relational good'; 
that it needs to be produced and enjoyed together as part of 
the relationship and cannot be produced alone, reinforcing 
the image of the RgRG being a positive connection 'held' 
between persons, each with a known identity and who have 
interests and purpose that intersect or overlap. The outcome 
of this shared concern is that both parties also share in the 
relational goods that emerge, and which (as proposed in 
Figure 26) feedback into each person's sense of self and 
internal conversation through the Relational Mechanism. 
This underlines the overall conclusion that RgRG can be 
described as ontological (in it together) connections, where 





19   When describing the relational aspect of personal action Archer (2016: 11.00-13.00 minutes) 
highlights the importance of "a warmth that links us in togetherness in the fate of at least someone or 




FIGURE 27: THE GENERATION OF RELATIONAL GOODS 
 
To illustrate this concept of 'total sharing', Fiona recounts a 
relationship she formed with the parents of a young man who 
had been informed that his long-term residential home was 
due to close in 4 weeks, with no local alternative available. 
Her role was to support them in applying for and setting up a 
Personal Health Budget and managing his care themselves. 
From Fiona's account of her own personal history and 
reflexivity, we know that her 'lived experience' and making 
sense of her own experiences have shaped her personal 
concerns (6.2.5, p206). This family was not included in the 
data collection, but Fiona described her understanding of 
their immediate concerns, ensuring their son's long-term 
wellbeing and that he was geographically close to home, also 
describing them as "both very intelligent – very capable of 
challenging things.". Analysis of Fiona's reflexivity (see 6.2.4) 
showed that (autonomously) 'getting things done' and 
'getting things right' are important to her and that she is 
adept at engaging with other people's perspectives, also 
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showing meta-reflexive tendencies. Her own concerns are 
linked to her competence, which is important to her identity. 
Her concerns for this family were expressed by empathising 
with their difficult position and seeing a potentially effective 
solution. They were 'in it together'; neither party could have 
(easily) resolved this situation independently of the 
other.  The relational goods held between them generated 
feelings of trust and reassurance for the parents ("I think they 
did get that trust and understanding."), and for Fiona, 
feelings of competence in supporting them ("it's taken that 
initial huge strain and worry off of them") and 
vindication ("they can see that what I was saying - that I was 
right"). 
This research proposes that this positive connection can 
generate an effect or a change in the people in the 
relationship through the Relational Mechanism; that the 
relational goods and their effects are shared, as Donati 
proposes in this requirement. This includes the practitioner, 
even though the putative subject of change is the service 
user. The Relational Mechanism cannot be seen, but it can be 
illustrated in this example by two empirically available 
'moments'. The first is for Fiona when she describes the 
realisation of how that situation would feel for these parents, 
having planned that their adult son would be looked after, 
and the sudden withdrawal of that assurance: "by talking to 
them and listening to them – I really began to understand –
because as a parent of anyone with a high-level support 
needs you are always aware of what's going to happen as I 
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get older … they had done all of that – they had done 
everything right.".  As described in chapter 6, Fiona's lived 
experience facilitates this level of insight, alongside her 
capacity for relational reflexivity.  For the parents, the 
process of working with Fiona created a shift (observed by 
Fiona) in their thinking: "you [I] really felt that they were 
acknowledging and feeling that this was the best solution 
– rather than feeling that that solution was being foisted on 
them.". In both examples, there is a discernible moment: a 
shift in thinking. For Fiona, the realisation of the parents' 
frustration, enabling an empathy that would sustain the 
relationship, and for the parents, acceptance of their 
situation and the potential of a workable solution.   
Just as it is important not to conflate relational goods with 
feelings, so it is important not to conflate them with practical 
outcomes. Practical outcomes are temporally distal from the 
relationship; however, the relationship can scaffold reflexive 
capacity and support new ways of thinking, which can lead to 
decisions and actions, which then lead to outcomes. The 
relational goods, through the Relational Mechanism, create 
change in the internal relations of the internal conversation, 
which may (or may not) lead to a change in reflexively-driven 
action, and may (or may not) strengthen the 'we-
relationship'. Fiona, in this example, described the outcome 
of the application for funds and the subsequent configuration 
of the budget as very positive, for herself, the parents, and 
their son: "the personal satisfaction of feeling – yeah this 
makes a difference – not just to the parents but also the 
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young man cos also I think…. he's got a better quality of life 
than he had in the residential…" and "if you are feeling yes 
I've got a good result – they are feeling you have got a good 
result for them – that increases the bond in the relationship". 
9.2.7: Requirement 5: Relationships that elaborate over 
time. 
The fifth requirement is that the RgRG requires elaboration 
over time, meaning that RGs cannot be products of a brief 
encounter or a series of impersonal interactions, but involve 
a development process. The RRM model represents this 
development process (Figure 26), a building of relational 
connection through continual iterations and revisions of the 
'we-relationship'.  
Each of the practitioners was asked to share an example of 
where their care relationship was not working well, and the 
following example from Zoe in GamePlay shows how the 
temporal process of 'growing' the RgRG might begin, even in 
a relationship that, due to other circumstances, has only a 
tiny chance of fully evolving. Zoe talked about recently 
achieving a small 'breakthrough' with a boy with whom she 




FIGURE 28: WATER FIGHT AT THE COMMUNITY EVENT 
 
This example depicts a highly tenuous relationship that, due 
to so many factors outside of Zoe's control, has only a small 
chance of becoming an RgRG at any point. In that example, 
Zoe entered into the water fight, joining him in something 
that was important to him. In doing this, she gave him 
attention, showed that she understood and cared, and it was 
an activity in which they could take an equal part and enjoy 
together. He may have experienced short-term feelings of 
acceptance, and belonging, and playfulness.  
Zoe's assessment that it was a 'breakthrough', that he would 
think she is 'cool' because of the water fight, indicates that 
she anticipates a shift in their relationship next time she sees 
him; the Relational Mechanism (Figure 26, 9.2.1) connecting 
with the boy's internal conversation and creating an 
increased (however tenuous) potential for their future 
relationship. This example illustrates the iterative nature of 
the developing relationship, agreeing with Donati's 
requirement that RgRGs develop over time. Zoe suggests that 
the boy changed an action based on this momentary 
relational connection with her. He changed his behaviour 
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from 'squirting everybody' to listening to Zoe and just 
including those who wanted to play, influencing his Reflexive 
Mechanism (7). This example shows a challenging and long 
road to an RgRG if it ever happens, but the model can help us 
understand how this process may happen and the potential 
value of relational connection for reflexive and behaviour 
change. An analogy shared by Dalkin et al. (2015:online) is 
useful here; that activation of a mechanism 'operates along 
a continuum similar to the light created by a 'dimmer switch', 
where intensity varies in line with an ever evolving 
context'.  The elaboration of the care relationship will 
undergo such changes in intensity; as the relationship 
develops, the intensity may grow (or fade), as also described 
by Zoe in her description of the gradual building of her 
relationship with Carly (7.4.1). Fiona concurs that a care 
relationship 'evolves', strengthening over time: "I would say 
it is an evolving relationship – as first of all it does start with 
you presenting the practicalities…and then as you get to 
discuss something with someone on a deeper level - you break 
down some of their barriers more – you do – you get to see 
more of the real person and their fears and anxieties." 
These relationships, by their very nature, are temporary. 
They are not usually life-long bonds; they are (relatively) 
short-term and purpose-oriented. Lorraine, Service Lead 
from WellCity, articulates this when she says that: "what I 
want is for the (care) relationship to naturally fade because 
that person is linking into meaningful relationships in their 
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own life – reconnecting or establishing new ones".  What is 
critical here is Lorraine's term 'naturally fade'.  
The relationship that generates relational goods operates 
within a timescale that cannot be externally determined but 
instead judged within the relationship by the people sharing 
the purpose that has inspired the relationship in the first 
place. Key learning from this is that RgRGs have a pace that 
cannot be externally mandated. In order for this to be the 
case, requirement 2, ‘a non-instrumental motivation’, must 
also be met, as prioritising service timescales over nurturing 
the relationship can create conditions which damage the 
potential of the relationship, as candidly concluded by 
Luke: "Now there's a certain type of person who will say … 
your times up … you've had this six sessions – it's a wrap - 
that's the sort of person I think – oh - what a waste of rations 
– where I just think – for fuck’s sake why don't you just go off 
and save all your time".   
9.2.8 Requirement 6: A reflexivity that operates 
relationally. 
The sixth requirement is that the reflexivity involved is: 'a 
reflexivity that operates relationally, thus, not reflexivity of an 
autonomous type or one that is blocked or fractured'. Donati 
excludes in his description of this requirement those with 
fractured reflexivity. However, in this study's care 
interventions, at least three out of the four service users 
presented with fractured tendencies20 and yet were engaged 
 
20 Note that when Fiona and Fran first met, their relationship formed at a difficult time for 
Fran when her anxiety levels were high – which may have led to fractured reflexive 
tendencies at that time. At the point of data collection, however, Fran demonstrated an 
active and autonomous mode. 
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in RgRGs within the care intervention. This discrepancy will 
be addressed in the next section, alongside the discussion 
about reciprocity. 
Firstly though, there were examples from the case studies 
that supported this requirement, where there was a 'block' 
that either prevented or inhibited a care relationship's 
development. Fiona from AllCare described a customer who 
had an adult daughter with a disability and complex health 
needs, with similar care needs to Fiona's own daughter. The 
customer varied in her level of engagement with Fiona over 
time, and Fiona's frustration about not being able to move 
forwards with this customer was evident: 
FIGURE 29: CHALLENGING TO ENGAGE, EXAMPLE 1 
 
In this example, the customer was not interviewed, and her 
reflexive tendencies are unknown, however, it is clear that 
she is inconsistently connecting with Fiona for support. She 
may tend towards self-sufficiency or may at times feel 
overwhelmed. In this case, Fiona’s lived experience may form 
a barrier to progress, as the customer knows that Fiona 
manages a PHB and PAs for her own daughter. This unspoken 





feelings of stress or inadequacy and affecting the self-
concept (me-relation) of the customer to the extent that her 
engagement is variable, consistent with the analogy of the 
dimmer switch above. 
The second example is from Maxine in WellCity, who 
described a visit to a man with a terminal illness who was 
concerned about how his wife would manage once he passed 
away, as she was reliant on him: 
FIGURE 30:  CHALLENGING TO ENGAGE, EXAMPLE 2 
 
In these examples, although at (1) in the RRM model, there 
was a potential for shared concerns, neither care recipient 
showed an openness, or orientation to the relationship, each 
for their own reasons, at that time. In Fiona's example, there 
were fluctuations in the customer's level of engagement, as 
if she were wavering between being open to the support of 
the relationship, sometimes completing a 'circuit' of the RRM 
model, and other times when she drew away. In Maxine's 
example, the gentleman appeared to her to be blocking a 
relational approach, either with her, or with others in his 
community, meaning that the relationships did not get past 
(1) in the RRM model. These accounts only give the 
practitioner perspective, and there may have been other 
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factors which contributed towards this lack of engagement 
from the care recipient’s position. They do suggest however 
that both parties need to be oriented to the relationship and 
its potential for value. These examples support Donati’s 
requirement that RgRG are not possible where reflexivity is 
blocked or fractured. However, Section 9.3.4 (p351) will 
further explore this conclusion, as conversely, we have seen 
in the case studies that despite the presence of fractured 
reflexive patterns, care relationships can generate relational 
goods, through a practitioner and service orientation to 
relational reflexivity. 
9.3 Part 2: Reflexive modes and individual reflexivity. 
The first part of the discussion sought to establish the model 
upon which the rest of this study is premised, showing the 
way that Archer and Donati's theories can be brought 
together in the RRM model which represents the causal 
potential within care relationships, given the right conditions. 
The introduction of the Relational Mechanism, and its 
explanation within the model, makes the connection 
between the generation of relational goods and their 
potential effect on individual reflexivity. 
The second part of the discussion will focus on the nature of 
individual reflexivity. Whilst individual reflexivity cannot be 
extricated from the ‘we-relationships’ which it incorporates, 
the reflexive tendencies of each participant are proposed to 
be relevant to the way that care relationships operate and 
this relevance will now be considered. From the planning 
stages of this research there has been an assumption that the 
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nature of both people has implications for the way that the 
care relationship operates in the context of their life and 
work circumstances; that each person is a ‘reflexive-person-
in-context’. This approach emphasizes the view that 
‘practitioners’ and ‘roles’ are not synonymous, and that ‘who 
someone is’ and the way that they think and operate has 
implications for the way they inhabit, interpret and 
participate in care relationships.  
9.3.1 The ORRAC Model 
A tool devised in the process of this research is the ORRAC 
model (introduced in 4.9.4). This model was inspired by 
Archer’s work on modes of reflexivity; the identification of 
biographically shaped reflexive tendencies which in turn have 
implications for how we live our lives, or as Archer’s (2007) 
book title says: ‘make our way through the world’. Two core 
features of Archer’s theory are incorporated: the role of 
relational reflexivity (Orientation to Relational Reflexivity) 
and the idea that we seek and produce change (or reproduce 
stasis) in our circumstances or maintain our existing 
circumstances (Orientation towards Agency for Change). 
These two features were identified because they are highly 
relevant to person-centred working and to the social 
interventions involved in this study. The process of data 
analysis inspired the idea that the extent to which 
participants tended to engage in relational reflexivity was 
variable (vertical axis), and in each person, could change 
through experience or external influences over time. Also 
variable between people was the extent to which they 
expressed agency for change in their lives or conversely 
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stasis, as represented by the horizontal axis of the model. In 
using these core elements as axes on the model, it has been 
possible to: 
• Visually represent the shifts in reflexive patterns during 
the life course, as demonstrated particularly for Maxine 
and Luke in case study 1.   
• Provide a comparative view of the reflexive tendencies 
of the practitioner and service user, enabling 
consideration of comparative reflexive patterns in care 
relationships. 
• Comment on and discern the reflexive patterns evident 
in organisations and their contexts, through service lead 
and practitioner interviews. 
9.3.2 Reflexive patterning: resisting ‘ideal types’ 
A key learning from working with modes of reflexivity is to 
resist any assumption that people slot into ideal types. One 
of the strengths of an understanding of reflexive modes, is 
that they are context sensitive and responsive. As such they 
should not be used to compartmentalise people or to 
clumsily predict responses. Archer shows us that reflexive 
tendencies are biographically tethered, and herself uses term 
‘ideal types’ to descriptively demonstrate the distinctions 
between modes, both biographically and behaviourally. 
However, she also says that we can each move through 
different modes on a single day in response to circumstances 
(Archer, 2017b). Introducing the term ‘reflexive patterning’ 
here rather than reflexive modes may prevent a tendency to 
allocate people to a mode-for-life and instead be sensitive to 
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the idea that the nature of the person, experiences, 
relationships and other contextual conditions can influence 
reflexive patterns over time. This does not exclude ‘ideal 
types’, as we saw with Una in case study 4, it is possible to 
operate primarily within a single mode, however it requires 
that we do not assume them, and that we recognise that 
changes in context may change reflexive patterns.  
Although the reflexive modes cannot be used as a blunt tool 
for identifying how people operate in care relationships, by 
using the ORRAC model to examine care relationships, we 
can begin to draw some insights from the reflexive patterns 
evident in this set of case study care relationships, and the 
relevance for personalisation policy. 
9.3.3 ORRAC model: Reflexive patterns in care 
relationships 
Personalisation policy and practice often uses the term 
empowerment (Donnelly, 2019, Nunkoosing and Hayden-
Laurelut, 2015, Dodd, 2013) which draws on the idea of a 
power differential between the practitioner and the service 
user, prompting an aim of equalising power, enabling the 
service user to gain more choice and control. It evokes a 
‘handing over’ of power and emphasises personal agency, in 
doing so, omitting a role for interdependence. It overlooks 
the value of relational reflexivity and the contribution of 
relationships that generate relational goods that can support 
individual development or personal change. In doing this it 
valorises autonomous reflexivity (quadrant 3); a sense of 
purpose-achieving self-sufficiency. This research takes a 
broader view, by allowing for reflexivity that incorporates 
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relationships, considering instead that each person is a 
reflexive person in context, panning out from Q3 to take 
account of the four quadrants of the ORRAC model.   
Figure 31 below summarises these differing orientations 
towards relationships, followed by an explanation of each of 
the quadrants and their implications for relationship with 
people representing other quadrants. Each statement begins 
with ‘when...’ to acknowledge that these are not fixed ways 
of being in relationship and in different circumstances people 
may operate in any of these ways. As described above, 
reflexivity is most accurately represented as a (potentially 
shifting) patterning of thought and action, and not a category 
of person or behaviour. A tendency towards a particular 
reflexive mode, however, can be identified where patterns of 




FIGURE 31: APPROACH TO RELATIONSHIPS IN EACH QUADRANT 
 
9.3.3.1 Quadrant 1: Communicative Reflexivity in care 
relationships  
In Case Study 4, we saw that Una’s communicative tendency 
(Q1) is family oriented. She draws Harry into her group, 
including him in the family and the support and protection 
that this offers. There is a family way of doing things and 
decisions are made by consensus. Harry is accepted as a 
group member, including being ‘honorary uncle’ to Una’s 
new grandson. Being included within this group has many 
benefits for Harry, however as described in the case study, 
there is a risk that Harry’s opportunities to fully develop and 
test his independence may be limited; an opportunity that 
may be more likely to emerge from a Q2 oriented care 
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relationship. Although this may seem potentially detrimental 
to Harry, this care environment is his family home, and he 
also participates in activities and therefore relationships in 
the community (eg car workshop) which may influence his 
reflexive capacity differently. Barbara’s account of retaining 
the right for CareConnect residents to have funded access to 
Day Centres in addition to the funding for CareConnect, is 
vindicated by this insight. Building diverse relationships 
within local communities provides further opportunity for 
the development of reflexive capacity. 
Within GamePlay’s offer, Zoe provides opportunities for 
Carly to experience decision-making and take responsibility. 
GamePlay’s culture and structures are designed to create the 
conditions for these opportunities. Carly can participate in 
activities, attend training, and volunteer her time to support 
others. Zoe and other coaches also provide, unique to 
GamePlay in this study, role models. Although Carly presents 
with an ‘expressive’ fractured patten of reflexivity, she also 
shows communicative patterns, and those with 
communicative tendencies reproduce that which they value 
in their context. Carly has close relationships with family 
members, but her background does not provide the 
contextual continuity needed to offer a framework for its 
reproduction in her own life. She says that her mum, dad, and 
nan are proud of what she is doing because she is the only 
one to be ‘doing something’ with her life. This statement 
shows that Carly’s journey is pioneering, but her close family 
lacks the blueprint available to others operating in a 
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communicative reflexive mode. At this point in her young life, 
Carly’s reflexive capacity is underdeveloped. She shows no 
capacity for the self-sufficiency typical of an autonomous 
reflexive pattern (for example, her inability to stick at a job or 
prepare for a maths test or interview) or the maturity 
required for meta-reflexivity. GamePlay provides her with 
role models and stepping stones that offer consistent 
direction. Carly’s emergent reflexivity, in communicative 
modality, can look to reproducing in her own life; what she 
sees has been possible for others. Archer’s model of internal 
relations of the internal conversation comes into play here 
(the ‘I’ talking to the ’me’, ‘you’ and ‘we-relation’). Through 
the care relationship (we-relation) and role modelling (you-
relation), Zoe and Gameplay provide Carly with an 
infrastructure for moving forwards, relational and 
aspirational. This journey is not a solitary one, because the 
relationships generated through the model cushion her, 
absorbing her mistakes, and resetting direction if she 
becomes derailed. 
9.3.3.2 Quadrant 2: Meta-reflexivity in care relationships 
Similarly to those operating in Q1, those operating in Q2 are 
oriented towards relational reflexivity and open to engaging 
with the personhood-in-context of others. However, in 
contrast with Q1, Q2’s meta-reflexive characteristics entail 
self-awareness and critique. Archer’s definition of meta-
reflexivity is described as a critical evaluation of oneself and 
one’s own internal dialogue. This ‘meta’ awareness of the self 
also enables a view of the ‘other’ person as unique and 
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separate, in both personhood and context. In this meta-
awareness, space is created (between self and other) to 
acknowledge each person’s own sense of self, their unique 
concerns and reflexive potential, accepting and expecting 
that their position and desires may differ from one’s own. 
This was seen in Zoe’s discussion about volunteering with 
young people in Case Study 3 (see 7.2.7). In her work, she 
acknowledges what is important to them at their stage of life: 
“I think it’s easy to forget how small the world seemed when 
you were that age - and like friendship dramas and stuff…I 
think when you have  that understanding about the issues 
that they are facing – then I think you are on a much 
better…[path]”. Maxine makes this distinction by talking 
about ‘empathy not sympathy’, seeing the people they 
support as individuals with their own set of choices: “it is 
about what somebody can be, as independent as possible in 
making decisions and choosing daily life”.  
The NHS personalisation plan (NHS Long Term Plan, 2019: 
online) proposes the importance of ‘perspective’; a way of 
‘seeing people’ that will lead to ‘different conversations’ and 
‘new relationships’. Quadrant 2, representing meta-reflexive 
patterns of thinking, underpins this description theoretically, 
and helps to resolve the theoretical gap identified in chapter 
2 (see 2.14). Meta-reflexive patterns of thinking are enabling 
of care relationships that can lead to personal change. When 
the personalisation strategy proposes a new ‘perspective’, it 
is promoting a greater orientation towards meta-reflexivity. 
However, we also know, from Archer’s own work and further 
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evidenced in this research, that meta-reflexive thinking is not 
operated by a switch, it is embedded in the biographically 
shaped personhood of the person providing care, in the 
shifting context of their own lives and the context which the 
care is provided. The work of shaping and sustaining meta-
reflexive-friendly work cultures and structures must also be 
in scope.  
9.3.3.2.1 Social vs clinical understandings of (meta-) reflexivity  
In clinical interventions, counsellors and psychotherapists 
use the term ‘reflexivity’ to specify a clinical stance which is 
aligned with meta-reflexivity.  Etherington (2016:1), quoting 
her own work (Etherington, 2004:19) says: ‘Reflexivity is…an 
ability to notice our responses to the world around us, other 
people and events, and to use that knowledge to inform our 
actions, communications and understandings.’ In these 
clinical terms, reflexivity (or meta-reflexivity) is deliberately 
honed expertise in applying self-awareness within clinical 
practice and is therefore not widely practiced. This 
observation is included here as it emphasises both the 
synergy with clinical practice and a distinction that is 
important in this work. Meta-reflexivity, in Archer’s terms is 
not a honed skill for clinical practice but is instead a 
ubiquitous pattern of individual reflexivity. It may be the 
case, however, that the development of this clinical expertise 
may be predicated on a capacity for meta-reflexivity in 
Archer’s terms. Lorraine in case study 1 emphasises this 
distinction by rejecting counselling training for the team. The 
role for WellCity practitioners is clearly delineated from this 
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clinical purpose and is instead a social and practical effort to 
re-orient people within their own reflexive capacity, rather 
than to provide specialist psychological support. 
9.3.3.3 Quadrant 3: Autonomous reflexivity in care 
relationships.  
Where autonomous reflexivity is operating in relationships, 
the internal conversation is more self- than relationally-
oriented, prioritising individual goals, self-sufficient and self-
directed action. In care relationships, this can translate into 
taking the lead and a sense of knowing what is best. Luke 
commented that early on, Maxine had “tried a few things” 
with him, which “in retrospect were a bit early…she wanted 
me to get healthier and get swimming and do this and do 
that.”. Luke’s comment suggests that these ideas were led by 
Maxine, based on her own interests. Similarly, Fran talked 
about a Direct Payments advisor from another organisation 
visiting to provide information, a visit that resulted in her 
being ‘none the wiser’. This visit appeared to be one of 
autonomous purpose, as the person did not engage 
effectively with Fran about what she already knew about 
Direct Payments or needed to understand.   
Autonomous ways of thinking and operating can create 
relational evils where system structures impose rules on 
relationships. Harry gave an example of a ‘lost’ relationship 
that left him feeling abandoned: “I did have a social worker 
come and help me with my feelings…and then he suddenly 
took me to a workshop knowing I liked cars – and then 
suddenly… didn’t actually see the male social worker again … 
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basically helped me with my feelings....of aggression and 
then took me to workshop and then just vanished”.  The 
detail of this situation is unknown, but Harry’s response 
suggests that this was a valued care relationship that had 
helped him. It may be that the system rules led the social 
worker to other priorities or that once Harry started at the 
car workshop, that the sessions were to end. However, 
Harry’s confusion suggests that the practitioner reflexivity in 
this situation was autonomous, and that the relationship was 
not valued sufficiently to warrant explaining (effectively) to 
Harry why it was ending. 
We have also seen Luke and Fran utilise their autonomous 
reflexivity within relationships to positive effect, to achieve 
autonomous goals for Luke in his past work context and 
engage the GP receptionist to allocate him a nominated GP. 
A similar example was provided by Fran, who utilised her 
experience and insight from her nursing days to manage the 
responses of her visiting carers to achieve the least-worst 
outcome. It is internally developed self-sufficiency emergent 
of natal context and subsequent experiences which drive this 
autonomous tendency. Fran, who manages her own care 
through a personal health budget, epitomises this 
independence in the context of challenging circumstances. 
These examples demonstrate autonomous patterns of 
reflexivity in the relationships of both practitioners and 
service users. Self-sufficiency and goal-orientation are 
important capacities and are invaluable in some aspects of 
care (e.g., emergency surgery) or where there are decisions 
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to be made within stringent time and resource constraints 
(e.g., an interim placement to ensure a person’s immediate 
safety and wellbeing), yet can have implications when not 
mindfully applied in care relationships. Grönroos’ (2011) 
assertion, discussed in the policy chapter, is relevant here, 
that outcomes are at the locus of the service user. This advice 
re-orients care goals to the person on the receiving end of 
care and simultaneously requires the practitioner to employ 
relational reflexivity to tune in to the unique interests-in-
context of the person they are supporting. 
9.3.3.4 Quadrant 4: Fractured reflexivity in care 
relationships 
Fractured reflexivity is a position of limited agency, through 
self (limited internal resources/ agency), through 
circumstance, through relationships (limited access to 
practical/supportive relationships), or any combination of 
these. Limited agency means that the options for those 
experiencing fractured reflexivity are to gain traction through 
their own means (autonomously), or to do so through 
relationships. Maxine had experienced a difficult period of 
life in her late teens and early twenties, and her account 
showed that without formal support, she had gained traction 
autonomously, even though she may have benefited from 
support had it been available. For those showing fractured 
patterns in this study, each one was growing or re-




9.3.4 Meta-reflexivity and the reciprocity problem. 
Donati’s requirements propose that relationships that 
generate relational goods cannot be generated where there 
is fractured reflexivity; however, in this research, RgRGs were 
observed within care relationships involving fractured 
patterns of reflexivity. Donati also sets out in requirement 
three, the ‘rule of reciprocity’ for RgRGs, and which in the 
first part of the discussion, I committed to address. This 
section proposes that intervention culture and structure can 
create conditions for the generation of RgRG and, due to the 
people in the relationship, enable a form of reciprocity; one 
that is based on an altruistic purpose. The structures are 
emergent of a culture that is meta-reflexive. 
The above has introduced the idea that orientation towards 
the agency of others is a key concept in understanding the 
role of individual reflexivity in care relationships. The 
prevalence of meta-reflexivity in the social interventions 
studied indicates a high orientation to relational reflexivity, 
not just in close social groups, but extending to those whose 
lives they either can only imagine or can identify with more 
closely through their own lived experience. This openness to 
engaging with the concerns, circumstances, and reflexivity of 
others is what characterises meta-reflexivity, involving an 
acknowledgment of the personhood, experience, and 
capacity or potential for the reflexivity of others, to forge 
relationships that generate relational goods that have the 
potential to foster personal change. In applying the ORRAC 
model to the case study analysis, the data showed evidence 
for a continuum of relational reflexivity, that involved 
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different meta-reflexive responses to circumstances and 
differences in relational reflexivity, agency, and purpose. 
Figure 32 identifies three levels of relational reflexivity.  
FIGURE 32: ORRAC MODEL: LEVELS OF RELATIONAL REFLEXIVITY 
 
9.3.4.1 Relational reflexivity for Autonomous purpose 
Relational reflexivity for autonomous purpose is the 
application of relational reflexivity to discern what is 
important to others or what others might be thinking in order 
to achieve a personal or instrumental objective. Many care 
relationships or interactions will involve this level of 
relational reflexivity, which may involve a positive convivial 
connection but is not an RgRG because there is no ‘we-
relationship’ established, no shared concerns or purpose. It 
is represented in the centre of the ORRAC model as it is 
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assumed to be common to all modes of reflexivity, not 
peculiar to any one mode. This was evident in Luke’s 
relationship with the receptionist in his quest to be allocated 
a named GP, and seen with Fran, who utilised her experience 
and insight from her nursing days to manage the responses 
of her visiting carers to achieve the least-worst outcome. 
These examples from Fran and Luke affirm that relational 
reflexivity is not the preserve of carers or practitioners. It is a 
use of relational means to achieve an outcome, but it does 
not follow that this has negative intent or outcomes. For 
Fran, it was pragmatic and protective. For Luke, it was an 
opportunity to use his well-honed relational skills to gain a 
small victory over the system. Any intervention in which a 
practitioner directs a particular course of action may use this 
autonomous form of relational reflexivity in the presumed 
interests of the person, for practicality, or expedience. 
9.3.4.2 Relational reflexivity for mutual purpose 
Relational reflexivity with a mutual purpose can occur where 
both parties have an active capacity for reflexivity. The 
relationship meets all Donati's requirements for relationships 
that generate relational goods, discussed in part one, 
including requirement 3, the rule of reciprocity. Recalling 
Figure 27, reciprocity entails a sense of 'In it together' and a 
'total sharing' of relational goods. The concerns of both 
parties are connected, and both play their part in generating 
relational goods. Those involved may be in different roles, 
but the roles' nature and boundaries are agreed upon and 
understood. The relationship between Una and Harry in their 
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CareConnect arrangement is one of mutual purpose. Harry's 
reflexivity is 'fractured' as an individual. However, as we saw 
in his case study, his relationship with Una and the nature of 
her family–oriented, communicative reflexivity means that 
they have an established 'we-relationship' which provides 
stability for Harry and meets Una's central concern of caring. 
The relationship between Fiona and the young man's parents 
(described in the Total Sharing section) is also an example of 
a relationship with a mutual purpose. As described above, 
the nature of AllCare's PHB support function means that most 
care relationships will either be instrumental, involving an 
autonomous relational reflexivity, or one of mutual purpose.  
This does not exclude the possibility of relationships of 
scaffolding purpose (see below), or even 'free-giving' 
relationships, and the service is responsive to the needs of 
individuals, as Peta said, "you build the services to meet all 
the different needs that people have".  
9.3.4.3 Relational reflexivity with Altruistic purpose 
Donati (Archer and Donati, 2015:250) describes a type of 
relationship that he calls 'free giving', a relationship 'where 
there is no expectation of reciprocation'. It could be argued 
that the care relationships that involve fractured reflexivity 
are such relationships, as the practitioners and organisations, 
in recognising the lack of agency of the recipients certainly 
give their time and energy freely. The relationship is such that 
they cannot expect much in exchange. However, there is a 
difference. Luke described a relationship of 'free giving' when 
he shared his experience with Sue, the GP support 
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practitioner who helped him at his lowest point. Sue bought 
him food and a can opener, sorted out medications and 
mobility aids, supported him to access social housing, and 
referred him to WellCity. In this relationship, Sue was caring 
for Luke in a 'free-giving' relationship. As Donati says, 'where 
there is no expectation of (direct or indirect, immediate, or 
delayed) reciprocation, there you have a gift relationship.' 
(Archer and Donati, 2015:250).  
Luke's relationship with Maxine is different as there is the 
anticipation of Luke's active involvement in 'moving forward'. 
Maxine and Luke's relationship supports him to move 
forwards, in practical terms and in his other relationships. 
An expectation of reciprocity is built into the service model. 
In this model, the focus of the relationship is on the agency 
of the person who lacks it, creating the opportunity and 
expectation for Luke to draw on his own resources. As Luke 
said of Maxine: "she would far rather hear that I've got myself 
an interview for paid work than she's set it up and arranged 
it". 
GamePlay is a quite different organisation and model, yet in 
the same way, there are expectations of reciprocation from 
Carly in the care relationships between her, Zoe, and 
GamePlay. GamePlay's methodology and staff role models 
present this expectation, and there is no progress without 
Carly's commitment and action. This commitment is nurtured 
through the care relationship with Zoe, a relationship that 
generates the relational goods that support this process (see 
Figure 26). The service model, involving activity, 
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development opportunity, and relationships, responds to 
Carly's personhood-in-context, acknowledging her potential 
for agency and by giving her opportunities to express it, 
continuing to support her through missteps and failures by 
keeping her connected through the relationship. This 
'reciprocity' is not of a mutual kind. It relies on a high 
orientation to relational reflexivity in which the practitioner 
can engage with the person in a way that both prioritises 
their concerns and circumstances and influences the nature 
of their internal conversation. The 'weighting' of the 
relationship is different, weighted towards the service user's 
concerns and circumstances and supporting their reflexivity. 
The practitioner and service model stand ready to take the 
greater weight if needed. 
For WellCity, this expectation of reciprocity is the gateway to 
the service, even though Lorraine says that this only has to 
be a "glimmer of motivation". If people do not show a 
readiness to move forwards, then the work with the 
practitioner is paused until they feel ready, but the 
practitioner will keep in contact. This is a pragmatic decision 
on the part of the organisation. Helping people move forward 
is their purpose, and although, as Maxine described, they 
spend time getting to know people, there is a limit to support 
if that person wants company but is not ready to challenge 
themselves. GamePlay has an open approach that enables 
any local young person to attend sports activities, and these 
early contacts are 'free-giving' relationships (Archer and 
Donati, 2015:250). Relationships are built within that 
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context, and structured opportunities within their 
methodology are optional but encouraged through the 
evolving practitioner and peer relationships. These 
relationships introduce an expectation of commitment and 
reciprocation. The ethos of both organisations has informed 
their structures, engineered to enable relationships to evolve 
in a natural way. They do not impose timescales or specific 
expectations but rely on the power of generating relational 
goods that support the reflexive development (or 
rehabilitation) of their care recipients and, in doing so, may 
engender action. The ethos in both cases is a commitment to 
social justice and others' flourishing, a meta-reflexive 
orientation.  
Therefore, these case studies require an addition to Donati's 
criteria, which sits between 'free-giving' relationships and 
reciprocal ones, here described as relationships with an 
altruistic purpose. These require orientation to relational 
reflexivity at an agential level and at organisational level 
because the structure of the delivery models is key. Care 
relationships can move up and down these gears of relational 
support if those involved can discern the level needed and 
have the skills and the flexibility within their models of care 
to respond appropriately. In this research, this flexibility was 
observable because the organisations involved promoted 
relationships within a meta-reflexive culture. It is proposed 
that this would be more difficult in a more autonomous and 
instrumental service culture. 
357 
 
9.3.5 Comparative reflexive patterns on the ORRAC 
model 
Figure 33 below plots the service lead, practitioner and 
service user patterns of reflexivity identified in this study. As 
presented in the case study chapters, each of the senior 
leaders showed a meta-reflexive stance in their accounts, 
and the social interventions studied draw upon these meta-
reflexive patterns in their cultural make-up. This research has 
illustrated that reflexive patterns can change throughout the 
life course, particularly in case study 1. The confirmation in 
this research that people’s reflexivity is influenced by their 
context and relationships is relevant here because each of 
three practitioners (Maxine, Zoe, and Fiona) with meta-
reflexive patterning at the time of interview, had a reflexive 
history which suggested a more autonomous beginning. 
Their orientation to relational reflexivity had developed 
variously through lived experience, relationships, and 
cultural work contexts. This finding suggests that 
organisational culture can have an essential contributory role 
in the shaping and maintenance of reflexive patterns of care 
workers, albeit that life events and relationships outside of 








FIGURE 33:COMPARATIVE REFLEXIVE TENDENCIES OF PARTICIPANTS 
 
The understanding of culture and structure proposed by 
Archer's M/M model (see 3.7) is that existing cultural ideas 
and structural processes influence people's thoughts and 
actions and are reproduced or changed through the thoughts 
and subsequent actions of people. The idea is that reflexivity 
is at the centre of either the agential adoption and 
reinforcement of existing culture and structure or their 
challenge, rejection, or adaptation. In the example from 
Aisling Duffy (2018) in the methodology and methods 
chapter, we saw that the practitioner supporting her mum 
prioritised their relationship, in doing so subverting their 
organisation's rules. 
Common to all four case studies (to varying degrees) was a 
critique of the statutory systems that created obstacles for 
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the people receiving support or implementing and evaluating 
their own service model. Internally, these teams define, 
reproduce and protect their own cultural and structural 
system and critique wider system cultural conditions, where 
these fail to support their work. Lawson's (2017) concept of 
'eudaimonic bubbles' (section 2.12) appears to effectively 
characterise the operation of such organisations that rely on 
their internal cultures. As the metaphor of 'bubble' implies, 
these interventions are vulnerable to external atmospheric 
change, whether financial, policy-driven, relational, 
reputational, or competitive. A protective factor for the study 
organisations was local and national networking. This applied 
to all the organisations in different ways. CareConnect 
sourced practical and moral support from their national body 
and network; GamePlay is part of an international network 
that provides both credibility and links into resources and 
success stories to promote their model. Both WellCity and 
AllCare are networked with a national partnership, and 
similarly to GamePlay, gained support from strong local 
networks and relationships. These relationships, whether 
they are with local commissioners or partnerships with 
similar organisations, generate RG through shared purpose 
and mutual effort.   
The challenge identified in the policy chapter was that the 
system cultures and structures within which these 
organisations exist are essentially individualistic and 
instrumental, perpetuated by system-oriented (rather than 
person-oriented) commissioning, management, and 
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evaluation practices. These practices, employing the rational 
rather than relational lexicon (Unwin, 2018), sustain 
primarily autonomous reflexive patterns, and the conditions 
that they generate can therefore undermine the value that 
the care relationship can offer. The relative vulnerability of 
the case study sites has supported this proposition; however, 
the way that they deliver relational support within these 
conditions also provides a theoretical blueprint for 
relationship-oriented practice, one that emphasises a more 
significant role for relational reflexivity. In proposing a 
greater role for relational reflexivity, it is a combination of 
agential, cultural, and structural orientation to relational 
reflexivity that is needed.   
This research finds that examining people's reflexive 
orientation and how they operate in relationships in context 
sheds light on how social interventions can (and sometimes 
do) use relational mechanisms to support personal change. 
Reflexive patterns have been identifiable in each person 
individually, within the care relationship, and in the 
leadership culture and structures.  
The proposition is that there are conditions that enable 
relational reflexivity and that service design that takes 
account of these conditions may enable greater access to the 
resource offered by relational goods, emergent of care 
relationships. Also, the generation of relational goods is not 
confined to care relationships and can equally be generated 
within relationships of mutual (or altruistic) purpose in 
commissioning, leadership, or partnership contexts. The 
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examination of these relationships was beyond the scope of 
this research; however, they are promoted by change leaders 
in public services and researchers who champion approaches 
that can respond to system complexity, such as Human 
Learning Systems (Lowe and Plimmer, 2019).  
9.4 Summary 
In the policy and practice chapter (section 2.14), the 
challenge to the current UK personalisation policy was the 
proposition that ‘perspective’ or ways of ‘seeing’ people 
were not adequately theoretically supported. There was an 
assumption in the policy that this would be followed by 
‘different conversations and new relationships’, but the 
theoretical gap was proposed to be, at an ontological level, 
the lack of a comprehensive understanding of the nature of 
people, relationships, and contexts and the potential of 
critical realism to address this gap. This research has taken 
steps to ameliorate the lack of theoretical engagement by 
uniquely using Archer’s and Donati’s social theories to 
explore and explain how the nature of people/ personhood, 
the nature of relationships, and the contextual conditions 
within which people and relationships operate leads to a 
more nuanced understanding of the contribution care 
relationships make, and also offers new ways of thinking 
about and planning for care delivery. 
In particular, this research has proposed that Archer’s 
conception of the development of personhood (personal 
identity) is applicable and potentially valuable for person-
centred theory and practice.  Its incorporation is 
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foundational to the theory of reflexivity. Building on this 
foundation, this research has generated the Relational/ 
Reflexive Mechanism model to represent the combined 
theory of Archer and Donati, explaining how the we-relation 
may operate to generate relational goods, under certain 
conditions, and that these may trigger a change in the 
internal conversation, through the (introduced) Relational 
mechanism.  
Donati’s requirements for RgRG have been applied and in 
part supported. It has been proposed, besides, that care 
relationships can operate as RgRG under certain conditions. 
The extent to which relational reflexivity is employed was 
held to be key. Three levels of relational reflexivity have been 
proposed: Autonomous relational reflexivity, Mutual 
relational reflexivity, and Altruistic relational reflexivity. In 
the case studies presented, a care relationship involving 
Altruistic relational reflexivity enabled care relationships to 
generate relational goods where reflexivity was fractured.  
In the process of completing this research, innovation was 
required to support the theoretical work. The ORRAC model 
was developed, introduced as an analytical tool and as a 
means of visually representing and explaining the research 
findings. This tool has been used in different ways to: 
• Plot the reflexive patterns of participants in the case 
study chapters 




• Introduce and illustrate the ‘levels’ of relational 
reflexivity (Autonomous, Mutual, and Altruistic) and  
• Visually represent the comparative reflexive patterns 





















Chapter 10: Conclusion 
10.1 Introduction 
This research has operationalised Archer’s social theory to 
examine care relationships in a way that has not been 
previously attempted. In doing so, several contributions to 
knowledge have been made in applying and developing 
theory, elaborating the role of relationships in 
personalisation theory and understanding the conditions 
amenable to the generation of relationships that generate 
relational goods (RgRG) in organisational contexts.   
The introduction to this research and the overview of 
relevant research in policy and practice contexts identified a 
lack of emphasis on the nature of ‘being’ and personhood in 
care delivery. They highlighted that despite consistent 
interest in person-centred care and personalisation policy 
over the last 15 years, there had been a lack of theorisation 
of the ontological nature of people and relationships applied 
to practice. This is not entirely ignored; it is instead, perhaps 
less helpfully, taken for granted.  
Critical realism, with an emphasis on ontological depth and 
the interplay between the emergent properties of structure, 
culture, and agency, provided the opportunity and means for 
a fresh perspective on care relationships, allowing for an 
examination of this ontological trio in an empirically 
observable context. Archer’s social theory has been 
foundational, enabling its fruitful application to the empirical 
examination and comparison of social care relationships in 
context. This involved specifically: 
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• The application of the Morphogenetic Approach 
(Archer, 1995) to establish the boundaries of the case 
in the case study design 
• The development of the ORRAC model, as a means of 
analysis and theory development, drawing on 
Archer’s work on reflexivity, the internal 
conversation, and reflexive modes 
• Using and building on Archer’s interview structure 
(Archer, 2003) in the method, in the second of the 
four data collection sessions.   
• The application of Archer’s account of relational 
reflexivity and Donati’s work on relational subjects, 
leading to their combined use in explaining the 
potentially causal role of care relationships through 
the introduction of the Relational/Reflexive 
Mechanism (RRM) model. 
Critiques of Archer’s social theory have been acknowledged 
and responded to (section 3.6), and where limitations were 
found in application, these are discussed below. However, 
the focus of this conclusion is the elaboration of the 
affordances of Archer’s theory for the examination of the 
people, relationships, and conditions of possibility for care 
relationships in person-centred social interventions and 
beyond. Indeed, these affordances in themselves illustrate 
the potential applicability of Archer’s theory and in doing so 
defend it against critiques that undermine both its 
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theoretical integrity and its utility (Caetano, 2014, Akram and 
Hogan 2015, Farrugia and Woodman, 2015). 
Due to the dynamic nature of the interplay between 
structure, culture, agency and relationships, the research 
questions (section 1.3.1) are addressed throughout the 
following conclusions rather than dealt with consecutively. 
To recap, they queried the role of the personal and reflexive 
nature of individuals in care relationships, the nature of the 
relationship, how it may contribute causally to personal 
change, and whether and how contextual conditions 
influence the care relationship and those within it. Finally, 
whether personalisation theory and practice should attend 
more closely to the care relationship’s role and its contextual 
conditions.   
10.2 The gap in person-centred theory and practice 
There is a missing piece in personalisation planning in health 
and social care: an understanding of the potential 
contribution of the care relationship to personal change. 
Rightly, as highlighted above, there is a strong emphasis on 
the ‘perspective’ of the person receiving care and the need 
for a changed relationship between people and practitioners. 
This research offers a more robust theoretical basis for this 
policy position.  
This research has also exploited the resonance of Archer’s 
theory to the practical project of personalised or person-
centred care; a resonance that can hardly be overlooked. 
Being Human (2000) sets out a thorough account of how we 
become who we are, through our earliest experiences in the 
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world, and onwards throughout life. The intention underlying 
personalisation is surely to engage with the personhood of 
the care recipient. What is personalisation, if not a way of 
engaging in supporting people with this process of ‘being’ or 
‘becoming’ at any stage of life? There may be a medical and 
social context, but the goal must ultimately be support that 
leads to the achievement of a (self-described) satisfactory 
lifestyle.  
The Policy and Practice chapter highlighted that a persistent 
focus on ‘doing’ person-centred activity and process has 
overshadowed a crucial emphasis on the ‘being’ aspects of 
person-centred culture and relationships. This observation 
aligned with other critiques that highlighted the tensions 
between the system and life-worlds (O’Brien, 2014), the 
rational and relational lexicons (Unwin, 2018), the emphasis 
on the ‘instrumental’ rather than the ‘relational’ in care 
delivery and evaluation (Lowe, 2017b). This research has 
found that critical realism is an appropriate theoretical lens 
to draw out the structural, cultural, and agential mechanisms 
at play in care contexts that aspire to person-centred 
practice. 
To explain the process by which care relationships can 
support personal change, Archer and Donati’s combined 
theories, applied to the case studies, enabled the 
introduction of the Relational/Reflexive Mechanism (RRM) 
model, which proposes how relationships are iteratively 
formed (and can recede) over time, and the conditions that 
support or (in their absence) undermine the relationship’s 
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integrity. This model applies to naturally occurring 
relationships, yet under facilitative conditions can also apply 
to care relationships. In concluding this research, it is crucial 
to reiterate that care relationships are not (usually) the only 
relationships in people’s lives and that people will be 
connected in this way to multiple individuals and groups with 
whom they are forming RgRGs (or evils). In acknowledging 
that relationships play a variable yet significant part in 
developing a person’s sense of self and future, all 
relationships are considered relevant, albeit that the focus of 
this research is on care relationships.  
10.3 Personhood  
The focus on relationships in this study does not undermine 
the centrality of the person in person-centred care or 
personalisation; it strengthens it. Each person is considered a 
relational being. The findings of this research are consistent 
with the perspective of personalism (Smith, 2011:68); that is, 
‘Literally, to be a person is in part to communicate with other 
persons toward the exchange of self and mutual 
understanding’ (emphasis in original). Bhaskar (2020:119) 
takes this a step further, and in doing so proposes an 
underpinning motivation for an orientation to relational 
reflexivity and generalised human flourishing. His philosophy 
of metaReality furthers the ontological understanding of 
persons by proposing that who we are incorporates others in 
a capacity for ‘co-presence’. This proposes a reason for the 
human impulse to operate relationally, consisting in (in part) 
a ‘transcendentally real self’, or less formally ‘the notion of 
our ‘higher’ or ‘better’ self’.   
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Even the most independent person is not devoid of 
relationality. Our sense of self incorporates our ‘we-
relations’. These consist in our developmental and ongoing 
engagement with the world. As represented in the RRM 
model (see 9.2.1), our internal conversation, at the centre of 
our reflexive process, incorporates internal consultation of 
the ‘we-relation’ representing single or numerous relevant 
relationships.   
Archer theorises our process of socialisation from our earliest 
years of life. This research, concurring with Smith’s holistic 
view of human dignity that spans the life course and that is 
inclusive of ‘all living humans’ as persons (Smith, 2011:479), 
proposes that Archer’s theory enables the potential for 
exploration of the personhood of any person, at any life 
stage. This move is not overtly approved or disallowed by 
Archer, albeit that she uses the term ‘normal people’ with 
insufficient qualification (Archer, 2000:221). Her insistence 
on a ‘naturalistic account’ of socialisation (Archer, 2000: 106) 
gives primacy to our embodied and developmental relations 
with the natural, practical, and social world in developing a 
sense of self, rather than an unwarranted reliance on 
linguistic and discursive capacities. Similarly, her account of 
the development of personal identity through emotional 
commentary on our concerns, and the proposition that the 
inner conversation is in part non-verbal (2000:231) can 
accommodate persons with any pattern of development, 
inclusive of people with any cognitive, linguistic, or social 
developmental profile, for example, those with a learning 
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disability and autism. This proposition was tested in case 
study 4, where analysis examining Harry’s relations with the 
natural, practical, and social orders assisted in a partial 
familiarisation with his concerns. This exploratory analysis 
indicates potential for further research utilising Archer’s 
articulation of the embodied and practical orders as well as 
the social on the development of individual concerns and 
preferences. It also warrants the exploration by carers and 
practitioners of a broad range of individual concerns and 
preferences, not purely social ones. This proposition 
underpins the focus that person-centred practice places on 
what is important to and for people; the idea of ‘perspective’ 
and ‘seeing people’ embedded in the NHS personalisation 
plan (NHS England, 2019: online). 
10.4 Practitioners as people, in context 
The research decision to engage equally with the personhood 
of each party in the care relationship was innovative and has 
been fruitful. Practitioners bring themselves to work; they do 
not shrug off their personal-self and shrug on a work-self 
each day. This research has found that the personhood-in-
context of carers and practitioners, their concerns, reflexive 
tendencies, and work contexts are implicated in the way they 
deliver care. The data revealed, in each case, that the 
practitioner-as-person was embedded in their participation 
in care relationships. Features of interest were lived 
experience, role modelling, family care culture, and insight 
into potential in others; all of these reflected through the 
organisational contexts that housed their practice. These 
features are of interest because they are constitutive of the 
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relational reflexivity of the practitioners, their orientation to 
engaging with the situation, experiences, and potential of the 
individuals they support.  
In Fiona’s case, lived experience facilitates the establishment 
of care relationships, enabling her to quickly tune in to the 
reflexivity-in-context of the families she supports. AllCare is 
an organisation that values lived experience and deliberately 
engages service user expertise in practical and governance 
roles. 
Role-modelling is integral to GamePlay’s service model, with 
fifty per cent of paid sports coaches having participated in the 
programme. Zoe’s expressed personal values of equality and 
mutual respect underpin her relational work and contribute 
to and draw from GamePlay’s culture. 
Agential potential is core to WellCity’s ideology. They do not 
engage actively with a care recipient until they have 
identified motivation for ‘moving forwards’, however slight. 
Maxine’s independent outlook and autonomous reflexive 
traits resonate with this principle, but her natural tendency 
towards making things happen is tempered by WellCity’s 
focus on the relationship enabling agency in the service user. 
CareConnect builds its model around a family care culture. 
Unlike any of the other case studies, Una’s home context is 
also her practice context, and CareConnect intends that 
carers are ‘themselves’ in their care relationships, in their 
natural contexts. Organisational orientation towards 
relational reflexivity is pivotal as the matching process is 
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largely intuitive and involves perceiving the personhoods of 
both the carer and the person requiring support. 
This embedding of personal-selves in facilitative work 
contexts enables practitioners to be congruent, influence the 
way the service is delivered, and learn from their 
organisations' cultural values, creating conditions where 
people and relationships can be prioritised. It is emphasised 
that in different cultural and structural contexts, the same 
practitioners may operate differently, as reflexive tendencies 
have been seen to be influenced by ideology, rules, and roles, 
albeit towards increased relational reflexivity for the sites in 
this research. Further research could examine the effects of 
different cultural and structural contexts on orientation to 
and expression of practitioner relational reflexivity in 
practice. 
10.5 Structures, roles and boundaries 
It was found that cultures and structures that are amenable 
to RgRGs risk a lack of clarity in role boundaries and as 
proposed in the last chapter, need more rather than less 
attention to relational boundaries. This means that 
protections that typically come from structural rules and 
roles must be managed differently due to the responsive 
nature of the relationships. The acknowledgement of the 
care relationship as a causal component rather than a by-
product of care has implications for policy and 
practice. These are implications for:  
• Organisational policy and leadership: Care organisations 
often espouse person-centred values, and these research 
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findings suggest that an emphasis on the relationship is 
needed in the articulation, establishment, practice, and 
review of practitioner roles, to incorporate what these 
values mean for care relationships explicitly, and 
therefore draw on their causal potential. This may 
present further implications for strategic planning and 
service design, where it is evident that existing structures 
undermine the relational contribution or fail to nurture it. 
• Frontline practice, in the way that roles are inhabited and 
enacted. For example, many professional team structures 
incorporate reflective practice. This activity is supported 
by the findings of this research, where reflective practice 
directly addresses how the practitioner-service user 
relationship is working. 
• Implications for organisations and frontline practitioners 
have onward implications for regulators, to ensure that 
quality standards incorporate guidelines on the value of 
care relationships, the circumstances (unique to each 
service model and intervention) in which these add value 
to the intervention, and the conditions required to 
support them. The CQC Key Lines of Enquiry 21  (Care 
Quality Commission, 2018:21) include two prompts for 
inspectors that specifically identify service and wider 
community relationships, standards that this research 
could strengthen through its theoretical elaboration of 
care relationships. In policy, much of the language of the 
 
21   These standards (R2.6 and R2.7) have been aligned with the CQC standards for 
Adult Social Care. 
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NHS personalisation plan (NHS England, 2019b:18), for 
example, includes descriptors of what personalised care 
should look and feel like. The statements are ideals, but 
this research explains how and why relationships 
contribute to effective personalised care. Relationships 
are mentioned, but the role of the practitioner-as-person 
is underplayed, in effect, de-personalised. Equally, the 
conditions of possibility for effective application of the 
guidelines are not detailed.  
10.6 The ORRAC model and patterns of reflexivity 
The ORRAC model was conceived as a heuristic based on 
existing theory to support data analysis, applying learning 
from Archer’s empirical work on the varying reflexive 
tendencies of individuals. Its utility grew throughout the 
research, ultimately applied in three ways: 
i. It was applied to participant’s biography and analysis, 
where possible, of their reflexive patterns over time. 
Archer (2003) used ideal types to draw out typical 
features of reflexive modes, but in this research, lifelong 
ideal types were not identified, except for Una, who 
presented with a consistent communicative reflexive 
mode. The ORRAC model enabled the mapping of shifts 
in agential and relational features of reflexivity during the 
life course, as shown for Maxine and Luke in case study 1, 
providing evidence that reflexive patterns vary in people 
and can be influenced by changing contexts.  
ii. In the discussion chapter, the ORRAC model was used to 
show that comparative reflexive patterns are of interest 
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in care relationships because the reflexive patterns 
of each person are implicated in the operation of the care 
relationship and its contribution to change. It was 
proposed that a high orientation to relational reflexivity 
is facilitative of care relationships that generate relational 
goods where the person being supported lacks the 
capacity for independent reflexivity or where there is a 
genuine shared purpose. This finding emphasises the 
importance of practitioners-as-people, and as such, has 
workforce implications, especially for interventions 
working with people with limited reflexive capacity. 
iii. Data analysis suggested that relational reflexivity could 
be autonomous, mutual, or an altruistic type and these 
were presented on the ORRAC model. Patterns of high 
orientation to relational reflexivity were noted in the 
organisational leads (and contexts) whose values 
prioritised equality, mutuality and the flourishing of 
others and acknowledged a place for agency in addition 
to supportive relationships. It was also found (linked to 
(i)) that Maxine’s reflexive tendencies were influenced by 
the culture of the organisation, leading to (in a work 
context at least) applied relational reflexivity. 
Theoretically, this analysis supports Archer’s claims for 
reflexivity and the way that personal biography and 
circumstances can shape the reflexive tendencies of people, 
offering empirical support for the practical applicability of her 




The ORRAC model has practical potential as a conceptual and 
teaching tool, as it is both anchored in theory and can visually 
represent empirical findings, helping to bridge theory and 
practice. As a conceptual tool, the model could support 
learning about and reflection on individual, team, and 
organisational patterns of reflexivity, including the relevance 
of the levels of relational reflexivity (autonomous, mutual 
and altruistic) for different service models and client groups, 
and the conditions that support relational mechanisms 
where (and with whom) they are considered effective. 
Although the ORRAC model may lend itself to practical use, 
there are reasons not to develop its practical potential in 
intervention contexts, apart from as a conceptual teaching 
tool. For example, there may be a temptation to develop a 
measurement tool for practitioner relational reflexivity to 
support recruitment or assess a commissioned service’s 
‘relational potential’. However, these types of tools, bluntly 
applied, would risk undermining the nuanced relations 
between culture, structure and agency, valorising one aspect 
to the detriment of the interplay between them. As has been 
observed, RgRGs are afforded by the interplay between 
culture, structure and agency and not by individual or even 
group reflexive tendencies alone. For example, it was noted 
that Maxine, whose pattern of reflexivity at the outset was 
primarily autonomous, adapted her reflexive approach in 
response to work relationships and the organisational 
culture. A recent conversation with Lorraine revealed that 
Maxine is now, two years later, a leader within the 
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organisational model.  Existing (qualitative) methods of 
values-based recruitment (e.g.Wellbeing Teams no date.) 
should be adequate to ensure that those with a capacity for 
relational reflexivity are recruited into care teams.   
Lastly. the ORRAC model was developed for the purpose of 
analysing care relationships in social interventions and its use 
in this research, is limited to this purpose. However, as a 
heuristic device that enables analysis of people’s reflexivity 
over time, it has potential for further application, beyond 
social care to other contexts where the nature of people and 
the nature and effects of relationships are of interest, such as 
education, organisational studies, community studies to 
name a few. 
10.7 Care relationships that generate relational 
goods 
This research has engaged with the work of Donati and the 
requirements that he set out for relationships that generate 
Relational Goods (RgRGs). These requirements relate to 
naturally occurring social relationships, such as those formed 
in families, community settings or with colleagues. Although 
Donati accepts that relational goods can be formed in the 
context of third sector activity in civil society, he does not 
detail how these requirements apply practically to care 
relationships in the sector. He does acknowledge that his 
requirements are based on 'what we know today' (Archer 
and Donati, 2015: 211), and in doing so, implies an invitation 
for elaboration.  
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This research has elaborated on the requirements, further 
specifying them based on learning from the case study care 
relationships. These are discussed in the previous chapter, 
but in particular, it was proposed that: 
• Relational goods can be generated and shared in care 
relationships where there is a commitment to a shared 
purpose, albeit through different roles in the relationship 
• RgRGs build over time and can grow and fade naturally. 
They cannot be engineered, but given space and the right 
conditions, they may form. 
• Where one party has limited or variable capacity for 
reflexivity, reciprocity in care relationships is possible 
where the structural, agential, and cultural conditions 
enable relational reflexivity.  
• If the value of relationships is foregrounded and 
protected in commissioning and planning, instrumental 
rules and processes can support rather than undermine 
the relationship. Donati (Archer and Donati, 2015:256) 
explains that threats for the third sector are a symptom 
of their constitution. They are built on their ethos, and 
their vulnerability stems from 'intrinsic characteristics 
[that] make the management of relationships with the 
external environment difficult'. As reported by the 
service leads of the study organisations, threats to their 
service models are applied externally through 
commissioning practice or other system pressures. The 
implication is that to draw benefits from such care 
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relationships, those designing, or commissioning service 
models should attend to the conditions that nurture the 
resource offered by the relationship. Lowe and Plimmer 
(2019:5) suggest that in a Human Learning Systems 
approach, this means commissioners and funders 
'creating trust with and between the organisations they 
fund'. 
Care relationships that generate relational goods cannot be 
mandated and are engaged in mindfully and responsively. For 
different people, the extent to which the care relationship 
has effects is variable22. An evaluation of the potential causal 
efficacy of the relationship is best made within it by those 
involved once the relationship has begun to form. The 
Relational/Reflexive Mechanism model, inclusive of Donati's 
requirements, provides a theoretical framework that could 
be developed for this purpose. This finding supports service 
models that have built-in flexibility in their provision of 
responsive support to people and families, where there is an 
emphasis on building and maintaining effective relationships. 
10.8 Practical applications 
The findings of this research offer value by 
explaining how relationships can (conditionally) support 
personal change, and the findings have recently been applied 
through the development of new service guidelines for one 
of the participating organisations. At the time of writing, 
 
22For some service users, a RgRG is not needed (at that time), or they may not be 
ready to engage in that way. For some, it is a temporary state (to achieve a short-
term goal), for others it may be a necessity; a connection amongst others that 
sustains them whilst they are (re)gaining traction in their lives. 
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since elaborating these research findings, joint guidance has 
been produced by the author and WellCity to support the 
induction and practice of their staff group. The developed 
theory has been translated to practical advice and clarifies 
the emphasis that WellCity places on relationships and the 
conditions that support them. Of particular use to the 
organisation has been the concept of the interplay between 
structure, culture, and agency. Lorraine, the organisational 
lead wrote in an email: “I loved what you wrote about the 
interplay with organisation/ values/ people in the training 
manual as it articulated something I couldn’t put my finger 
on” 23 . This critical realist concept emphasises the co-
existence of these interacting emergent phenomena, and in 
doing so, helps to make ongoing sense of the relations 
between them in real-life contexts. In addition, Donati’s 
requirements, with the adaptations from this research, have 
been included in this guidance to clarify the characteristics of 
relationships that can generate causal effects. Despite their 
practical applicability, these criteria are not intended to be 
used lightly as a service checklist. As previously described, 
their existence and effects rely on supportive cultural and 
structural foundations within the wider system context, 
designed to promote, nurture, and safeguard relational 
approaches. The development of service guidelines 
demonstrates the applicability of the developed theory, 
bridging the divide between academia and practice and 
providing theoretical coherence to WellCity’s service model. 
 
23 Personal correspondence, 26/4/21 
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The practical implications of these findings may present a 
conundrum for those designing care in considering how to 
implement or apply them and will be a particular challenge 
to existing service models that do not adequately attend to 
conditions that nurture care relationships.  
The study organisations have service models consistent with 
Lawson’s (2017:242) metaphor of ‘eudaimonic bubbles’: 
‘wider community-specific flourishing-facilitating 
contingently protected sub-communities.’ We have seen that 
the contingent protections, in these organisations, are 
maintained through a combination of: 
• A tacit understanding of the causal implications of the 
care relationship; implications that this research has 
more fully explained 
• An uncompromising prioritisation of: 
o The personhood of the service user and their 
interests 
o The care relationship in the service model 
• Values that both draw on and promote the relational 
reflexivity of team members 
• Allegiance to, and promotion of established and 
defensible principles such as the social model of 
disability, opportunities for socially disadvantaged 
youth, or the value of family and community culture 
in supporting disabled people 
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• Nationally networked support (eg CareConnect/ 
Think Local Act Personal) 
• Long-term, hard-earned fruitful relationships with 
local commissioners and partners 
These conditions are sustainable within the ‘bubble’ of the 
interventions, albeit perennially vulnerable to system 
changes and challenges beyond their control.  
Each of the service leads and to some extent the practitioners 
and care recipients highlighted bureaucratic barriers to 
maintaining a care model that promotes relational goods, 
often because the service culture was inconsistent with that 
of the wider system. This was evident where relationships 
with commissioners did not sustain core service values. 
Lorraine (WellCity) described adapting her approach in a bid 
to provide social prescribing (p185) needing to ‘use their 
language…to gain their [ie the funders] trust’. This new 
relationship was arguably compromised from the outset, 
with somewhat mismatched value-sets between the 
contracting organisations. Similarly, sudden growth resulting 
from new funding can threaten the ‘bubble’ through the 
introduction of new structures, personnel and therefore new 
internal cultural conditions. Recent discussion with Lorraine 
and Maxine has highlighted this as an effect of recruiting new 
staff to deliver social prescribing, in a model that has 
practitioners working between WellCity and GP practices, 
with destabilising cultural and structural effects. Ian 
(GamePlay) foresaw this challenge in a funding opportunity 
that would require them to partner with another 
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organisation (p252), perceiving that the value inherent in 
GamePlay’s model would be compromised by this required 
change. These examples highlight the vulnerability of 
services that are founded on values-oriented practice, and 
where wider system structures run the risk of undermining 
the very value of the services they seek to commission. A 
contribution of this research is to highlight the benefits of 
examining the interplay between structure, culture and 
agency, both within organisation’s ‘bubble’ and in their 
external relationships.  
Finally, many service models whose intended outcomes may 
benefit from drawing on the value that care relationships can 
offer, do not operate in this way. What, then can we learn 
from these relationship-oriented service models and 
furthermore, can this learning be applied beyond the third 
sector? 
10.9 What can we learn? 
To answer this question, it is worth recollecting points posed 
in the Policy and Practice chapter. Firstly that ‘creating value 
sits with the service user as value-in-use, in the context of 
interaction with the service users’ broader life experience 
and drawing attention to their personhood’ (see 2.8). This 
assertion is supported theoretically by the 
Relational/Reflexive Mechanism model, which shows how 
the relationship and creation of relational goods can be 
implicated in personal change. Nurturing an individual’s 
reflexive capacity through a care relationship will have 
unpredictable effects, that may have both practical benefit 
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and significant long-term import for individuals and those 
close to them, but that may be indiscernible or unremarkable 
to a person who is unaware of the context. Capturing such 
outcomes is challenging but this cannot reduce their value for 
those either receiving or delivering care, raising the familiar 
question: how can these less tangible outcomes be 
accommodated? 
The second point emphasises the role of values in service 
design and in evaluating outcomes, also considered in the 
policy and practice chapter (see 2.11). The values of, or, in 
other words, what matters to people who lead, deliver and 
access services has been shown to be central to how the case 
study service models are designed, delivered, and 
experienced. A.Fox (2019: 165), proposes outcome 
measurement based on: ‘a clear, shared idea of what 
wellbeing looks like and clear individual and joint roles in 
pursuing it’. Sayer’s (2011:61) argument provides support for 
this position, suggesting that reason and values have been 
artificially separated. He proposes, to re-balance 
instrumentally rational approaches, the application of 
practical reason that takes account of tacit, experience-based 
knowledge that attends to detail and ‘embrace[s] ethical 
judgement’. In doing so Sayer re-positions values as integral 
to reasoning and rationality. This focus on human values and 
flourishing is consistent with Porpora’s (2017:58) claim that 
‘our human vocation is to achieve certain relational goods’, 
towards generalised flourishing. Certainly, in the study 
organisations, yet arguably in most care delivery contexts, 
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the aim is to achieve human flourishing. This research, 
reflecting on the interplay observed between the emergent 
properties of structure, culture, and agency in the study sites, 
proposes that greater attention to the values that underpin 
system and service cultures has the potential to shape 
structures (through the ideas and actions of agents) that 
enable and do not constrain person-centred approaches.  
Thirdly, and resulting from the above, different approaches 
to commissioning and performance management need to be 
considered, approaches that involve collective reasoning of 
informed stakeholders, rather than an arms-length 
assessment of representative variables. If the goal is 
flourishing at the locus of the service user, then those funding 
and holding organisations to account must engage with this 
purpose and understand the workings of the service model 
designed to achieve it. Ian from GamePlay made this point 
when talking about a shift in attitude from funders in the 
context of ‘County Lines’ (see 7.2.8). He noted that some 
commissioners now want to ‘contribute’ to solving this 
complex issue rather than simply monitoring an agreed set of 
outcomes. This move means employing an understanding of 
complexity in the way that accountability and performance 
are managed. Lowe (2017b), describing new structural 
interdependencies between state and civil organisations, 
challenges governance practice that relies on instrumental 
and outcomes-based approaches to accountability. He 
argues that it is nonsensical to hold organisations 
386 
 
accountable for outcomes that they cannot be responsible 
for due to complexity.  
The above points have significant implications for wider 
health and care policy. Although not naive propositions, they 
are recognised as challenging in the current system. The lack 
of engagement with the value of relationships has led to 
conditions that can limit their effects in health and care 
contexts, rather than nurture them. This research shows that 
care relationships, particularly those that involved a highly 
personalised dimension cannot be treated as exogenous and 
are instead integral to the way many services work with 
people to achieve outcomes. 
For policy and practice, this research recommends creating 
the conditions of possibility for such causal care 
relationships, where it is likely that investment in them offers 
the potential for improved outcomes for (some) people. This 
negates the option of ‘one size fits all’ service models, and 
instead, would involve ongoing internal evaluation of the 
extent to which care relationships add value within the 
intervention, for different people in different client groups. 
The potential value of the care relationship has been 
illustrated through the case study examples, and the 
discussion has proposed some theoretical tools that could be 
further developed to support services to better understand 
the nature and contribution of care relationships in their 
contexts. For example, the ORRAC model and the 
differentiation between autonomous, mutual and altruistic 
relational reflexivity could offer frameworks for considering 
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the reflexive tendencies of a team, and the extent to which 
care relationships are acknowledged and accommodated 
within service models. This approach would require policy 
makers, commissioners, and organisations to ask the 
question: Are we missing out on achieving outcomes with this 
person, family, or client group by: 
• not commissioning or engaging in relationship-
oriented practice and/or by 
• failing to attend to the interacting structural, agential, 
and cultural conditions within which care 
relationships can add value?  
 
10.10 Beyond the voluntary and social care sectors 
This research has focused on voluntary and social care sector 
services and is therefore cautious in its recommendations for 
interventions beyond these sectors. However, throughout 
this research, and with reference to many years of delivering 
and managing care in health and education contexts, the 
viability of care relationships that generate relational goods 
in the statutory sector has been an additional preoccupation. 
The potential for these types of care relationships is ever-
present in any context, not least because people who are 
personally drawn to caring are often employed to care. 
Equally, forming relationships that generate relational goods 
is a naturally occurring phenomenon in our family and 
community lives. In the light of this, are there principles that, 
if well-governed, could be held to protect and nurture 
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conditions for (potentially) causal care relationships in any 
context? 
Although familiar to us in natural contexts, the case studies 
have shown that working towards RgRGs in care practice 
cannot be undertaken casually. It is practised mindfully, 
underpinned by a way of thinking, being and relating. The 
concept of developing a relationship of ‘shared purpose’ and 
‘in it together’ encapsulates what this type of relationship 
means. In these interventions, it is recognised that 
the relationship does the work. Ensuring that conditions 
support relationships is crucial, and it is the mindful review of 
the structural, agential, and cultural interplay that enables 
their guardianship. Under the right conditions, this could 
happen in statutory organisational teams with a robust 
patient-centred ethos and arms-length yet on-board 
supportive leadership and commissioning arrangements. 
However, due to the targeted nature of some statutory 
services, the circumstances and reflexive capacity of people 
accessing support may never become known to the 
practitioner. As a result, any opportunity to support the 
person or family utilising relational mechanisms can be 
overlooked. The author’s clinical field of Speech and 
Language Therapy (SLT) provides an example 24 . SLTs 
routinely support parents of children with delayed language 
development in clinic settings. Service models vary, but the 
typical service model is an assessment, advice and perhaps 
 
24 This example should not be taken to characterise all SLT practice – which varies 
greatly depending on client group and context 
389 
 
some clinic-based individual or group sessions to 
demonstrate good practice. For language development, it is 
the child’s everyday environment that offers opportunities to 
learn words, build concept knowledge, and communicate. 
The therapist relies on the parent to apply certain practices 
at home, which may require the parent to make changes in 
the way they think about their role in supporting language 
(Davies, 2014). For many parents, this model is adequate, and 
an RgRG is not warranted. Others are less well able to 
implement the advice, and the opportunity to effect change 
is missed. This is a situation where the care relationship could 
contribute, yet it may not be a central focus for the 
practitioner. SLTs are invariably approachable and 
professional, but clinic-based service models are not oriented 
around forming relationships that generate relational goods, 
even though, for some parents, a relational approach could 
make the difference. There is no intention of singling out SLT 
here, as the principle applies to any professional practice 
operating in similar conditions; it is just to highlight that the 
potential causal contribution of the care relationship can 
be overlooked, a state emergent of the long-term contextual 
conditions (professional and organisational) within which 
service models have developed.  
10.11 Summary 
The lack of clarity of the role of relationships within concepts 
of personalisation and person-centred care prompted the 
questions in this research. The charge was laid that the 
contribution of relationships in care practice is taken for 
granted. An imbalance of emphasis was noted between the 
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activities of (‘doing’) person-centred care and ‘being’ person-
centred, in a way that underplayed the value that care 
relationships offer. The research questions regarding the 
nature of people, relationships and context have been 
explored, and new insights have emerged through the 
application of critical realist social theory. To the question: 
‘Should personalisation theory and practice attend more 
closely to the role of the relationship?’, the answer is yes, 
absolutely.  
The care relationship is implicit in personalisation and 
person-centred care because another person invariably 
delivers care. This research has sought to make the nature of 
care relationships explicit and has presented a new way of 
thinking about the causal contribution that relationships can 
make to care, opening up opportunities for a more nuanced 
analysis of care relationships and the contexts in which they 
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Appendix 5: Research schedule: Session 3 
General Introduction 
In our first session together, we talked about a fictional 
character called Jack – the dilemma he had about a possible 
move, and how he thought through his options, the pros and 
cons – in relation to the things which were most important to 
him; his family, his social life and his job.  The reason for doing 
that in detail was to draw attention to the way that we use 
our internal conversation (an important part of this research).  
That we think things over, mostly internally (but sometimes 
out loud to others) to weigh up our options – in the light of 
both our life circumstances and in the light of what is most 
important to us. Our decisions and actions are a result of this 
internal deliberation. We act in response to, and as a result 
of our deliberations.  Jack will make his decision to having 
balanced all of those types of thoughts that you and X 
suggested.  We also talked about how other people might 
influence Jack’s thinking may be influenced by others – by 
what (he thinks) they might think or say to him. 
Today we are going to be talking about whether and how you 
use your internal conversation in thinking about your life – 
you can use examples from the past or things that are 
happening now. In the second part of the interview, we will 
talk about what is most important to you.  We are all 
different and there are no right answers. 
During this interview – it is important that you share info and 
examples that you feel comfortable sharing with me.  
Discussion about thinking or parts of your life or history may 
prompt thoughts/ examples which you may not feel 
comfortable sharing, and it is fine to say to me that you don’t 
want to talk about certain aspects of your life. 
Interview part 1  
Q1 When we first met – you reported that you recognised the 
experience of having an internal conversation – thinking 
things over in your mind – is that right?   
Q2 Firstly tell me a bit about what that is like for you – how 
do you experience it? How often/much? 
Q3 You may recall that in the Jack exercise I added in 
different types of ways we use our internal conversation.  We 
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are going to go through these to discuss whether you use 
them and if you do, how note that not everybody uses every 
type and some are used more than others…you can take your 
time to think about your ideas/answers 
Planning (the day – the week or much longer ahead) 
Rehearsing (practicing what you will say or do) Mulling over 
(dwelling on a problem, a situation or relationship) Deciding 
(debating what to do, what is for the best) re-living (some 
event, period or relationship) prioritising (working out what 
matters most, next, or to you at all to you), Imagining (the 
future, including what would happen if..), Clarifying – sorting 
out what you think about some issue, person or problem), 
Imaginary conversations (held with people known to you or 
whom you know of), Budgeting (estimating whether or not 
you can afford to do something in terms of money, time, 
effort) 
Q4 Are there any other ways you use your internal 
conversation in addition to these? 
 
Interview part 2 
During our first session you completed a questionnaire and 
at the end of it, you were asked to think about your main 
concerns – the areas of your life which matter most to you at 
the moment.  We are going to talk about these now – first of 
all whether you have thought about these and whether there 
are any you would like to change or others you would add. 
(Share ICONI list) 
Plus prompts/supplementary questions re: 
☑ Whether or not these had long been the interviewees 
concerns? 
☑ Whether or not the (open-ended) listings of concerns 
dovetailed smoothly 
☑ Whether or not interviewees spent time in thinking out 
exactly what they should do in the light of these concerns 
☑ Whether or not they saw or had seen anything in their 
backgrounds which was helpful or obstructive relating to 
realising these concerns** 
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☑ Whether and how/ how much the thoughts or 
perspectives of others are included in or influence 
deliberations about concerns 
 
Interview part 3 
Moving on to the future, what kinds of things do you think 
about when contemplating the future?  How do you 
deliberate about your future?  
Bearing in mind those things that are most important to you, 
what types of activities or actions to you do to ensure that 
you can continue to prioritise them? 
(note how plans relate to aspirations, sacrifices or regrets, 
















Appendix 6: Research Schedule: Session 4 
Introduction 
Today is the last session that you will be participating in as 
part of this research.  In previous sessions we have been 
talking about the way you think things over – and in particular 
those things which are most important to you.  Today we are 
going to be talking about care relationships and how these 
work. 
During this interview – it is important that you share info and 
examples that you feel comfortable sharing with me.  
Discussion about support relationships may prompt 
thoughts/ examples which you may not feel comfortable 
sharing, and it is fine to say to me that you don’t want to talk 
about certain aspects of these relationships. 
Interview part 1 – care/support relationships in general 
In the second part of the interview, I will go onto asking you 
about the relation between yourself and XXX – but for this 
first part I want to start by asking you about support 
relationships more generally.  This can include relationships 
you can remember from the past or current ones – whichever 
fits best with the question. 
1. (Aside from current relationship) Think of a care/support 
relationship which has been positive and tell me about it 
(prompts): a) the person themselves b) how the relationship 
formed and developed c) what was good about the 
relationship – what did you /they get from it? D) how was it 
similar to/different from other relationships? E) did someone 
take the lead – you /them – or would you say it was an equal 
relationship? 
2. When a relationship works well in this way – what types of 
words would you use to describe it? (How would you 
describe it to friends/ colleagues?   (May want to ask what 
makes it different from a friendship – or a care ‘interaction’) 
3. Think of a support relationship where the relationship has 
not been so easy (no names) and tell me about it (prompts): 
a) the person – what did you know of them, b) how the 
relation formed and developed (the service) c) what was 
difficult about the relationship d) similarities and differences 
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to other relationships. E) did someone take the lead – you 
/them – or would you say it was an equal relationship? 
4. Do you find as a P/SU that you are completely yourself – or 
do you adjust who you are in any way? To what extent do 
you get to know each other on personal level? 
5. View from the other side:  Have you been in a role where you 
have provided care to others over a period of time (SU)/ 
received care from others (practitioner) – are there 
particular people /carers who you think back to and 
remember? Can you tell me about that relationship? Can you 
think of any words which describe the nature of that 
relationship) 
How did it feel different – to be on the other side of the fence? 
What worked/didn’t work? 
Interview part 2: Care/support relationships – specific 
6. Tell me about XXX (what do you know about him/her as a 
person– what were your initial thoughts on meeting 
him/her? Have your thoughts/impressions changed (what’s 
different? What do you value/find challenging about this 
person?  Is there anything which you ‘share’ with them in the 
way that you think about things – anything that you think is 
important to both of you?  Are there things that you have 
different views about? 
7. How did you first meet? In the early stages – what did you 
expect of this relation? Can you remember how you felt? 
(Confident/apprehensive/reassured?) 
8. How would you describe the relationship between you and 
X? What words best fit? 
9. What – if anything – is different for you personally because 
of this relationship – in the context of what the service 
offers? Positive or negative. 
10. Do you think the way you think about things influences the 
way XXX thinks/ do you think the way XXX thinks influences 
what you think in this relation? If yes – in which way? 
11. What individual characteristics of a support person/ service 
user would get in the way of things moving forward for 
you/them (achieving desired change)? 
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Interview part 3 – organisation: structure/culture 
12. What do you know about AllCare – how did you first hear 
about them – tell me about your first experience or contact 
with them 
13. From what you know of the AllCare/ leadership – what 
ideas/ideals are important to them – what are their 
priorities? 
14. What are the main processes and rules which come to mind 
when you think about AllCare? 
15. What is it about AllCare (and the way the organisation is 
part of the system) which supports the care/support 
relationship you have?  What can get in the way of the care 
relation? (for practitioners -any boundaries established by 
the organisation – formally or informally) 
Is there anything else that I haven’t covered in the interview 
that you have thought of? 
Introducing the research: 
Practitioners and Service Users: can you remember how the 
idea of participating in this research was introduced to you? 
Practitioners – why did you select X participant – and how did 













Appendix 7: Research schedule Session 5  
General Introduction 
As you are aware, this research is looking into the role of the 
relationship between practitioner and service 
user/customer, specifically the nature of the relation and 
how it may contribute to care and outcomes – and the factors 
which enable and constrain the relation.  I have completed 
all the data collection with the case study ‘pair’ from your 
organisation – and today, to add to that I am interviewing you 
as an organisational lead to understand the how the context 
for the care relationship operates.  
1. Firstly, I wanted to ask you about your view about the role of 
the relationship in delivering care – specifically the 
practitioner-service user relationship?   
What does the relation add? What are the effects of the 
relation for the service user, the practitioner, the 
organisation? Examples? 
2. Can you share an example of where a care relationship within 
the service went well/ not well?  What was striking about this 
example? 
3. From an organisational point of view, what are the things 
that in your experience enable productive relationships 
between practitioners and service users? What do you 
proactively do?  
4. Same question but from a wider system point of view 
5. From an organisational point of view, what are the things, in 
your experience which prevent or undermine productive 
relationships between practitioners and service users? (Do 
you/how do you manage these?) 
6. Same question but from a wider system point of view (if not 
covered ask about the effect of contractual changes) 
7. Tell me about the people who are working in the service – 
what is it about them – what do you think are the important 
factors (skills/ personality traits/ their outlook on life as 
individuals) which works or perhaps doesn’t work in 
providing relation-based interventions? 
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8. Tell me about the range of service users/customers who 
typically access this part of the service (want to understand 
the extent of variety – levels of independence/agency) 
9. When allocating a new case to a practitioner, what types of 
things do you consider/ are considered?  Do you ever find 
that your initial allocation is not a good fit? Can you think of 
an example of when this has happened? 
10. Could you describe the difference between the type of 
relationship typical in your service, and that of a clinician-
patient relationship? 
11. Similarly, could you describe the difference between the type 
of relationship typical in your service and that of a friendship? 
(what are the advantages/challenges) 
12. If not covered in previous answers – In your view, does the 
care relation contribute to the outcome – to what extent 
would you attribute the effect of the intervention to the 
relation? Examples? 
Do you have anything further that you would like to add – 
























Inner Dialogue Me 
Interpreted 
Inner dialogue You 
Interpreted 
Inner Dialogue We 
Tying his school tie/  keeping within 





found it difficult to 
physically tie the tie - 
reliant on mum to help  
Dovetailing 
challenging as 
things that matter 
to Harry are in 
conflict 
I am not good at tying the 
tie   
 
Rules are very important 
to me  
 
Preference for being 
young  (I didn’t have to 
wear a tie in primary 
school) 
you will get into trouble - might 
get a detention  
 
Only have two choices - not 
wear tie/ risk punishment OR 
let mum do it 
no evidence of a 'we' 
relation with mum in this 
context 
Buying childish toys Being more adult/ 
being seen to be 
more adult 
 
Family - Not 















Likes 'childish' toys 
and buys them 
sometimes 
family and the way 
he is seen by 
others  
 
Rules and doing 
the right thing 
I am childish - I like 
childish things but I need 
to be more adult 
 
I know that playing is a 
'flaw' in adults 
 
It's important to me what 
people think about me 
I might be a bad influence on 
my nephew 
 
People will mock me if I take 
toys out in public 
 
Una will be cross with me if I 
buy childish toys 
Maintaining relationship 
with Una is important - 
not making her cross 




social - may 
also be physical 
in sensory 
terms - kicking 
ball 
doesn’t want to make 
the mistake of  
bringing a wet football 
into the house 
Keeping Una happy 
prioritised over 
playing out with ball 
in wet weather 
I like kicking the ball 
around 
I need to play football when it 
is dry/ not raining or muddy 
(observation -This may 
be to do with maintaining 
relationship with Una as 




Appendix 9: Ultimate concerns in context: Fiona, 
AllCare Practitioner 
 
 
